Fwd: MANDUKYA UPANISHAD AND KARIKA: INTRODUCTION 2

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

 

 

In the last post we have concluded that Vedas use `converse'

statements

to show that satyam jnaanam and anantam are swarUpa laxaNas of

Brahman

and not attributes of Brahman.

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Coming back to the discussion of objects, we have established that

objects can be defined only through their attributes. Attributes

differentiates one object from the other. Extending this statement

further, only objects have attributes. Conversely, that which has

attributes must be an object. In addition, only finites can have

attributes since the attributes differentiate one object from the

others. Thus, objects are not only limited by other objects but are

also limited by space and time (desha kaala vastu paricchinnam).

From

these statements, we derive two conclusions. Brahman which is

infiniteness or limitless cannot have attributes, for 1) it is not

finite to have attributes and 2) it is one without a second. There

is

no second to differentiate Brahman from other objects. Hence, sat –

chit – ananda are to be recognized as not even LakshaNas of Brahman –

but we use the terms as upAya for Upadesha, that is, they used for

the

purpose of teaching as tools to facilitate the student of Vedanta to

reject that which is not sat or not chit or not ananda as not

Brahman.

It is similar to defining infinity in mathematics. Mathematically,

the

very word infinity is not description of infinity but it is mere

exclusion of any finite as not infinite. If infinity is describable

then it is no more infinite. Thus, that which is asat (not present

eternally), that which is achit (inert), and that which is AnAnanda

(unhappiness) cannot be Brahman. In principle, absolute infiniteness

cannot be defined. There are local infinities such as `pi' or `e' ,

or

parallel lines etc in Math. However, these are finite infinites or

one-dimensional infinities (here dimension means aspect rather than

spatial dimension). Brahman means infinite from all aspects. It is

absolutely infinite without any limitations what so ever. Scriptures

call Brahman as nirguNa or attributeless. Since attributes

differentiate (or exclude) one object from the other, such an

absolute

infiniteness cannot exclude anything, since by exclusion it ceases

to be

absolutely infinite. Brahman should be all-inclusive, since it is

infinite. Hence, scripture defines as satyam jnaanam anantam

brahma –

that which is eternal, and that which is pure knowledge, and that

which

is infinite is Brahman. We have already noted in the beginning that

pure knowledge cannot be defined. The scripture provides us the

reason,

since pure knowledge is nothing but Brahman itself, which is

indefinable

as it is attributeless or more precisely it is non-objectifiable.

 

As a slight diversion, we may note that Bhagavaan Ramanuja explains

nirguNa as durguNa rahita. That is, Brahman does not have any bad

qualities, whereas for an advaitin nirguNa means guNa atIta that is

Brahman is beyond the concepts of guNa, since all concepts are

finite.

Any conceptualization is finitization. Instead, Bhagavaan Ramanuja

defines Brahman as ananta kalyANa guNa Ashhraya. That is, Brahman is

the locus of infinite auspicious qualities. Here the auspicious

qualities are infinite and the extent of each quality is infinite.

Thus, Brahman is locus of infinite love, infinite compassions, etc.

If

one examines these critically, infinite cannot be measured or

quantifiable. Therefore, human mind cannot comprehend the qualities

that Brahman has. Close examination shows that the definition that

Bhagavaan Ramanuja provides is not much different from Advaitin's

analysis of nirguNa. Description as locus of infinite auspicious

qualities however provides the mind a positive vision for

contemplation

and meditation so that those auspicious qualities that one admires

can

become one with the meditator. It provides an Alambanam (something

to

hold on) for the mind during meditation. However, advaitic

interpretation matches with the Vedic statements involving `neti,

neti

...not this, not this.' wherein all this, this, this are rejected

which

are quantifiable through guNas or qualities. By rejecting all that

which has guNas one gets absorbed into that which is beyond human

comprehension. Vedantic definitions are therefore very precise and

self-consistent (samanvaya).

 

We may also note that not only Brahman cannot be defined, the subject

`I' also cannot be defined. Any attempts to define the subject will

make it as an object and not a subject any more. Since the

definitions

are only in terms of attributes, definability only rests with

objects.

Since subject is not an object and can never become an object for

analysis, it has no attributes either. Only operational definition

that

can be given for subject `I' in the spirit of neti, neti,

is `subject is

that which cannot be objectified' – this is not a definition but

helps

to negate all the objects or all those that can be objectifiable or

attributable as `not I'. The reason becomes clear. `I am' is

existent-conscious entity and by definition of `prajnaanam brahman –

its

identity with Brahman is established. Therefore, it is also

`sat-chit-ananda', which is the swaruupa lakshaNa for Brahman. The

Vedic statement `aham brahmaasmi – I am Brahman' follows. As we will

see that mAnDUkya upaniShad is going to reinforce this identity with

the

statement `ayam aatma brahman', the self that 'I am' is Brahman.

MAnDUkya upaniShad in mantra 7 provides a brilliant description for

realization of ones own nature or nature of Brahman in meditation.

Thus, we can see that all Vedic statements are logically

self-consistent.

 

Before we proceed further, we need to recognize that Brahman being

absolutely infinite it cannot exclude anything since any exclusion

compromises its infinite nature. We also recognize that Brahman is

consciousness, which is infinite. Hence, it cannot include anything

that is unconscious or inert. On the other hand, objects and thus

the

world is inert or achetana vastu. How do we resort these two

contradictory requirements without compromising the all-pervasive

conscious aspect of Brahman on one side, and the existence of inert

world on the other. This aspect will be addressed later. We may

state,

however, that Bhagavaan Ramanuja brings these two aspects and

synthesizes by proposing a vishiShTa advaita with all-inclusive

oneness

of Brahman but with internal diversity. To do that he has to resort

to

consciousness as adjective or attributive knowledge from the point of

jiivas (dharma bhuuta jnaana) while keeping self-consciousness of the

jiivas as intrinsic knowledge of the jiivas (dharmi jnaana). This

dualistic consciousness becomes inevitable in his approach in order

to

accommodate the inert world as eternal existent entity. Here in

Ramanuja's approach the inertness of the world is preserved as part

of

Brahman along with self-conscious jiivas, both constituting the

totality

of Brahman like organs of the cosmic being, virAt puruSha. From

totality point, it is one (advaita) but from intrinsic point Brahman

has

internal diversity with multiple jiivas and jagat as part of His

total

body. Just as my `I-ness' pervades throughout the body, the `I-

ness' of

Paramaatma pervades the entire cosmic body, each part and cell of the

body. The Vedic statement `antaryAmin' or indweller is utilized to

prove that conscious Brahman is indweller of chit swaruupa jiivas and

achit swaruupa jagat. That the consciousness is all-pervading, and

at

the same time the statement that it is an `indweller or antaryAmin'

appear to be a contradiction. To avoid this contradiction, it is

emphasized that it is not so in the model proposed using the analogy

of

the individual soul, which is an indweller of the body, still

pervades

the body. In vishiShTAdvaita, the self consciousness or dharmi

jnaanam

is inherent with the jiiva as chaitanya swaruupa. However, dharma

bhuuta jnaana is acquired as the jiiva evolves towards moxa. This

jnAnam or knowledge which is not purusha tantra (cannot be willed) is

gained at the grace of ParamAtma using which one becomes aware of the

ones dependence on paramAtma and also will be conscious of (by dharma

bhuuta jnaana) His infinite glory, sharing His infinite happiness.

 

With this background, let us examine now more closely how the

knowledge

of an object takes place, since the reality of the jagat is

intimately

related to it. Senses can only measure the attributes or qualities

of

an object; color and form by the eyes, sound by the ears, hardness

and

texture by the touch, taste by the tongue, and smell by the nose.

These

are the only measurable qualities by the five senses. Object has its

attributes, yet object is different from its attributes. It is true

that without the attributes the object cannot be defined. However,

attributes themselves are not the object but it is their locus.

There

are different theories of how attributes and the locus of the

attributes

are interrelated. Examination of the perceptual process indicates

that

senses can only measure (they are called maatraas) attributes but

cannot

grasp the substantive. Since knowledge can take place only via

senses,

the absolute knowledge of the object does not exist, other than the

knowledge of its attributes. Knowledge of any object is essentially

attributive knowledge, rather than absolute knowledge. This fact

becomes clearer when we examine the substantive of the objects.

Since

senses cannot grasp the substantive of an object, the substantive

knowledge is not available through perception. Since inference

(anumaana pramANa) as a means of knowledge also rests on pratyaxa

pramANa for validation, one cannot gain substantive knowledge of the

objects and hence the knowledge of the world using inference. Only

resort is the shaastra pramANa or Veda pramANa. Vedas indicate that

substantive of every object and hence the world is nothing but

Brahman,

(sarvam kalvidam brahma1), which is of the nature of

consciousness-existence. Brahman is the material cause (upaadAna

kAraNa) in addition to being efficient and instrumental cause

(nimitta

kAraNa). Hence, substantive knowledge of any object and thus the

world

involves knowledge of Brahman. Brahman cannot be known either by

perception or by inference. Thus, analysis of the perceptual process

and recognition that we can only have attributive knowledge and not

substantive knowledge are further confirmed by Veda-s. The mAnDUkya

upaniShad will be reinforcing the above analysis.

 

1(I get complaints from our friends that we are not quoting the

complete

statement of the shRiti – The statement is `sarvam khalvidam brahma

tajjalAniti shAnta upAsIta| " Ch-3.14.1. – Meaning – " All this, in

fact,

is Brahman; From this everything comes, into this everything

disappears

and by this or on this everything is sustained " . The full statement

reinforces the Ti. Up. Statement `yato vaa imaani bhuutani jaayante

… "

further confirming that Brahman is the material cause for the

universe

of objects that can be pointed out as idam, idam, this, this,.. -

sarvam, thus the entire universe. The part quoted above makes the

essence that all `this, idams' are nothing but Brahman. Any other

explanations not withstanding, we are not deviating from the intended

meaning of the scriptures by not fully quoting the upaniShad's

mantra.

 

Another complaint is that we only quote quarter of the sloka `neha

nanAsti kincana' – the full line is " manasaivAnupadraShTavyam, neha

nAnAsti kicana| " Br. Up. 4-4-19. It means through mind alone the

truth

(Brahman) has to be realized, there are no internal differences what

so

ever in that Brahman – As we shall see that manDUkya UpaniShad

zeroes on

this statement. This is precisely what is being discussed above

related

to the mental cognition of the self and the world of objects since

Brahman is the material cause for everything, and internal

differences

one sees in the mind are only apparent and not real, since in Brahman

there are no internal differences. The word `anudraShTavyam' implies

that to see this fact one needs a deeper analysis or inquiry. The

second part of the sloka that was not quoted above pertains to what

happens to those who mistake that there are internal differences in

Brahman. Let us recognize that dvaitins and vishiShTa Advaitins have

different interpretations for the above statements, with which

obviously

they seem to be happy.)

 

Analyzing further, in gaining the attributive knowledge, in addition

to

the sense input, there is a transactional utility of the object that

was

perceived through the senses.

This is acquired as the child grows from childhood and learns, based

on

the transactional utility of the object. This helps to conclude that

there is an object out there with the attributes that have been

measured

by the senses. Thus, name and form together get stored as

attributive

objective knowledge. This becomes precursor for all transactions or

vyavahaara. Mentally, the object `out there' is recognized as the

thought of an object in the mind with all the associated attributes:

form, color, smell, taste, etc. Here, we are not concerned about the

details of the relation between the attributes and the object. The

perception of the object `out there' (therefore, the knowledge of the

object `out there') occurs in three sequential steps. First, the

senses

gather the attributes of an object via perception. If the senses are

defective, the attributes that are gathered can be erroneous. For

senses to operate fully, the environment (such as proper

illumination,

etc) should also be conducive. Once the attributes are gathered,

they

are fed to the mind. The sense input and the integration by the mind

(volition) can go on continuously as more or better information is

gathered by the senses. The second step in the process of perception

involves integration of the sense input by the mind and providing a

mental image of an object as the locus for the attributes and the

intellect cognizing the object. At this stage, we cognize that

there is

an object `out there' having such and such attributes that the sense

have measured. By education and training, the senses can be trained

to

pick up subtler differences in the attributes and feed the mind. For

example, with trained eye one can pick up various shades of say, blue

color. Similarly, with trained ear, one can pick up subtler

differences

between various ragas or tunes in the music, and thus one will be

able

to differentiate one raaga from the other. The third step in the

cognitive process involves comparison of perceived image of the

object

with the attributes with the images stored in the memory.

Recognition

of the object based on the information in the memory occurs when the

image in the mind matches with the image with their attributes in

memory. Thus, recognition process forms the third step in the

sequence

of the knowledge. The recognition will be fuzzy if the matching is

not

exact. We say `This object looks like the other object but we are

not

sure'. If there is no matching at all, then we say `I see such an

object with these attributes, but I do not know what it is'. The

naming

of an object and knowledge of the object go together. Thus word and

the

object or form (that includes all other associated attributes)

together

is stored as one package. Thus, we have 1) the objective knowledge

is

attributing knowledge, 2) attributive knowledge involves an image in

the

mind with its attributes and 3) a name (word) associated with it.

Name

is nothing but a sound or assemblage of syllables. Language,

communication and transactions involving meaningful association of

words

(by convention) follow. Thus, sounds, syllables, words involving

names

ultimately are related to the objects, the world and our transactions

with the world. Thus, the world is nothing but objects `out there',

and

from the mental cognition process, the objects `out there' are

nothing

but the images formed in the mind and stored in the memory along with

the names associated with the objects. Thus, one can see the chain

of

sequences involved with the mind playing a central role in the

knowledge

of an object and thus the knowledge of the world. This is not

mentalism

commonly discussed by vijnAnavadins, but recognition that mind is

playing a central role in the cognition of the world of objects.

Senses

do not generate the attributes but only gather the attributes from

the

object `out there'. Based on the attributes that they gather objects

are cognized. It is important to recognize that no substantives for

the

objects can be established by mental cognitions. Because of the

lack of

cognition of the substantives, errors in the attributive cognitions

can

occur. This limitation of the human intellect and the limitation in

the

cognitive process have to be recognized at the outset.

 

When the child sees an object for the first time, he gathers the

attributes to the degree that his senses can gather. When his mother

teaches the object by naming it – the name and the image are stored

along with its attributes in his memory. Thus when he sees a `cow'

for

the first time and mother says that is a cow, the image of the cow,

its

attributes and the name are stored. For example, if it is a white

cow

and the mother says that is a cow, all the information is stored.

Next

time when he sees another cow, which is black and mother again says

that

is also a cow, he picks the common features of the two cows as

generic

features (jAti), taking the specific features such as white or black

as

the attributes of individual cows (vyashhTi). Thus generic

attributive

knowledge (jAti jnaanam) as well as specific attributive knowledge

(vyashhTi jnAnam) are gathered and stored into the memory as learning

proceeds. The synchronization of the name and form is intense that

every name is associated with a form and every form is associated

with a

name. Thus when one hears a word `cow' at any time (even when one is

not perceiving a cow at that instance) the image of the cow with the

sound of its name is brought in from the memory and internal

perception

of the cow occurs. Thus, word and the form get associated

inseparably

(avinaabhAva sambandha). The object cow `out there' is associated

with

the thought of cow in the mind, since there is no other substantive

associated with the cow other than its image in the mind is

perceived by

the mind. Thus, thought of the cow along with the name `cow' is the

object cow outside. Here the image first and the name second occur

due

to their coexistence in a subsequent perceptions. On the other hand,

when one hears the word `cow', along with the name the image is

brought

in from the memory. Here the name comes first followed by the

image.

Perception here is from memory. Either way, the name and form (naama

and ruupa) go together for each attributive-objective knowledge. In

all

these, attributive knowledge there is no substantive knowledge

involved.

This lack of substantive is more easily perceived in the dream world

than in the waking world. Nature is providing a wonderful analogy to

educate a contemplative intellect the transactional realities

involved

in the waking and dream worlds. MAnDUkya upaniShad is, therefore, a

glorious blessing of the Vedas to the mankind.

(As a side note, it is recognized lately that images are stored in

one

side of the brain while the name or language is stored in the other

side. Therefore, recognition process involves gathering information

from two different sides of the brain. If these two are not

synchronized, particularly when one reaches an advanced age, we have

only a partial recognition. It is a common experience for many of us

mature people that when we see a person we say `we know this person

and

I have seen him somewhere, but I cannot remember his name'. We could

easily pullout the image but not the name from the other side of the

memory bank).

 

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