the unknown object

[Guest guest]

Namaste to all.

Actually, there is no contradiction between what Michaelji writes and what

Subbuji writes.

As stated in the book quoted by Michaelji, empirical (vyAvahArika) objects exist

even before they are seen by any one. A chair is there is my room whether I see

it or not. So it is said that they have ajnAta satta, as quoted by Michaelji.

But illusory objects like rope-snake have existence only when they are seen by

some one. There is authority for this in vedantic works. So what Michaeelji has

said is correct.

But what Subbuji has said is also correct because he says that the empirical

objects—the whole world—have no real existence of their own. Their existence is

only due to Brahman which is sat. Thus there is no contradiction.

Best wishes,

S.N.Sastri

 

 

advaitin , " subrahmanian_v " <subrahmanian_v wrote:

 

> Namaste Michael ji,

>

> While the position stated by me in the portion quoted by you is the

established one in Advaita of Shankara, right from the very first sentence of

the adhyAsa Bhashya, here is a specific mention:

>

> In the GaudapAda kArikaa II.34, the verse states:

>

> // The diversity in the universe does not exist as an entity identical With

Atman, NOR DOES IT EXIST BY ITSELF. Neither is it separate from Brahman nor is

it non—separate. This is the statement of the wise.//

> Regards,

> subbu

>

[Guest guest]

Subbu-ji, what you are saying is true for the universe of objects in totality. In other words, it is true from a pAramArthika angle. It is not valid for all individual objects empirically. If it were so, advaita-vedAnta would become a theory of subjective idealism, which it is clearly not.

To say that diversity is mithyA is different from saying that a desk exists only when I see it. 2010/1/20 subrahmanian_v <subrahmanian_v

 

 

 

Namaste Michael ji,

 

While the position stated by me in the portion quoted by you is the established one in Advaita of Shankara, right from the very first sentence of the adhyAsa Bhashya, here is a specific mention:

[Guest guest]

PraNAms to all

 

Just a point since Michael started his post referring presumably my persistent

statements.

 

Prof Jha in his talks on tarkasagraha recently made same statements about the

existence and the knowledge of the existence.

 

The topic - aakaaSha pushpam asti vaa na vaa - the sky-flower exists or not?

 

Jha made a statement somewhat similar to existence of unknown objects - do they

exist or not?

 

I am presenting it since it is relevant to the topic.

 

Nyaaya's position is (as per Jha) objects exist before the knowledge of the

existence of the objects. -( From my point that is an axiomatic statement - By

that I can say any object including my gaagaabuubu exists.)

 

Next he made a statement - sky flower does not exist because it is not known or

experienced by any one.

 

I pointed out to him that the above two statements are contradictory.

 

Let us take two positions:

 

1. sky flower exists, even though so far no one has observed it - in this,

existence of the sky flower is by declaration without any basis like any other

unknown object in the universe.

 

2. Sky flower does not exist THREFORE no one has observed it or we should say

none will be able to observe it. That the sky flower does not exist is also an

axiomatic statement here.

 

Does sky flower exists or not? - How do you prove either way? We are not talking

about praatibhaasika objects like rope/snake.

 

The best answer is it is anirvacaniiyam or indeterminate – Until it is

observed, we can tentatively say that it does not exist unless one proves by

some deductive or inductive logic.

 

The statement that I make all the time that Michael refers to:

The existence of an object is ESTABLISHED by knowledge its existence -Until then

it is INDETERMINATE - that means we do not know it exists or not. – I cannot

say the unknown objects do not exists unless I know by direct contact with

Iswara that he has created that unknown object!

 

Michael - I never say that objects are created by jiiva's mind. You can say they

are created by Iswara - But we would not know what He has created until we have

the knowledge of their existence. Mind perceives the existent object not

non-existent objects - that includes even the snake that the mind projects on

the rope based on memory that is true or imagined. Mind does not project

gaagaabuubu on the rope since it has no knowledge of it.

 

We have a clear distinction between Iswara sRishTi and jiiva sRiShTi - no

confusion there. But what is Iswara SrishTi we will not know - we can theorize

it - but will not know until we know their existence either pratyaksha or

anumaana or arthaapatti.

 

I agree with Sastriji and Subbuji.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

praNAms

Hare Krishna

This vyAvahArika satya & pAramArthika

satya & their clear cut understanding from vyavahAra is a never ending

puzzle is it not?? See, we do accept that there is jeeva-jeeva bedha

(there is hell a lot of differece between paripUrNa vedAntins like big

four S's of our group, Sri Sastri prabhuji, Sri Subbu prabhuji, Sri Sadananda

prabhuji & Sri Sunder prabhuji and lip vedAntins like me :-)) ,

jeeva-jada bedha, (difference between bhaskar & basket:-), jada-jada

bedha (difference between ice cream & gobi manchuri:-), jeeva-Ishwara

bedha (difference between bhagavaan bhaskara & mortal bhaskara) etc.

etc. and accordingly we have been promptly following these difference to

its reality...and at the same time if someone questions paramArthik ONENESS

or ultimate nondual reality, which we advaitins tirelessly advocating,

we again with all humility say, no, this ultimate ONENESS cannot be explained

in words & it cannot be reached even from the mind ( we quote those

famous shruti vAkya-s yato vAcho nirvartante aprApya manasa saha,

na tatra chakshurgacchati, na vAggacchati nO manaH etc. in justification.)

Under these circumstances, I have a doubt here, when everything fair and

true from the vyAvahArik point of view where is a theory that can be refuted

from the advaita perspective?? I am not able to understand which

are the stand points that can be refuted from vyAvahArik point of advaita??

If nothing is wrong in vyavahAra & the bedha is true and pAramArthika

is indescribable, what is that we are refuting here & from which

standpoint?? My doubts may sound like from the desk of dvaitin but

I have these fresh doubts after seeing somany 'comfort' answers in the

name of vyAvahArika & pAramArthika :-))

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

Namaste Subbu-ji and Sastri-ji,

We must distinguish between two areas of discourse here as Sastr-ji points

out. On the one hand we have the ordinary everyday empirical plane of

subjects and objects which is intersubjective. The objects on this plane

continue to exist whether anyone is thinking of them or not. On the other

hand there are those subjective mental states; emotions, illusions etc

which have no existence unless one is the process of experiencing them.

Just because both are experienced does not put them both on the same

footing as to their nature in the sense that we ought not to be able to

distinguish between them. It is perfectly clear that we do. (cf. B.S.B.

II.ii.29)

 

From a wholistic totalising absolute standpoint working our way back

through successive levels of superimposition as recommended by Shankara in

Brh.Up.ii.iv.11: the view is different.

 

" When, through these successive steps, sound and the rest, together with

their receiving organs, are merged in Pure Intelligence, there are no more

limiting adjuncts, and only Brahman, which is Pure Intelligence,

comparable to a lump of salt, homogeneous, infinite, boundless and without

a break, remains. Therefore the Self alone must be regarded as one

without a second. "

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

Subbu-ji writes:

" From the above words of Shankara and Anandagiri it is clear that the

objective world, anAtman, can claim (even) existence ONLY on the

authority/observership of a sentient Atman, that is other than itself. "

 

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

To address that point: In the preamble to the B.S.B. the central puzzle

that Shankara puts to us is - how does the object which is out there and

inert come to be in the mind of the subject. His problem could only exist

if there was a really out there object with an apparent wholly other

nature to the subjects. To say that the object already is in the personal

individual mind or can only exist by being in the mind of the subject is

not the solution that Shankara offers. That is the way of Subjective

Idealism and Shankara in B.S.B.II.ii.28 rejects it. I remember Sada-ji

had trouble with that sutra also and was inclined to reject it on grounds

which seemed specious to me.

 

Instead Shankara offers a substratum metaphysics which is the one that VP

elaborates in its discussion of 'perceptuality'. This is different topic

from what Shankara regards as a basic given viz. the independent otherness

of the object.

 

The GK according to all scholarly accounts is early advaita which suffered

from the fact that the dominant Buddhist philosophy at the time sliced and

diced the problem field in a certain way. It is as it were a force field

which influenced Gaudapada's thinking. Moreover according to the latest

thinking on the matter by scholars he may have flourished around 500AD

which is considerably earlier than was previously thought. In 200+ years

ideas ripen, they are clarified and extraneous elements are separated

out. It is obvious that there will be dissonance when this can even be

seen in the thinking of a single man in a single lifetime. Did Shankara

give his seal of approval to the GK by not directly confronting issues in

the commentary? I don't think so because being engaged in polemics with

Buddhism, that would amount to offering aid and comfort to the enemy.

However, as I pointed out, he does directly contradict Gaudapada in

B.S.B.II.ii.29 which is significant.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

 

 

 

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17:49:00

[Guest guest]

Subbuji - PraNAms

 

I know you do not want to discuss. I totally agree with the contents of your

post. Here are just comments in relation to perception that was actually

discussed in the knowledge series.

 

We can never perceive the substantive of an object. What we perceive is only the

attributive content - form and colors through the eyes, sound through the ears

etc. An image is formed in the mind via sense input with those attributes.

Vedanta paribhaasha (VP) says the existence of the object is -essentially -

imaged - as the existence as the VRitti. Since existence is all pervading what

is imaged is only the attributive content of the object out there as vRitti in

the mind. The substantive Brahman as existence of the object is the same as the

substantive as existence as vRitti. The attributive content of the object that

distinguishes that object from others in the universe is imaged as attributive

content of the vRitti. Hence VP says the perception is complete only when the

existence of the vRitti with its imaged attributive content is united with the

consciousness of the subject - that causes one to be conscious of the existence

of the vRitti with the

attributes from which the existence of the object out there.

 

It is not idealistic theory since imaged attributes are not individual mental

creation but coming from the object content outside the mind. Errors in

perception arises when the attributive content perceived by the sense either

incomplete or defective. The point in relation to the post is - there is no

substantive of the object other than existence and that existence cannot be

perceived. Existence expressed in terms of material is what mithyaa is all about

- which we cannot say sat or asat - hence anirvacaniiyam as the first definition

of falsity in Advaita siddhi.

Vyaavahaarika satyam is negated only at the level of paaramaarthika satyam until

then as part of saadhana one has to recognize its limited reality and not to

give more importance than what it deserve. Given more reality to the apparent

plurality is delusion - cause for samsaara. Hence saadhaka as your post reminds

us is to recognize the mithyaatva aspect of the world of objects.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

--- On Wed, 1/20/10, subrahmanian_v <subrahmanian_v wrote:

 

Pramaana-s reveal only Sat, Existence:

 

It cannot be said that perception etc., have to be accepted as revealing the

objects of common parlance, e.g., a pot, that are not illusory like the

rope-snake for, this distinction is without a difference. Further, if perception

etc., have to be accepted as pramanas revealing objects (whose existence is

independent of one's knowledge of them), then they should be deemed to reveal

only the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) that is the sattA (Existence) of each of the

objects of parlance like the pot as revealed in the experience, `the pot is,'

for the concealment whose cessation is brought about by the concerned pramana

can pertain only to the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) which is self-effulgent and

not to the inert objects of the world. That is why it is said:

 

ato'ubhava eva eko viShayo'jnAtalakSha NaH

akshAdInAm svataH siddho yatra teShAm pramANatA (Sambandha VArtika 1002)

[Therefore it is the self-established one Experience alone, and none other which

can be regarded as unknown, that is the object of perception etc., whence they

(perception, etc.,) become valid.]

The `adhishThAna' (Substratum) that is revealed is conditioned by the form,

colour, etc., of the object regarded as perceived and as such, not the

unconditioned `adhishThAna' (Substratum) . Further enquiry shows that the

`adhishThAna' (Substratum) is the attributeless Atman as the Shrutis such as

(Kathopanishad 2.5.9) [His form is not to be seen, no one beholds Him with the

eye.] declare. Thus It cannot be revealed by the so-called pramanas that are

outward as alluded to by the Shruti (Kathopanishad 2.4.1) whose real meaning

lies in showing that the Self is not an object for the sense organs, nor can

they be deemed as revealing the objects of the world because of the

consciousness of the co-presence and co-absence of the sense organs and the

items of knowledge as pointed out already. The position is, therefore, that they

are falsely regarded as pramanas in the same way as in a dream. So has it been

said in the Vedanta-siddhAnta- muktAvaLi 14). The

unsublatable self-established Atman Itself is to be accepted as the Substratum

of all illusion.

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael,

 

You say: “However, as I pointed out, he does directly

contradict Gaudapada in B.S.B.II.ii.29 which is significant.”

 

I raised this apparent contradiction last year (I think) and

Sastri-ji replied, concluding: “What Shankara says in GK 2.4 is that

dRishyatvam and unreality are common to both the states and so they are

similar. Everything that is dRishyam is unreal, because it is different from

brahman which alone is adRishyam and real. Here he does not go into the

difference between the two states. This he brings out only in BSB. II.ii.29. So

there is actually no contradiction. The similarity alone is pointed out in GK

2.4. The difference is pointed out in BSB II.ii.29.”

 

And Swami Paramarthananda, commenting on BSB, says: “We

should know the differences (vaidharmya) and the common features (sadharma)

between waking and dream states. In the vaitathya prakaraNa, we are quoting the

example to reveal the common features: both are objects of experience -

dRRishya; both are anitya (transient) and parichchinna (limited) and both are

negatable by pramANa. Therefore both are mithyA. The uncommon feature is that

jAgrat prapa~ncha is outside the mind whereas svapna prapa~ncha is inside the

mind.

 

“In BSB, the yogachAra philosopher is trying to say that

jAgrat and svapna prapa~ncha-s are the same because both are inside the mind

and we don't agree with this.”

 

So I don’t actually think there is a real contradiction

here.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

[Guest guest]

Dennis-ji, I fully agree with what you have written below. In fact this point has been discussed many times on the list before. However, I must also mention that sometimes the posts of Sadananda-ji, Subbu-ji and others are worded in such a way that they seem to advocate a view that phenomena in the jAgrat state are also creations of the mind. This is not accepted by the BSB, though I am not sure if all yogAchArins accepted such a view.

On a side note, I would like to know your source for the below quote of Swami Paramarthananda. Though I live in Chennai and attend some of his classes, I have never seen a BSB commentary by him, other than audio cassettes.

2010/1/21 Dennis Waite <dwaite

 

 

 

 

 

 

And Swami Paramarthananda, commenting on BSB, says: “We

should know the differences (vaidharmya) and the common features (sadharma)

between waking and dream states. In the vaitathya prakaraNa, we are quoting the

example to reveal the common features: both are objects of experience -

dRRishya; both are anitya (transient) and parichchinna (limited) and both are

negatable by pramANa. Therefore both are mithyA. The uncommon feature is that

jAgrat prapa~ncha is outside the mind whereas svapna prapa~ncha is inside the

mind.

 

“In BSB, the yogachAra philosopher is trying to say that

jAgrat and svapna prapa~ncha-s are the same because both are inside the mind

and we don't agree with this.”

[Guest guest]

Subrahmanian-ji, many thanks for your post. I am of course in full

agreement with all your quotations. However, as far as the

dR^iShTi-sR^iShTi-vAda is concerned, it must be noted that it works

only in conjunction with the eka-jIva-vAda.

 

Regarding pAramArthika and vyAvahArika, I suppose we should recognize

that this distinction too is ultimately a matter of prakriyA only.

2010/1/20 subrahmanian_v <subrahmanian_v

 

 

While we generally recognize two standpoints,

paaramaarthika and vyaavahaarika, it would be beneficial to identify in

the Shankaran Advaita a standpoint that the mumukshu, aspirant, has to

take.

From Sridakshinamurtistotram Part IX – I (p.201 in advaitin posting)

[.........]

Further embellishment of Drishti-srishti-vAda – drishtireva srishtiH

[.........]

[Guest guest]

Hare Krishna, Namaskarams.

 

This is an excerpt from Swami Dayananda’s lecture on

Kaivalya Upanishad and felt that the

following is relevant to the ongoing discussion.

 

“Advaitam is a vision inspite of the presence of Dwaitam.

Neither it is opposite of Dwaitam, nor one is absent when the other is present.

it is simply a vision and everything is in one awareness. All known things and

unknown things in the whole of cosmos that includes you also is in that

awareness that is ekam.

 

baskaran

 

The INTERNET now has a personality. YOURS! See your Homepage.

[Guest guest]

Ramesh-ji,

 

The Swami Paramarthananda quote is from his (390 hours worth)

talks on the Brahmasutra (mp3 format). Note that I haven’t listened to

all of these yet – in fact I am only about 90 hours into them – but

I listened to this one out of sequence specifically!

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

 

 

<<On a

side note, I would like to know your source for the below quote of Swami

Paramarthananda. Though I live in Chennai and attend some of his classes, I

have never seen a BSB commentary by him, other than audio cassettes.>>