Hellenistic Astrology

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Hellenistic Astrology

Hellenistic

and Late Antiquity astrologers built their craft upon Babylonian (and

to a lesser extent Egyptian) astrological traditions, and developed

their theoretical and technical doctrines using a combination of Stoic, Middle Platonic

and Neopythagorean thought. Astrology offered fulfillment of a desire

to systematically know where an individual stands in relation to the

cosmos in a time of rapid political and social changes. Various

philosophers of the time took up polemics against astrology while

accepting some astral theories. The Stoic philosopher Posidonius was

alleged to embrace astrology and write works on it (Augustine, De civitate dei,

5.2). Other Stoics such as Panaetius and (late) Diogenes of Babylon

were primarily adverse to astrological determinism. For some

philosophers such as Plotinus,

horoscopic astrology was absurd for reasons such that the planets could

never bear ill will toward human beings whose souls were exalted above

the cosmos. For others, such as the early Church Fathers, ethical

implications of astrological fatalism were the main point of

contention, as it was contrary to the emerging Christian doctrine of

free will. The Gnostics,

who for the most part believed the cosmos is the product of an evil and

enslaving creator, thought of the planets as participants in this

material entrapment. Prominent Neoplatonists

such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus found some aspects of

astrology compatible with their versions of Neoplatonic philosophy. The

cultural importance of astrology is attested to by the strong reactions

to and involvement with astrology by various philosophers in late

antiquity. The adaptability of astrology to various philosophical

schools as well as the borrowing on the part of astrologers from

diverse philosophies provides dynamic examples of the rich "electicism" or "syncretism" that characterized the Hellenistic world.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Babylonian Astrology in the Hellenized WorldHellenistic Theorization and Systemization of Astrology

Early Greek Thinking

Fate, Fortune, Chance, NecessityGreek MedicinePlato and DivinationAges, Cycles, and Rational Heavens

Philosophical Foundation of Hellenistic Astrology

Astral Piety in Plato's AcademyStoic Cosmic Determinism

Fate and NecessityStoic-Babylonian Eternal RecurrenceDivination and Cosmic SympathyThe Attitude of Stoic Philosophers Towards Astrology

Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean Developments

Ocellus LucanusTimaeus LocrusThrasyllusPlutarch

 

The Astrologers

The Earliest Hellenistic Astrology: Horoscopic and KatarchicEarliest Fragments and TextsManiliusClaudius Ptolemy of AlexandriaVettius Valens

The Skeptics

The New Academy (Carneades)Sextus Empiricus

Hermetic and Gnostic Astrological TheoriesNeoplatonism and Astrology

PlotinusPorphyryIamblichusFirmicus MaternusHieroclesProclus

Astrology and ChristianityReferences and Further Reading

1. Introduction

a. Babylonian Astrology in the Hellenized World

Astrology, loosely defined as a method of correspondences between

celestial events and activity in the human realm, has played a role in

nearly every civilization. Its role in the late-Hellenistic era is of

special concern, particularly due to its complex interaction with Greek

philosophy, as well as its claims on the life of an individual. A

horoscopic chart (also "birth chart,natal chart," or "horoscope") is

a list of planetary positions against a backdrop of zodiac signs,

divided into regions of the sky (with reference to the rising and

setting stars on the horizon) on the basis of one's exact time and

place of birth. Such charts form the basis of "natal astrology" or

"genethlialogy," which started in Babylon but was later developed in

Hellenized Greek speaking regions.

The earliest surviving horoscopic chart pertaining to an individual

is dated 410 B.C.E. in Babylon. Babylonian astrology flourished from

the seventh century to the Seleucid era (late fourth century). However,

astral religion and divination based on star omens have a much longer

history in Mesopotamia. Stars were considered to be representations of

gods whose favors could be courted through prayers, magical

incantations and amulets. The triad of Anu, Enlil, and Ea corresponded

not with individual stars or planets but to three bands of

constellations. Traces of the basic characters of the planetary gods,

such as the malevolent nature of Mars/Nergal (the god of destruction

and plagues) and Venus/Ištar (the goddess of love), can be found in

Hellenistic astrology. Given the small available sample of Late

Babylonian horoscopic tablets containing planetary placements and

laconic predictions (around 28 extant), it is very difficult to come to

solid conclusions about the theoretical ground for the practice of the

earliest horoscopic astrologers. The case will be different in the

Hellenistic culture in which theoretical grounding was important for

the development of the practice, and in which there is more extensive

textual evidence.

Given the dynamic tension resulting from Greek philosophy meeting

Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian and Jewish religions and ideologies, and

the "syncretism" of cross-cultural influences, the Hellenistic era

provided fruitful soil for the cultivation of what began primarily as a

Mesopotamian system of celestial omens. Before Alexander's conquest,

the practice of astronomy and astrology in Babylon flourished but was

not yet of much interest to the Greek thinkers. Babylonian

priests/astrologers, notably Berossus, who settled on the island of

Cos, are thought to be responsible for introducing astrology to Greece

and the surrounding area. Plato mentions those who seek celestial

portents in the Timaeus (40c-d), while the student of Plato who authored the Epinomis paved the way for application of astronomical studies to astral piety.

As the intellectual center in Egypt, Alexandria is a likely location

for major developments in Hellenistic astrology. A portion of what

Garth Fowden (in Egyptian Hermes) classified as "technical

Hermetica," material typically earlier than the "philosophical

Hermetica," represents a part of the early Hellenistic astrological

corpus. Surviving Greek astrological writings, catalogued over a period

of fifty years in a work called the Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum (CCAG),

reveal that for the sake of credibility, many of the Hellenistic

astrologers attributed the earliest astrological works to historical or

mythologized figures such as the pharaoh Nechepso, an Egyptian priest

associated with Petosiris. Hermes is a legendary figure credited with

the invention of astrology. Some fragments attributed to Hermes survive

while some of the Nechepso/Petosiris work from the mid-second century

B.C.E. survives in quotes by later authors. Asclepius, Anubio,

Zoroaster, Abraham, Pythagoras, and Orpheus are additional figures

having astrological works penned in their names. There are late

Hellenistic references to three Babylonian astronomers/astrologers,

Kidinnu (Kidenas), Soudines (the source of some material for second

century C.E. astrologer, Vettius Valens), and Naburianos. The rivalry

between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms may be reflected in the

astrologers' varying attributions of the origins of astrology to

Egyptians or Babylonians (called the Chaldaeans). Various astrological

techniques and tables are either attributed to Egyptians or Chaldaeans,

but by late antiquity, the source for specific techniques and

approaches were often wrongly attributed. By the second century B.C.E.,

Babylonian astrology techniques were combined with Egyptian calendars

and religious practices, Hermeticism, the Pythagorean sacred

mathematics, and the philosophies of the Stoics and middle Platonists.

b. Hellenistic Theorization and Systemization of Astrology

Hellenistic astrology displays the influence of a variety of

philosophical sources. However, given the divergent and ever

multiplying streams of thought in the Hellenized world, practical

astrology did not necessarily conform to one particular philosophical

model offered by the major philosophical schools. However, as outlined

below, the Neopythagoreans, Platonists and Stoics provided the

foundational influence on the development of the art.

After a system or systems of Hellenistic astrology quickly

developed, the later practitioners and writers did not follow any one

philosophical influence as a whole. In fact, the surviving

instructional texts only scantily betray the philosophical positions of

the authors. Vettius Valens, whose Anthologiarum is one of

the most valuable sources for historians of this subject, indicates

Stoic leanings. The astrologer, astronomer, and geographer whose work

greatly influenced later development of astrology, Claudius Ptolemy

(fl. 130-150 C.E.), using Aristotelian influenced manners of argumentation that had been absorbed by other Hellenistic schools such as the Middle Platonists and the Academic Skeptics,

sought to portray astrology as a natural science, while dismissing a

good portion of doctrine due to lack of systematic rigor. The later

Platonic Academy had its

fair share of astrological interest – head of the academy in the first

century C.E., Thrasyllus, for example, acted as an astrologer to

Emperor Tiberius and is credited for works on astrology and numerology.

Neoplatonists Porphyry,

Iamblichus and Proclus all practiced or accepted some form of astrology

conforming to their unique contributions to Neoplatonism. It is

difficult to imagine that the practice of astrology would have been

divorced from philosophy by philosophers who were also astrologers. The

idea of astrology, as a systematic account of fate, had a pervasive

impact on the influential thinkers of the time who helped to shape the

theoretical and cosmological understanding of the practice. Thinkers in

the skeptical Academy and Pyrrhonic

schools sought to attack the theoretical underpinnings of the practice

of astrology, using a variety of arguments centering around freedom,

the ontological status of the stars and planets, and the logical or

practical limitations of astrological claims.

We now turn to the philosophies and philosophical schools of the

Hellenic and Hellenized world that made the spread and acceptance of

Babylonian astrology possible.

2. Early Greek Thinking

a. Fate, Fortune, Chance, Necessity

The role of Fate was often interchangeable with that of the gods in

early Greek thinking. Fate implied foreknowledge, which was divine and

sometimes dispensed by the gods. The intervention of the gods in human

affairs also presented the possibility of two paths of fate, based on a

moral choice. A decision that pleased or displeased the gods (such as

the choice Odysseus must make regarding the Oxen of the Sun (Odyssey,

Book XII) could set one off on a road of inexorable circumstances to

follow.

For the pre-Socratic philosophers, personified powers – such as Moira (Fate or Destiny) Anankê(Necessity), Nemesis, Heimarmenê (Fate), Sumphora (Chance) and Tukhê

(Fortune or Chance) – took on both metaphysical significances and

personifications that blurred any distinction between the theological

and the ontological. In thinkers such as Anaximander, Moira and Tukhê

play a part in cosmology that exceeds and is possibly even prior to the

gods. While the Olympian gods may be given foresight into the workings

of Moira, they were often left without the power to

transgress this transcendental dispensation of justice. Nature and the

gods were both encompassed by Moira. At this time in Greek

thinking, Fate and Fortune, and Zeus as its capricious dispenser, fell

outside the pale of human understanding, for leading a virtuous life

was no insurance of protection from material ruin. This sense of

futility resulted in the pessimism of Ionian thinkers such as Mimnermus

and Semonides. The attitude toward Moira and Tukhê by Archilochus is wholly pessimistic, for Moira and Tukhê

were the sole dispensers of good and evil, with no possibility of

mediation. We see the emergence of the question of the role of human

responsibility in justice and injustice in early Greek thinking (that

is, Solon), but it is unusual to see sharp distinctions between

circumstantial Fate that dispenses good or evil and the human response

to fate through virtue that was to later develop in Hellenistic

thinking (such as found in the later Stoic position that happiness is

self-control in spite of an immutable Fate). Theognis, however, offers

a proto-Stoic forebearance of Fate and triumph of human character,

while he expresses the frustration of apparent injustice in the

dispensation of good to the wicked and bad to the innocent. Democritus

reacted to skepticism based on the whims of Chance by favoring a causal

determinism ruled by necessity (anankê). Attribution of events

to Chance, he claimed, was an excuse for one's lack of vigilance of the

chain of causality (Fr. 119, Diels-Kranz). While not claiming such a

thing as absolute chance, Democritus retained chance to indicate an

obscure cause or causes.

We find in pre-Socratic thinking a stage set for the overcoming of

the limitations of knowledge about the laws of the cosmos, not simply

on a universal scale, but on the level of individual fortune as well.

Hellenistic astrologers, in part, attempted to provide a complex astral

logic to explain the apparent injustices of Fate. They attempted to

fill this gap of knowledge and turn Chance and Fate into a predictable

science for the initiated.

b. Greek Medicine

The development of Greek medical theory brought about a distinction between a basic "human nature" (koinê phusis) and an "individual nature" (idiê phusis). Greek medicine was motivated by the idea that nature has a unity and lawfulness. In the manner of Democritian Atomism, even Tukhê

is causal, but not necessarily predictable. A Hippocratean would

classify an individual's psychophysical nature into one of four types

based on the qualities of hot, cold, moist, and dry. Astrologers

borrowed and elaborated upon the psychology and character typology

found in early medical theory (cf. Manilius, Astronomica, 2.453-465; Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos,

3.12.148). In turn, astrology in the Hellenistic era was to in turn

inform medical theory with 1) zodiacal and planetary melothesia (the

association of astral phenomenon at birth with physical type), 2)

iatromathematics (which included consideration of auspicious and

inauspicious times), 3) sympathies and antipathies between healing

plants and celestial bodies, and 4) prognostication of the course of an

illness, of life expectancy or recovery, based on the moment a person

fell ill. Melothesia and iatromathematics are found in the works of

astrologers Manilius, Teucer (Teukros) of Babylon, Ptolemy, and

Firmicus Maternus, as well as a variety of anonymous and

pseudepigraphal works. (cf. Serapion, CCAG, 1.101-102; Pythagoras, CCAG, 11.2.124-138).

Galen's own position on

astrology was nuanced, for he rejected some aspects of astrological

doctrine as it had been applied to medicine (particularly the

Pythagorean numerology used in critical days, and the association of

thirty-six healing plants with the Egyptian decans), while he supported

other astrological considerations such as the Moon phases and

relationship to planets for prognosis. Two of his works pertaining

directly to this topic, On the Critical Days and Prognostication of Disease by Astrology. InOn the Critical Days

Galen claimed an empirical basis for his selective acceptance, favoring

astronomical accuracy (with fractional measures) over the Pythagorean

doctrines in astrology (such as seven days per quarter cycle of the

Moon). A passage in On the Natural Faculties (1.12.29) also

alludes to his support of astrology in general and to a lost work on

the physician Asclepiades where he dealt with the topics of omen,

dreams and astrology. The context of the passage reveals that his

theoretical acceptance of astrology is due to his Vitalist view of

Nature (that the natural world is a living organism) as opposed to the

Atomistic view of Nature (that all things are composed of inanimate

atoms). Nature, for Galen (drawing upon the Vitalist position of

Hippocrates) possesses faculties of attraction and assimilation of that

which is appropriate (e.g., for an organism) and of expulsion of that

which is foreign. Nature also provides the soul with innate ideas such

as the virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, etc. Omens and astrology

are signs of Nature's providence and artistry of the principles of

assimilation and expulsion. The Atomist (Epicurean)

school rejected astrology and divination by dreams and omens because

they believed there is no causality and purpose in Nature, so there is

no means of producing these "signs" or correspondences and no means of

prediction by way of them.

c. Plato and Divination

Babylonian astrology was not wholly unknown to the Greeks prior to Alexander's campaign. Plato, for instance, demonstrates an awareness of divination by the stars in the Timaeus dialogue, in which the protagonist criticizes divination by the stars without the means of astronomical calculation (logizethai) and a model (mimêmaton) of the heavens:

To describe the dancing movements of these gods, their

juxtapositions and the back-circlings and advances of their circular

courses on themselves; to tell which of the gods come into line with

one another at their conjunctions and how many of them are in

opposition, and in what order and at which times they pass in front of

or behind one another, so that some are occluded from our view to

reappear once again, thereby bring terrors and portents of things to come to those who cannot reason

– to tell all this without the use of visible models would be labor

spend in vain. 40c-d, Donald J. Zeyl translation, emphasis mine).

Each astronomical consideration listed in this passage, the

conjunctions and oppositions, the occlusion or heliacal settings of

planets and stars, the retrogradation are basic considerations in

Babylonian (and subsequently Greek) astronomy. This passage may allude

to early exposure of the Greeks to astrological methods more akin to

numerology rather than based on astronomical observation, for the use

of visible models can more accurately measure celestial phenomena. It

may also be taken as evidence that Plato is at least aware of the

Babylonian practice of omenic astrology or the horoscopy that emerged

in the fifth century B.C.E. Also in the Timaeus, Plato

mentions the "young gods" whose job it is to steer souls. The identity

of these gods would become a problem in later Platonism, but they are

established, at least by the first century as planetary god (Philo, De opificio mundi,

46-47). As this dialogue was treated with great importance in Platonism

during the formative period of Hellenistic astrology, this passage

could have been used by those looking for philosophical justification

for the practice. Plato further expresses in the Laws(7.821a-822c; 10.986e) the value of studying astronomy for the sake of astral piety. He points out that the name planetos

(from "to wander") is a misnomer, for the Sun, Moon and planets display

a cyclical regularity in their course that can be more accurately

understood by astronomical research. We can suspect, in this regard,

the influence of contemporary astronomers and students in the academy

such as Eudoxus. Astral piety, however, is to be contrasted with

"astrology" proper that originated with the attempt to apply reason,

order, and predictability to phenomena that had been previously considered to be merely astral omens.

Plato held in low regard the divinatory arts that are not prophetic,

i.e., a madness (manic/mantic) directly inspired by the gods (cf. Ion). He expressed an attitude of ambiguity toward divination revealed in the double-edged characterization of Theuth (cf. Phaedo,

274a), the inventor of number, calculation, geometry, astronomy, games

and writing. Just as writing results in a soul's forgetfulness through

the mediation of symbols, semiotic or sign-based prediction, as

astrology was often considered, is inferior to directly inspired

prophecy (Phaedo, 244c).

d. Ages, Cycles, and Rational Heavens

As early as Hesiod, the Greeks mythologized ages of civilization.

The Golden Age, in which the gods walked upon the earth, gave way to

Silver, then Bronze, then Iron Age. Empedocles taught of a natural

cycle of the interplay of Love and Strife: Love and harmony dominated

one Age, then Strife in the next Age. Plato also expresses world ages,

particularly in the Statesman or Politicus

(269d-274d). Throughout the myths in this dialogue and others, he

introduced the notion of a "cosmos" or a rational order and ontological

hierarchy of the spheres of heavenly beings, elements, daimons, and

earthly inhabitants. The cosmologies in Plato's dialogues marked the

emergence of a rational cosmic order in place of earlier cosmogonies.

His Timaeus dialogue, with its detailed story of the creation

of the world, was to become, perhaps the most influential book along

with the Septuagint in the late Hellenistic era). Babylonian

astronomical cycles would, soon after Plato, fuse with Greek

cosmologies. In the Myth of Er in the Republic, Plato

describes the cosmos as held together by the Spindle of Necessity, such

that the spheres of the fixed stars and the planets are held together

by an axis of a spindle. Sirens sing to move the spheres (or whorls)

while the Three Moirai participate in turning the wheel. Each

whorl has its own speed, with the sphere of the fixed stars moving the

fastest and in the direction opposite those of the planets. In the Phaedrus

(245c-248c) dialogue, he further illustrates the Law of Destiny that

governs souls who accompany the procession of the gods in a heavenly

circuit for a period of 1000 years. If the souls remember the Good

(those of the philosophers) they will regain lost wings of immortality

in three circuits or 3000 years. Otherwise they fall to the earth and

continue a cycle of rebirths for 10,000 years. Immortal souls dwell in

the rim of the heavens among the stars.

This leads to another significant development introduced by Plato,

one that would become critical for the Hellenistic spread of astrology

and astral piety – the ensouled nature of celestial bodies. Plato gives

the planets and stars a divine ontological status absent in the

writings of the pre-Socratics, many of whom took the planets and stars

to be material bodies of one substance or another. (for example, Anaxagoras [Plato,Apology, 26d]; Xenophanes [Aetius, De placitis reliquiae, 347.1]; Anaximander [Aristotle De caelo, 295b10]; Leucippus and Democritus [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9.30-32]). In the Laws

(10.893b-899d; 12.966e-967d), Plato posits that Soul is older than

created things and an immanent governor of the world of changing

matter. Secondly, the motion of the stars and other heavenly bodies are

under the systematic governance of Nous. That the circuits of

the planets and stars have an ordered regularity or rationality, and

that they are always in motion, indicates that they are immortal and

ensouled (cf. Phaedrus, 245c). While leaving open the

question of whether the Sun, Moon and planets create their own physical

bodies or inhabit them as vehicles, Plato includes in the Athenian's

argument that celestial beings are in fact gods, and (unlike the

thought of the Atomists) are engaged in the affairs of human beings (Laws, 10.899a-d). Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaxagoras who believed that mind (Nous) governs the cosmos, failed in their cosmological account by not also recognizing the priority of soul over body (Laws,

12.967b-d). The conception of mind moving soulless bodies, noted the

Athenian, led to common accusations that studying astronomy promotes

impiety.

As Babylonian astronomical cycles met with a rational and ensouled

Greek cosmos, the basis for both Stoic eternal recurrence and technical

Hellenistic astrology was formed.

3. Philosophical Foundation of Hellenistic Astrology

a. Astral Piety in Plato's Academy

The Platonic dialogue Epinomis, most likely written by

Phillip of Opus, demonstrates a transformation of the view of the

heaven that soon paved the "western way" for astrology. This dialogue

shows the transformation of the planets into visible representations of

the Olympian gods, just as the Babylonian planets were images of their

pantheon. The older names of the planets encountered in Homer and

Hesiod (and in Plato's Republic) designated their appearance rather than divine personification. Jupiter was shining (Phaithon), Mercury was twinkling (Stilbôn), Mars was fiery (Pureos) and Venus was the bright morning star and evening star (Phosphoros and Vesperos). In the Epinomis,

the planets are given proper names for Greek gods, though the author

leaves open the question of whether the celestial beings are the gods

themselves or likenesses fashioned by the gods (theous autous tauta humnêteon orthotata, ê gar theous eikonas hôs agalmata hupolabein gegonenai, theôn autôn ergasamenon,

983e). The new names of planets as Greek gods corresponded loosely with

the astral deities of Babylonian astrology, such as the identification

of ruling Olympian, Zeus, with the planet Jupiter, replacing the

principle Babylonian god Marduk. Ištar (female as evening star, male as

morning star) became Aphroditê/Venus, Nergal (god of destruction)

Ares/Mars, Nabu Hermes/Mercury, Ninib Kronos/Saturn, and Sin became the

female lunar deity Selênê.

The author of Epinomis extends the sentiment of astral piety evident in the Laws,

and goes so far as to say that the highest virtue is piety, and that

astronomy is the art/science that leads to this virtue (989b-990a) –

for it teaches the orderliness of the celestial gods, harmony, and

number. While Plato himself would never place the heavenly gods in

direct control of a person's destiny, the distinction between the

fatalism of such a control measured by astrology and an astral piety

that permitted some intervention of gods in human affairs was not

sharply drawn. Does the care of the gods for "all things great and

small" (epimeloumenoi pantôn, smikrôn kai meizonôn, 980d) mean

that it is through their activities or motions they control, guide or

occasionally intervene in human matters? While we do not yet see a

clear distinction between astral piety and practical astrology, later

texts on mystery cults, Gnosticism, Hermeticism, and magic demonstrate

that someone who either worships stars, or is concerned with their

ontological status, need not be technically proficient in astronomy.

Nor must they believe that life is fated by astrally determined

necessity. Likewise, the technical Hellenistic astrologers who

calculated birth charts and made predictions did not necessarily

practice rituals in reverence to planetary gods. While there is no

clear evidence for a unified school in which technical astrologers were

indoctrinated into both technique and theory of the craft, the fact

that the Hellenistic techniques (barring the basic foundation of

Babylonian astrology) had developed in a variety of conflicting ways

speaks to the possibility of several schools of thought in theory,

practice, and perhaps geographic distance. As each astrologer

contributed their own techniques or variations on techniques, the

technical material quickly multiplied, and students of astrology had

many authoritative writers to follow. The most likely scenario is that

the practicing astrologers possessed a variety of viewpoints about the

life and "influence" of the planets and stars, based on available

cosmological views in religion and philosophy. While borrowing freely

from Stoic, Pythagorean and Platonic thought, the astrologers who would

soon emerge varied theoretically on issues such as which aspects of

earthly existence may or may not be subject to Fate and the influence

of the stars, and whether or not the soul is affected by celestial

motions and relationships.

b. Stoic Cosmic Determinism

Although the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, integrated fate into the system of physics, the first Stoic to write a treatise On Fate (Peri heimarmenês)

is Chrysippus of Soli (280-207 B.C.E.). Xenocrates and Epicurus both

penned lost works of the same title prior to his (Diog. Laert., 4.12;

10.28). Given the influence of Xenocrates on the Stoa on matters as important as oikeôisis,

there is no reason to think that all of the issues of fate and freedom

discussed by Chrysippus originate with him. Later Stoics such as

Boethus, Posidonius and Philopator, dedicated works to fate, a topic

that would become a critical issue for all Hellenistic schools of

thought. The development of Hellenistic astrology is placed in the

context of these theories.

i. Fate and Necessity

Stoic theory of fate involves the law of cause and effect, but unlike Epicurean atomism, it is not a purely mechanistic determinism because at the helm is divine reason. Logos,

for the Stoics, was the causal principle of fate or destiny. This

principle is not simply external to human beings, for it is

disseminated through the cosmos as logos spermatikos (seminal reason) which is particularly concentrated in humans who are subordinate partners of the gods. Individual logoi are related to the cosmic logos through living in harmony with nature and the universe. This provided the basis of Stoic ethics, for which there is the goal of eupoia biou or smooth living rather than fighting with the natural and fated order of things. Chrysippus makes a distinction between fate (heimarmenê) and necessity (anankê)

in which the former is a totality of antecedent causes to an event,

while the latter is the internal nature of a thing, or internal causes.

By its nature, a pot made of clay can be shattered, but the actual

events of the shattering of a specific pot are due to the sum total of

external causes and inner constraints. Fate, in general, encompasses

the internal causes, though to be fated does not exclude the autonomy

of individuals because particular actions are based on internal

considerations such as will and character. Some events are considered

to be co-fated by both external circumstances and conscious acts of

choice. Diogenianus gives examples of co-fatedness, e.g., the

preservation of a coat is co-fated with the owner's care for it, and

the act of having children is co-fated with a willingness to have

intercourse (Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 2.998). Character or

disposition also plays a part in determining virtue and vice. Polemical

writers such as Alexander of Aphrodisias characterize the Stoic

position as maintaining that virtue and vice are innate. However, it is

more accurate to say that for the Stoics an individual is born morally

neutral, though with a natural inclination towards virtue (virtue

associated with reason/logos) that can be enhanced through training or

corrupted through neglect. Though morally neutral at birth, a human

being is not a tabula rasa, but has potentialities which make

him more or less receptive to good and bad influences from the

environment. An individual cannot act contrary to his or her character,

which is a combination of innate and external factors, but there is the

possibility of acquiring a different character, as a sudden conversion.

Since character determines action the ethical responsibility rests with

the most immediate causes. An often cited example is that of a cylinder

placed on a hill – the initial and external cause of being pushed down

the hill represents the rational order of fate, while its naturally

rollable shape represents will and character of the mind (Aulus

Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 7.2.11). Cultivation of character

through knowledge and training was thought to result in "harmonious

acceptance of events" (which are governed by the rational plan of the

cosmos), whereas lack of culture results in the errors of pitting

oneself against fate (Gellius, 7.2.6).

ii. Stoic-Babylonian Eternal Recurrence

Berossus, a Babylonian priest who settled on the island of Cos and the author of Babuloniakos,

is often credited for bringing Babylonian astrology to the

Greek-speaking world. Because he is thought to have flourished around

280 B.C.E., he is not the first to expose Greek speakers to this art,

but he is known for founding an astronomical and astrological school.

Kidinnu and Soudines, two Babylonian astronomers mentioned by second

century C.E. Vettius Valens, also contributed to Hellenistic astronomy

and astrology. Although many of the technical and theoretical details

of pre-Hellenistic Babylonian astrology in Greece are lost in all but a

few tablets, the doctrine of apokatastasis or eternal recurrence is attributed to Berossus by Seneca (Quaest. nat., 3.2.1). One scholar of the history of astronomy (P. Schnabel,Berossus und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur,

Leipzig 1923) argued that Kidinnu possessed a theory of "precession of

the equinox" prior to Hipparchus. Precession occurs due to a slight

rotation of the earth's axis resulting in a cyclical slippage of the

vernal point in reference to the stars. (See section on Ptolemy for

more on precession) From this was concluded an eternal recurrence based

on the precession of the vernal point through the constellations.

Schnabel's theory, however, had been refuted by Neugebauer. Whatever

the case may be, it is likely that Babylonian cosmological theories

influenced the founding Stoics, particularly Chrysippus.

The early Stoic version of the eternal recurrence is that a great conflagration (ekpurôsis) marks a stage in the cycle of the reconstitution of the cosmos (apokatastasis). One cycle, a Great Year (SVF, 2.599), would last until the planets align in their original position or zodiac sign in the cosmos (SVF,

2.625). Each age would end in Fire, the purest of elements and the

irreducible cosmic substance, and would be followed by a restoration of

all things. This fire, for the Stoics, was a "craftsmanly fire" (pur tekhnikonidentified

with Zeus and of a different nature than the material fire that was one

of the four elements. In the reconstitution of the world, the fiery

element would interact with air to create moisture, which then

condenses into earth. The four elements would then organize in their

proper measures to create living beings (SVF, 1.102). By

Necessity, the principle cohesive power of the cosmos, the same souls

which existed in one cycle would then be reconstituted in the cosmos

and would play the same part in the same way, with perhaps an

insignificant variation or two. This concept from the early Stoa is

sometimes known as the "eternal recurrence." Because human souls are

rational seeds of God (Logos, Zeus, Creative Fire), the conflagration

is an event in which all souls return to the pure substance of creative

fire (pur technikon), Zeus. This is not to be understood as an

"afterlife" of human souls, as one would find in Christianity, for

example. God, then restored in his own completion, assesses the lives

of the previous cycle and fashions the next great age of the world that

will contain an identical sequence of events. Heraclitus,

whom the Stoics claimed as a precursor, possessed an earlier doctrine

of conflagration, though it is not to be assumed that his generation

and decay of the cosmos was measured by the planetary circuits, for its

movement, to him, is a pathway up and down rather than circular (Diog.

Laert., 9. 6). As reported by Philo,

the only Stoics to have rejected the eternal recurrence include Boethus

of Sidon, Panaetius, and a mature Diogenes of Babylon (De aeternitate mundi, 76-7).

Astrological configurations were specified as part of the Stoic-Babylonian theory of eternal recurrence. According to Nemesius,

The Stoics say that when the planets return to the same

celestial sign [sêmeion], in length and breadth [mêkos kai platos],

where each was originally when the world was first formed, at the set

periods of time they cause conflagration and destruction of existing

things. Once again the world returns anew to the same condition as

before; and when the stars are moving again in the same way, each thing

that occurred in the previous period will come to pass indiscernibly.

(SVF, 2.625, tr. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers V. 1, p. 309).

The word sêmeion used by Nemesius could represent any celestial indicator, though the typical word for "sign of the zodiac" was zôidion.

The celestial position of "length and breath" (latitude and longitude)

is more specifically identified by second century C.E. astrologer

Antiochus as the last degree of the zodiac sign of Cancer or the first

degree of Leo. A variation of this theory of apokatastasis includes anantapokatastatis,

which is an additional destruction by water which occurs when the

planets align in the opposing sign, Capricorn. Such destruction by a

Great Flood during this alignment was also attributed to Berossus by

Seneca. Fourth century astrologer turned Christian, Firmicus Maternus,

associatedapokatastasis with the Thema Mundi (or Genesis Cosmos),

which is a "birth chart" for the world consisting of each planet in the

15th degree of its own sign. For the sake of consistency with the Stoic

eternal cosmos, Firmicus claimed this chart does not indicate that the

world had any original birth in the sense of creation,

particularly one that could be conceived of by human reason or

empirical observation. The Great Year contains all possible

configurations and events. Because it exceeds the span of human records

of observation, there is no way of determining the birth of the world.

He claimed that the schema had been invented by the Hermetic

astrologers to serve as an instructional tool often employed as

allegory (Mathesis, 3.1). A more common Genesis Cosmos mentioned in astrological texts is a configuration of all planets in their own signs and degrees of exaltation hupsoma), special regions that had been established in Babylonian astrology.

iii. Divination and Cosmic Sympathy

The eternal recurrence doctrine in Stoicism entails justification of

divination and belief in the predictability of events. The Sun, Moon

and planets, as gods, possess the pur technikon and are not destroyed in theekpurôsis (SVF,

1.120). While their physical substance is destroyed, they maintain an

existence as thoughts in the mind of Zeus. Because the gods are

indestructible, they maintain memory of events that take place within a

Great Year and know everything that will happen in the following cycles

(SVF, 2.625). Divination, for Stoicism, is therefore possible,

and even a divine gift. Stoics who accepted divination include

Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, and Antipater (SVF, 2.1192).

The presupposition that divination is a legitimate science was also

used by Chrysippus as an argument in favor of fate. Cicero, however, argued for the incompatibility of divination and Stoicism (De fato,

11-14), particularly the incompatibility between Chryssipus' modal

logical (which allows for non-necessary future truths) and the

necessary future claimed by divination's power of prediction. These

non-necessary future truths include all things that happen "according

to us" (eph' hêmin). The example argument presented by Cicero,

"If someone is born at the rising of the Dogstar, he will not die at

sea," would not, by his account, fall under the category of

non-necessary truths since the antecedent truth is necessary (as a past

true condition). Therefore the conclusion would also be necessary

according to Chrysippus' logic. Cicero mentions Chrysippus' defense

against charges of such contradictions, but regardless of the success

or failure of Chysippus' defense against them, the issue for the

possibility of divination, for the Stoics, was not considered a logical

contradiction between fate and free will. The eph hêmin in Stoicism was based on a disposition of character that, while not a causal necessity,

would lead one to make decisions between the good, bad, and indifferent

in accordance with nature. Because human beings are by nature the

rational seeds (logoi spermatikoi) of the Godhead, their

choices will correspond to the cosmic fate inherent in the eternal

recurrence, and would not alter that which is divined. For Chrysippus,

at least, the laws of divination are accepted as empirically factual

(or proto-science) and not as a matter of logicalconnectivity between past, present, and future. Since divination occurs as a matter of revelation thoughsigns,

the idea that there can be knowledge of a necessary causal antecedent

leading to a future effect is not the principle behind it (cf. Bobzein,

p. 161-170). The Stoic argument for divination through signs would be

as follows: if there are gods, they must both be aware of future events

and must love human beings while holding only good intentions toward

them. Because of their care for human beings, signs are then given by

the gods for potential knowledge of future events. These events are

known by the gods, though not alterable by them. If signs are given,

then the proper means to interpret them must also be given. If they are

not interpreted correctly, the fault does not lie with the gods or with

divination itself, but with an error of judgment on the part of the

interpreter (Cicero, De divinatione, 1.82-3; 1.117-18).

Another theory in support of divination and by extension astral divination, is that of cosmic sympathy.

Cosmic sympathy was already prevalent in Hipparchean medical theory,

though Posidonius is credited for its development in the Stoic school.

Posidonius, though, claimed to have drawn this notion from Democritus,

Xenophanes, Pythagoras and Socrates. Stoic physical theory holds that

all things in the universe are connected and held together in their

interactions through tension. The active and passive principles move pneuma,

the substance that penetrates and unifies all things. In fact, this

tension holds bodies together, and every coherent thing would collapse

without it. Pneuma as the commanding substance of the soul

penetrates the cosmos. This cosmos, for the Stoics, is both a rational

and sensate living being (Diog. Laert., 7.143). The Stoics thought that

the cosmos is ensouled and has impulses or desires (hormai).

Whereas in Platonism these impulses are conflicting and need the

rational part of the soul to govern them, in Stoicism desires of the

cosmic soul are harmoniously drawn toward a rational (though not

entirely accessible to human beings) end, which is Logos, or Zeus'

return to himself through the cosmic cycle of apokatastasis.

So the idea of cosmic sympathy supports divination, because knowledge

of one part of the cosmos (such as a sign) is, by way of the cohesive

substance of pneuma, access to the whole. In contrast to

Plato's disparaging view of divination that it is not divinely inspired

but based on the artless fumbling of human error, the Stoic view, for

the most part, is that rational means of divination can be developed.

The push to develop a scientific (meaning systematic and empirical)

knowledge-based divination finds its natural progression in

mathematically based astrology.

Stoic-influenced astrologers went a step further than Stoic

philosophers to define innate potentials of character by assigning them

to the zodiac and planets. Virtuous and corrupt characteristics are

identified as determined by the potential of the natal chart, while

external circumstances are indicated by the combination of this chart

with transits of planets through time and certain periods of life set

in motion by the configurations in the natal chart. For instance, in

his list of personality characteristics for individuals born with

certain zodiac signs on the horizon, Teukros of Babylon (near Cairo)

includes character traits that are not morally neutral. For example,

those born when the first decan of Libra is ascending are "virtuous" (enaretous), while those born when the third decan of Scorpio is ascending "do many wrongs" or are "law-breakers" (pollous adikountas).

iv. The Attitude of Stoic Philosophers Towards Astrology

While it is clear that Stoic philosophy influenced the development

of astrology, the attitude of the Stoa towards astrology, however,

varied on the basis of the individual philosophers. Cicero stated that

Diogenes of Babylon believed astrologers are capable of predicting

disposition and praxis (one's life activity), but not much else.

Diogenes, though, is said to have calculated a "Great Year" in his

earlier years (Aetius, De placitis reliquiae, 364.7-10). His turn to skepticism changed his view on Stoic ekpurosisand

likely modified his view on astrology. Middle Stoic Panaetius is said

to have rejected astrology altogether. That an astrological example is

used by Cicero to illustrate a contradiction in Chrysippus' logic and

divination does not necessarily mean that Chrysippus himself had much

exposure to or took an interest in astrology. (Cicero's example is, "If

someone is born at the rising of the Dogstar, he will not die at sea." Si quis (verbi causa) oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur. De fato,

12). In Chrysippus' time, Hellenistic astrology had not yet been

formulated systematically. However, given that the example is based on

a consideration of importance to Babylonian astrology, the rising of

the fixed star Sirius, the possibility exists that Chrysippus or one of

his contemporaries discussed astrology in the context of logic and

divination.

Posidonius was alleged by Augustine to have been "much given to astrology" (multum astrologiae deditus) and "an assertor fatal influence of the stars" (De civitate dei

5.2). His actual relationship to astrology, however, is more

complicated, but there are several reasons to think that he supported

astrology. For one, in his belief that the world is a living animal, he

followed Chrysippus in identifying the commanding faculty of the world

soul as the heavens (Diog. Laert., 7.138-9. Cleanthes

considered it to be the Sun). Secondly, Posidonius had a strong

research interest in astronomy and meteorology. He was the first to

systematically research the connection between ocean tides and the

phases of the Moon. His research in this area possibly led him to his

doctrine of cosmic sympathy, as he considered natural affinities among

things of the earth. Cosmic sympathy allows for an association between

signs (within nature that can extend to planets and stars) and future

events without direct causality. If the higher faculty of the cosmos is

located in the heavens, then it is more likely that these signs would

carry weight for Posidonius. Thirdly, Cicero, who can be given more

credibility than Augustine by having attended Posidonius' lectures,

mentions him in connection with astrology in De divinatione (1.130). Fourthly, Posidonius (as a Platonic-influenced thinker) believed idea that the signs of the zodiac (zôdia)

are ensouled bodies – living beings (Fr. 149, Edelstein-Kidd / Fr.

400a, Theiler). However, given that Posidonius is flourishing at the

same time as the earliest textual evidence for Hellenistic astrology

(first century B.C.E.; some "technical" Hermetic fragments about Solar

and Lunar observations may be earlier), it is difficult to say what

type of astrology he would have had an interest in – whether it had

been remnants of the Babylonian omen-based astrology, or the beginning

formulation of a systematic Greco-Roman astrology. Because he was

widely traveled, he may have gained exposure to one or more astrologers

or schools of astrologers. With his observations of the connection

between seasonal fluctuations of the tides and the Solar/Lunar cycles,

he apparently refuted Seleucus, a Babylonian astronomer who believed

that the tides also fluctuation according to the zodiac sign in which

the Moon would fall; he claimed the tides were regular when the Moon

would be in the equinoctial signs of Aries or Libra and irregular in

the solstitial signs of Capricorn, Cancer (Fr. 218, Edelstein-Kidd /

Fr. 26, Theiler). This observation would not have necessarily been

considered an astrological one, though it is schematized

according to characteristics of the zodiac rather than lunations and

seasons, and such schematizations were quite common in Hellenistic

astrology. It cannot be said with certainty whether Posidonius'

advocacy of cosmic sympathy lent support to the development of

astrology or if this development itself reinforced Posidonius' own

theories of cosmic sympathy and fate.

The importance of astrology in politics of first century Rome was

aided by its alignment with Stoic fatalism and cosmic sympathy.

Balbillus, son of Thrasyllus and astrologer to Nero, Seneca, and a

certain Alexandrian Stoic, Chaeremon, were all appointed tutors to L.

Domitius. Chaeremon (who Cramer, p. 116, identifies with the Egyptian

priest/astrology in Porphyry's Letter to Anebo and in Eusebius'Praeparatio evang., 4.1) wrote a work on comets (peri komêtôn suggramma) that cast these typically foreboding signs in a favorable light. Seneca, too, wrote a work on comets (Book 7 of Quaestiones naturales), in which he portrays some as good omens for the Empire (cf. Cramer, p. 116-118).

c. Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean Developments

So far in this account of the theoretical development of Hellenistic

astrology, the pre-Socratic thinkers contributed a deep concern for

fate and justice. Plato contributed an orderly and rational cosmos,

while those in the early Academy displayed an astral piety that

recognized the planets as gods or representations of gods. The Stoics

contributed theories of fate and divination, that already had an

astrological component with the Babylonian contribution to the Eternal

Recurrence. Cosmic sympathy, present in Greek medicine and popularized

by the middle Stoic Posidonius, provided astrologers with a theoretical

grounding for the associations among planets, zodiac signs, and all

other things. One notable Stoic contribution to Hellenistic astrology

which distinguishes it from the Babylonian is the incorporation of

Chryssipus' principle of two forces, active and passive, manifest in

the activities of the four elements. Fire and air were active, earth

and water passive. The astrologers later assigned these elements and

dynamic qualities to each sign of the zodiac. Further philosophical

developments by the Middle Platonists and the Neopythagoreans would

then lead to astrology as a system of knowledge due to its systematic

and mathematical nature. The systematic nature would make it plausible

to some and a worthy or dangerous foe to others. These developments set

astrology apart, epistemologically speaking, from other manners of

divination such as haruspicy (study of the liver of animals), or dream

interpretation.

The union between Pythagorean theory and Platonism should come as no

surprise given Plato's late interest in Pythagoreanism. From the early

academy onward, elements of Pythagorean theory became part and parcel

of Platonism. Speusippus wrote a work on Pythagorean numbers (Fr. 4),

and he would become influential in this regard, if not as directly on

subsequent Academy members as on Neopythagorean circles. He and

Xenocrates both offered cosmic hierarchies formed from the One and the

Dyad. The One, or Monad, is a principle of order and unity, while the

Dyad is the principle of change, motion, and division. The manner in

which these principles are related was a critical issue inherited from

the early Academy. Xenocrates (Fr. 15) believed that stars are fiery

Olympian Gods and in the existence of sublunary daimons and elemental

spirits. We see in Xenocrates both the identification of Gods with

stars (as we saw in Phillip of Opus) and the notion that Gods are

forces of Nature, thereby creating an important theoretical issue for

astrology, namely what is the domain of influence of the planetary

gods, as the Olympians are identified with the planets. He also

believed that the world soul is formed from Monad and Dyad, and that it

served as a boundary between the supralunary and sublunary places.

Xenocrates' cosmology would be highly influential on Plutarch, who

elaborated on the roles of the world soul, the daimons, the planets and

fixed stars.

The middle Platonists, many of whom believed themselves to be true

expounders of Plato, were influenced by other schools of thought. The

physical theories of Antiochus of Ascalon are very Stoic in nature. For

example, he incorporated the Stoic "qualities" (poiotêtes),

which were moving vibrations that act upon infinitely divisible matter,

into his cosmology. The unity of things is held together by the world

soul (much as it is held together in Stoic theory by pneuma).

Antiochus equated the Stoic Logos/Zeus with the Platonic World Soul,

and this soul of the cosmos governs both the heavenly bodies and things

on earth that affect humankind. He also accepted the Stoic Pur Tekhnikon

(Creative Fire) as the substance composing the stars, gods, and

everything else. There is little to indicate that Antiochus held in his

cosmology the notion common to some other Platonists of transcendent

immateriality; his universe, like the Stoics, is material. On the

subject of fate and free will, he argues against Chrysippus (if he is

in fact the philosopher identified as doing so in Cicero's De fato and Topica)

by accepting the reality of free will rather than the illusion of free

will created simply by the limitations of human knowledge in grasping

fated future events. Antiochus' view on other beings in the cosmos,

particularly the ontological status of stars and planets, may be found

in his Roman student Varro who stated that the heavens, populated by

souls (the immortal occupying aether and air), are divided by elements

in this order from top to bottom: aether, air, water, earth.

From the highest circle of heaven to the circle of the

Moon are aetherial souls, the stars and planets, and these are not only

known by our intelligence to exist, but are also visible to our eyes as

heavenly gods." (from Natural Theology, tr. Dillon, Middle Platonists, p. 90).

Daimons and heroes, then, were thought to occupy the aerial sphere.

The importance of Antiochus for the development of Hellenistic

astrology may be his break with the skepticism

of the New Academy, one which allowed the Middle Platonists to espouse

more theological and speculative views about the soul and the cosmos

while anticipating Neoplatonic

theories. In Alexandria, which, not by coincidence would become a

hotbed for astrological theory and practice, Platonism incorporated

strong Neopythagorean elements. Eudorus of Alexandria, who wrote a

commentary on Plato's Timaeus, contributed to the importance

of Timaean cosmology in middle and Neoplatonic thought. References to

Eudorus' are found in Achilles' work, Introduction to Aratus' Phenemona.

Achille used Eudorus as a source for this work that also contains

references to Pythagorean theories of planetary harmonies. We know from

Achilles that Eudorus followed the Platonic and Stoic belief that the

stars are ensouled living beings (Isagoga, 13). This

intellectual climate is likely the immediate context for the

development of systematic astrology – with its complex classifications

of the signs, planets, and their placements in a horoscope, and the

numerological calculations used for predicting all sorts of events in

one's life.

i. Ocellus Lucanus

The revival of Pythagoreanism by the mid-first century B.C.E.

brought about the acceptance of pythagorica of "Timaeus of Locri" and

Ocellus Lucanus as genuinely "early" Pre-Platonic Pythagorean texts,

though both mostly like date around the second century B.C.E., or at

latest, the first half of the first century B.C.E. The Neopythagorean

texts just mentioned are significant for the development of Hellenistic

astrology. They represent cosmological theories that likely were used

as justification for astrology.

In On the Nature of the Universe (peri tês tou pantos phuseôs),

Ocellus argues for a perfectly ordered harmonious universe that is

immutable and unbegotten. By appealing to the empirical rationale that

we cannot perceive the universe coming to be and passing away, but only

its self-identity, he concludes the eternity of the whole, including

its part. This whole though is divided into two worlds, the supralunary

and the sublunary. The heavens down to the Moon comprise a world of

unchanging harmony that governs the sublunary realm of all

changing and corruptible activity. In Platonic manner, the unchanging

(the Monad) governs and generates the changing (the Dyad). In

Pythagorean manner, the divine beings in the unchanging realm are in

perfect harmony with one another through their regular motions. Visible

signs for the unchanging harmony and self-subsistence of the universe

are found in the harmonious movements of things in relation to one

another. Based on the nature of the relations listed – "order,

symmetry, figurations (skhêmatismoi), positions (theseis), intervals (diastaseis),

powers, swiftness and slowness with respect to others, their numbers

and temporal periods" (1.6) – he clearly means the movements of planets

and stars. This list comprises the primary factors by which astrologers

would assess the strength and qualities of planets in a given horoscope

as the basis for the formulation of predictive techniques and

statements. For instance, swiftness of planets was thought to make them

stronger while slowness (which occurs close to the retrogradation

motion) weakens the planet, while "figurations" (skhêmatismoi) is a word used for aspects, or the geometrical figures planets make to one another and the ascending sign (horoskopos).

Temporal periods were assigned by astrologers in a variety of ways,

though usually based on the "lesser years" of the planets, the time it

took for one planet to complete its revolution with respect to a

starting point in the zodiac. "Intervals" (diastaseis) were

measures that were calculated either between planets or between planets

and the horizon or culminating points in a horoscope; in the case of

the latter, the intervals were used in astrology to determine strong

and weak areas in the horoscope. The former notion of intervals was

used for determining various time periods of one's life assigned to

each planet (cf. Valens, Anthologiarum, 3.3). "Numbers" was a term used to indicate a planet's motion (as appearing from earth) as direct or retrograde. "Powers" (dunameis)

of the planets are combinations of heating, cooling, drying, moistening

– these powers made planets benevolent or malevolent (cf. Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos, 1.4). Ocellus goes on to name these powers as hot, cold, wet, and dry, and he contrasts them with the "substances" (ousiai)

or elements of fire, earth, water and air. The powers and substances,

or "qualities" and "elements" as they are more commonly called, were

used in horoscopic astrology to describe the natures of the planets and

zodiac signs. In Ocellus' explanation of astral causality, the powers

are immortal forms that affect changes on the sublunary substances

(2.4-5).

Whether or not Ocellus and other Neopythagoreans are at the

forefront of formulating these particular astrological rules, he

provides a metaphysical basis for the notion that the planets and stars

effect changes on earth. He is further described as saying that the

Moon is the locus where immortality (above) and mortality (below) meet.

He also says the obliquity of the zodiac, the pathway of the Sun, is

the inclining place at which the supralunary generates activity in the

sublunary realm. The Sun's seasonal motion conforms to the powers (hot,

cold, wet, and dry) that bring about changes in the substances

(elements); the ecliptic path inclines these powers into the realm of

strife and nature.

In his discussion on the generation of men, Ocellus argues, in more of an Aristotelian than Platonic sense (as found in On Generation and Corruption,

that the only participation of men in immortality is through the gift

by divinities of the power of reproduction. Following rules of morality

in connubial relations results in living in harmony with the universe.

Immoral transgressions, though, are punished by the production of

ignoble offspring. A manner of cosmic sympathy (as found in Greek

medicine) plays a role in determining that the circumstances of

conception (such as a tranquil state of mind) will reflect upon the

nature of the offspring. This notion is in keeping with the fact that

astrologers studied charts not only for the moment of birth, but for

conception as well. The only major difference is that for the

astrologers, the circumstances of the birth appear to be reflected

universally at a given time and not the direct result of moral or

immoral actions as it is for Ocellus. The moment of birth or conception

for the astrologers is reflected in all things of nature and in any

activities initiated at that particular moment, as reflected in the

positions of the planets and signs. The technical astrologers typically

did not include reflections on moral retributions in their manuals of

astral fate. They were primarily concerned with detailing knowledge of

fate for its own sake, though speculation about such matters as

retribution and rebirth is not excluded by astrological theory.

ii. Timaeus Locrus

The Hellenistic text attributed to Timaeus Locrus, On the Nature of

the World and the Soul, purports to be the original upon which Plato

drew for his dialogue of his name. For the most part, it consists of a

summary of the material by Plato. The circles of the Same and the

Different carry the fixed stars and the planets respectively. The

sphere of the fixed stars containing the cosmos is granted the

Pythagorean perfect figure of the dodecahedron. One addition of note

for the theory of astrology is the doctrine of the creation of souls.

The four elements are made by the demiurge in equal measure and power,

and Soul of man is made in the same proportion and power. Individual

souls of human beings are fashioned by Nature (who has been handed the

task by the demiurge of creating mortal beings) from the Sun, Moon, and

planets, from the circle of Difference with a measure of the circle of

the Same that she (Nature being hypostasized as the female principle)

mixes in the rational part of the soul. There appears in this to be a

difference in individual souls reflecting different fates based on the

composition. While this merely reiterates what is found in Plato's Timaeus

(42d-e), the supposition that one could read this account straight from

Timaeus Locrus gave authority to these notions. It is likely that these

ideas filtered to the astrologers, who would devise methods for seeking

out the ruling planet (oikodespotês) for an individual (see section on Porphyry).

Perhaps what they were seeking in the horoscope was one of the "young

gods" whose task it was to fashion the mortal body of each soul and to

steer their course away from evils. As mentioned above, some

philosophers associated the young gods with the planets.

Astrological fragments of a writer "Timaeus Praxidas" date to the

same period (early to middle first century B.C.E.), but there is little

textual evidence to indicate that these are one and the same writer.

What it at least indicates is that the legend of Timaeus lent authority

to the astrological writers.

iii. Thrasyllus

Thrasyllus (d. 36 C.E.), a native of Alexandria, was not only the

court astrologer to Tiberius, but a grammarian and self-professed

Pythagorean who studied in Rhodes. Given that he published an edition

of Plato's works (and is known for the arrangement of the dialogues

into tetralogies), and that he wrote a work on Platonic and Pythagorean

philosophy, we can assume that his astrological theory represents

Middle Platonism of the early first century C.E. However, a summary of

his astrological work "Pinax" (tables), indicates that he is drawing

upon earlier sources, particularly the pseudepigrapha of "Nechepso and

Petosiris" and Hermes Trismegistus. A numerological table, perhaps

containing zodiac associations to numbers as that found in Teukros of

Babylon, is also attributed to Thrasyllus. It appears that his own

philosophy contains a mixture of Hermetic and Pythagorean elements.

A search for exact origins of astrology's development into a complex

system remains inconclusive, but the following can be surmised. The

combination of Pythagorean theory, such as the supralunary realm

influencing the sublunar, Platonic ensouled planets moving on the

circle of the Different, Stoic determinism and cosmic sympathy, and the

emergence of a Hermetic tradition, comprised the intellectual context

for the systematic structuring of astrology, its classifications of the

signs, planets, and their placements in a horoscope, and the

numerological calculations used for predicting all sorts of events in

one's life.

iv. Plutarch

Besides being a prolific writer on a variety of subjects, Plutarch

was, philosophically speaking, a Platonist, as defined by his era, that

is, one influenced by Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neopythagorean notions.

In Plutarch's case this includes ideas culled from his study of Persian

and Egyptian traditions. By his time (late first century C.E.),

astrology had been systematized and appropriated by Greek language and

thinking, and in Rome, the political implications of astrological

theory were made evident in the relationships between astrologers and

emperors (such as Thrasyllus and his son Balbillus) and in the edicts

against predictions about emperors (cf. Cramer, 99 ff). Plutarch's own

form of Platonism did not then directly contribute to the technical

development of astrology, but it does add a Middle Platonic

contribution to an explanation of how astrology gained some credibility

and much popularity in the first three centuries of the common era. He

also borrowed some astrological concepts (and metaphors) for his own

philosophy. First of all, as a priest of Apollo, Plutarch saw all other

deities as symbolic aspects of One God that is invisible and

unintelligible. He gained impetus for this from an etymology of

"Apollo," which is explained as an alpha-privative a-pollos, or "not many" (De E apud Delphos, 393b). He resists a pure identification of the Sun with Apollo (De pythiae oraculis

400c-d), because the One God is Invisible, and the Sun an intelligible

copy. He likens the Sun to one aspect, that of the Nous, the heart of

the cosmos. The Moon is then associated with the cosmic Soul (and

spleen), and the earth with the bowels. Taking cue from Plato's

suggestion in the Laws (10.896 ff) of two world souls,

beneficent and malevolent (a concept Numenius would take up later), he

believed the malevolent soul to be responsible for irrational motion in

the sublunary world. The malevolent or irrational soul preexisted the

demiurge's creation. It is not pure evil, but the cause of evil

operating in the sublunary realm, mixing with the good to create cosmic

tension. Plutarch maintains the distinction of Ocellus between the

generating supralunary realm and the generated sublunary realm, but he

offers more detail about operations in the sublunary world of change.

He posits two opposing principles or powers of good and evil that offer

a right-handed straight path and a reversed, backwards path for souls (De Isis., 369e). Individual souls are microcosms of a world soul (based on Timaeus, 30b), and the parts of the soul reflect this cosmic tension. Souls are subject in the sublunary realm to a mixture of fate (heimarmenê), chance (tukhê), and free choice (eph' hêmin). The "young gods", the planetary gods in the Timaeus

(42d-e) that steer souls, Plutarch designates as the province of the

irrational soul. With the emphasis of the irrational soul and the

mixture of forces in the sublunary realm, Plutarch's cosmology allows

for the possibility of astrology. Plutarch also posits four principles (arkhê) in the cosmos, Life, Motion, Generation and Decay (De genio Socratis,

591b). Life is linked to Motion through the activity of the Invisible,

through the Monad; Motion is linked to Generation through the Mind (Nous); and Generation is linked to Decay through the Soul. The three Fates (Moirai)

are also linked to this cycle as Clotho seated in the Sun presided over

the first process, Atropo, seated in the Moon, over the second, and

Lachesis over the third on Earth (cf. De facie in orbe lunae,

945c-d). At death the soul of a person leaves the body and goes to

Moon, the mind leaves the soul and goes to Sun. The reverse process

happens at birth. Plutarch is not rigid with his use of planetary

symbolism, for in another place, he associates the Sun with the

demiurge, and the young gods with the Moon, emphasizing the rational

and irrational souls (De E apud Delphos, 393a).

Plutarch's own opinion about astrology as a practice of prediction

is ambiguous at best. He supported the probability of divination by

human beings, although dimmed by the interference of the body, as

evident in his arguments for it in On the E at Delphi (387) and in De defectu oraculorum

(431e ff). However, he complains about generals who rely more heavily

on divination than on counselors experienced in military affairs

(Marius, 42.8). In his accounts of astrologers, his attitude appears to

be more skeptical. InRomulus (12), he discusses the claims

made by an astrologer named Taroutios, namely, of discovering the exact

birth date and hour of Romulus as well as the time in which he lay the

first stone of his city, by working backwards from his character to his

birth chart. Plutarch considered astrologers' claims that cities are

subject to fate accessible by a chart cast for the beginning of their

foundation to be extravagant. He also wrote about how Sulla, having

consulted Chaldaeans, was able to foretell his own death in his memoirs

(Sulla, 37.1). However, Plutarch finds himself at a loss at

explaining why Marius would be successful in his reliance on divination

while Octavius was not so fortunate accepting the forecasts of

Chaldaeans.

4. The Astrologers

a. The Earliest Hellenistic Astrology: Horoscopic and Katarchic

Cicero's account in On Divination of Eudoxus' rejection of

Chaldaean astrological predictions points to Greek awareness of

Babylonian astrology as early as the third century B.C.E. Another

account about Theophrastus' awareness of Chaldaean horoscopic astrology (predicting for individuals rather than weather and general events) is given to us by Proclus (In Platonis Timaeum commentaria,

3.151). Technical manuals by Greek-speaking astrologers used for

casting and interpreting horoscopic (natal) charts date as early as the

late second century B.C.E. In addition to natal astrology, many of the

fragments exemplify the practice of katarchical astrology, or the selection of the most auspicious moment for a given activity. Katarkhê

was also used to ascertain events that had already happened, to view

the course of an illness, or track down thieves, lost objects, and

runaway slaves. Fragments attributed to Thrasyllus, the

philosopher-astrology include such methods. This use of astrology

implies that the astrologers themselves did not prescribe to strict

fatalism, at least the kind that dictates that knowledge from signs of

the heavens cannot influence events. Perhaps like Plutarch, they

believed in a combination of fate, chance, and free will. Given the

pervasiveness of cosmic sympathy and a unified cosmic order, astrology

pertaining to proper moments of time and to natural occurrences was

less controversial than that pertaining to the soul of human beings.

However, the texts of the next few centuries focus primarily on natal

rather than katarchic astrology. Methods to ascertain controversial

matters such as one's length of life would proliferate and play a

significant part in Roman politics (cf. Cramer, p. 58 ff). Such

fascination with either the fate or predisposition of individuals

reflects a stronger concern in the late Hellenistic world for the life

of the individual in a period of rapid political and social change.

b. Earliest Fragments and Texts

The earliest Hermetic writings, the technical Hermetica (dated

second century B.C.E. and contrasted with philosophical Hermetica cf.

Fowden, p. 58) include works on astrology. As mentioned by Clement, (Stromata,

6.4.35-7), they include: on the ordering of the fixed stars, on the

Sun, Moon and five planets, on the conjunctions and phases of the Sun

and Moon, and on the times when the stars rise. These topics in the

early Hermetica do not reflect much technical sophistication in

comparison to the complicated techniques of prediction that we find in

the katarchic and natal astrology texts of other astrological writers.

The astronomical measurements that appear to be used for these topics

are most likely for the purpose of katarchic astrology and ritual

because they do not contain the apparatus for casting natal charts. An

exception to the technical sparsity of astrology considered to be in

the lineage of Hermes Trismegistus are the works attributed to Nechepso

and Petosiris (typically dated around 150 B.C.E.), portions of which

survive in quotations. Combined, they are considered a major source for

many later astrologers, and are said by Firmicus Maternus to be in line

with the Hermetic tradition, handed down by way of other Hermetic

figures such as Aesclepius and Anubio, from Hermes himself. It is

impossible to say to what extent the writers of these texts had

organized existing techniques or invented new ones, but based on the

frequency with which Nechepso and Petosiris are quoted by later

authors, we can be certain that they were important conveyers of

technical Hellenistic astrology. More about the astral theories in the

later philosophical Hermeticism and Gnosticism will be discussed below.

Additional fragments are preserved of real and pseudepigraphical

astrologers of the first centuries B.C.E and C.E. including Critodemus,

Dorotheus of Sidon, Teukros of Babylon, (pseudo-)Eudoxus, Serapion,

Orpheus, Timaeus Praxidas, Anubion, (pseudo-)Erasistratus, Thrasyllus,

and Manilius. Only a few representative writers will be highlighted

below.

c. Manilius

For most of the early astrological writers, we can only speculate

about their theoretical justification for the practice, two exceptions

being first century B.C.E. Roman Stoic Manilius, (from whom we have the

Latin didactic poem, Astronomica), and Thrasyllus, whose work

is described above. Manilius was also associated with the Roman

imperial circle, dedicating his work to either Augustus or Tiberius

(see Cramer, p. 96, for more on this controversy). While his poetic

account of astrology contains much technical material, there is little

evidence to show that he himself practiced astrological prediction.

Some scholars speculated that he intended to avoid the political

dangers of the practice in his day with the poetic writing style and

the exclusion of astrological doctrine about the planets, which is

necessary for the practice (or his work could simply be incomplete).

His Stoic philosophy is one in which Fate is immutable, and astrology

is a means of understanding the cosmic and natural order of all things,

but not of changing events. However fated we are, he says, is no excuse

for bad behavior such as crime, for crime is still wicked and

punishable no matter what its origin in the sequence of causal

determinism (4.110-117). He used the regularity of the rising of the

fixed stars and the courses of the Sun and Moon as proof against the

Epicureans that nothing is left to chance and that the universe is

commanded by a divine will (1.483-531). Nature apportions to the stars

the responsibility over the destinies of individuals (3.47-58). Nature

is not thought to be separate from reason, but is the agent of Fate –

one orchestrated by a material god for reasons not readily accessible

to the mortals who experience apparent injustices and turns of events

that defy normal expectations (4.69-86). The purpose of the deity is

simply to maintain order and harmony in its cosmos (1.250-254).

Astrology demonstrates cosmic sympathy among all things and can be used

to predict events insofar as it grants access to the predestined order.

In addition to the use of astrology for psychological acceptance of

one's fate, Manilius emphasizes the aesthetic and religious benefits of

its study, for he considers it a gift to mortals from the god Hermes

for the sake of inducing reverence and piety of the cosmic deity.

d. Claudius Ptolemy of Alexandria

Astrology had increased in popularity in the second century C.E.,

and two writers of this period operating under different philosophical

influences, Ptolemy (c. 100-170 C.E.) and Vettius Valens (fl. 152-162

C.E.), will next be discussed. Ptolemy is an exception among the

astrological authors because first and foremost he is an empirical

scientist, and one who, like his philosophical and scientific

contemporaries, is concerned with theories of knowledge. His works

include those on astronomy, epistemology, music, geography, optics, and

astrology. He is best known as an astronomer for his work Syntaxis mathematica (Almagest), but from the middle ages to present day, his astrological work,Apotelesmatica (or Tetrabiblos

as it is more commonly known), has been considered the key

representative of Greek astrology, primarily due to its prominence in

textual transmission.

Scholars have claimed Ptolemy's main philosophical influences to be either Peripatetic,

Middle Stoic (Posidonius), Middle Platonist (Albinus) or Skeptic

(sharing a possible connection with Sextus Empiricus). Any attempts to

tie him to a single school would be futile. His eclecticism, though, is

by no means an arbitrary amalgam of different schools, but a search for

agreements (rather than disagreements sought by the Pyrrhonian

Skeptics) and a scientist's harmony of rationalism and empiricism (cf.

Long in Dillon & Long, p. 206-207). His epistemological criteria

(in On the Criterion shows only superficial differences with the Skeptics, while he often employs Stoic terminology (such as katalêpsis) without the Stoic technical meanings. He extends the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis

(as the manner of familiarity that a Stoic Sage achieves with the

cosmos) to the relations of familiarity that planets and zodiac signs

share among themselves.

Because Ptolemy deviates significantly from other astrologers in

theory and technique, some have doubted that he was a practicing

astrologer at all. It is difficult to support this claim when in theTetrabiblos

he makes a long argument in favor of astrology and he claims to have

better methods than offered by the tradition. It seems best to call him

a "revisionist" rather than a "non-astrologer." His revisions and

causal language make his position vulnerable to later attacks by

Plotinus and other philosophers. The methods Ptolemy rejects include

material that can be traced to the Hermetic Nechepso/Petosiris text,

particularly the use of Lots (klêroi) and the division of the chart into twelve places (topoi)

responsible for topics in life such as siblings, illness, travel, etc.

Lots were points in the chart typically calculated from the positions

of two planets and the degree of the ascending sign. He also rejects

various subdivisions of the zodiac and nearly all numerologically based

methods. He considered these methods to be disreputable and arbitrary

because they are removed from the actual observations of planets and

stars. (It might be noted here that he also rejects Pythagorean

musicology on empirical grounds in his work Harmonica).

Ptolemy says, in the beginning of Book I, that the study of the

relations of the planets and stars to one another (astronomy) can be

used for the less perfect art of prediction based on the changes of the

things they "surround" (tôn emperiekhomenon). He notes that

the difficulty of the art of astrological prediction has made critics

believe it to be useless, and he argues in favor of its helpfulness and

usefulness. He blames bad and false practitioners for the failing of

astrology. The rest of the argument involves the natural cosmic

sympathy popularized by Posidonius. The influence of the Sun, Moon, and

stars on natural phenomena, weather and seasons brings the possibility

than men can likewise be affected in temperament due to this natural

ambience (ton periekhon). The surrounding conditions of the

time and place of birth contribute a factor to character and

temperament (as we find earlier in Ocellus). While the supralunary

movements are perfect and destined, the sublunary are imperfect,

changeable, and subject to additional causes. Natural events such as

weather and seasons are less complicated by additional causes than

events in the lives of human beings. Rearing, custom, and culture are

additional accidental causes that contribute to the destiny of an

individual. He seems to encourage critics to allow astrologers to start

their predictions with knowledge of these factors rather than do what

is called a "cold reading" in modern astrology. The criticism he

counters is that of Skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus, who elaborated

on earlier arguments from the New Academy, and who argue that an

astrologer does not know if they are making predictions for a human or

a pack-ass (Adversus mathematicos, 5.94).

Ptolemy's arguments that astrology is useful and beneficial are the

following: 1) One gains knowledge of things human and divine. This is

knowledge for its own sake rather than for the purpose of gains such as

wealth or fame. 2) Foreknowledge calms the soul. This is a basic

argument from Stoic ethics. 3) One can see through this study that

there are other causes than divine necessity. Bodies in the heavens are

destined and regular, but on earth are changeable in spite of receiving

"first causes" from above. This corresponds again to the Neopythagorean

Platonism found in Ocellus. These first causes can override secondary

causes and can subsume the fate of an individual in the cases of

natural disasters. Ptolemy's attribution of the nature of planets and

stars, which is the basis of their benefic or malefic nature, is that,

like Ocellus before him, of heating, drying, moistening, and cooling.

The stars in each sign have these qualities too based on their

familiarity (oikeiôsis) with the planets. Geometrical aspects

between signs, which are the basis of planetary relations, are also

based on "familiarity" determined by music theory and the masculine or

feminine assignment to the signs. He considers the sextile and trine

aspects to be harmonious, and the quadrangle and opposition to be

disharmonious.

Book 2 of Tetrabiblos includes material on astrological

significations for weather, ethnology and astro-chorography. Ptolemy is

not the first to delineate an astrological chorography (geographical

regions assigned to signs of the zodiac), and his assignments differ

significantly from those found in Dorotheus, Teukros, Manilius, and

Paulus Alexandrinus. Book 3 and 4 consist of methods of prediction of

various topics in natal astrology. Absent in his work is the

katarchical astrology found in earlier writers. Ptolemy is the first

astrologer to employ Hipparchus' zodiac modified to account for the

"precession of the equinox," that is, the changing seasonal reference

point against the background of the stars. This zodiac uses the vernal

equinox as the beginning point rather than the beginning of one of the

twelve constellations. (This "tropical" zodiac would become the

standard in the Western practice of astrology up to present day. Modern

opponents of astrology typically utilize precession – pointing out the

fact that zodiac "signs" no longer match with the star constellations.)

Other astrologers, including those shortly following Ptolemy, were

either not aware of Hipparchus' observation or did not find it

important to make this adjustment. Valens claims to use another method

of Hipparchus, but it is debatable whether or not he adjusted his

zodiac to the vernal point. Ptolemy had no impact on other astrologers

of the second century, likely because his texts were not yet in

circulation.

We do not find in Ptolemy's work the language of signs and astral

divination, but a causal language – the relationships between the

planets cause natural activity on earth, from weather to seasons to

human temperament. However, Ptolemy argues for the fallibility of

prediction, and cannot be considered a strict astral determinist for

this reason, though he believed that astrology as a tool of knowledge

could be made more accurate with improved techniques, closing the gap

of fallibility. The idea that stars are causes is not original with

Ptolemy, being an acceptable idea to Peripatetic thinkers cued by Aristotle's eternal circular motions of the heavens as the cause of perpetual generation (On Generation and Corruption

(336b15 ff). For Ptolemy, though, this idea as a justification for the

practice of astrology was probably filtered through the Peripatetic

influenced Neopythagoreans such as Ocellus. Ptolemy's arguments may

have been the target of subsequent attacks by Alexander of Aphrodisias,

Plotinus and early Church Fathers.

e. Vettius Valens

The work Anthologiarum of Vettius Valens the Antiochian

(written between 152-162 C.E.) is important for a number of reasons. It

contains fragments of earlier writers such as Nechepso and Critodemus,

and numerous horoscopes important for the study of the history of

astronomy. He is also an astrological writer who best exemplifies the

details of the practice and the mind of the practitioner. Having

traveled widely in search of teachers, he exhibits techniques

unavailable in other astrological texts, indicating much regional

variety. Among his sources, he mentions the following astrologers and

astronomers (in alphabetical order): Abram, Apollinarius, Aristarchus,

Asclation, Asclepius, Critodemus, Euctemon, Hermeias, Hermes,

Hermippus, Hipparchus, Hypsicles, Kidenas, Meton, Nechepso, Petosiris,

Phillip, Orion, Seuthes and Soudines, Thrasyllus, Timaeus, Zoroaster.

Valens claimed to have tested the methods and to have the advantage of

making judgments about the methods through much toil and experience

(cf. 6.9). He occasionally interjects the technical material with

reflections about his philosophical convictions. His philosophical

leaning is far less complicated than Ptolemy's, for it is primarily

based on Stoic ethics. His association of the Sun with Nous

(1.1), for example, exhibits remnants of the Neopythagorean/Middle

Platonic roots (see Plutarch), but his conscious justification for

astrology is based on Stoicism. That which is in our power (eph' hêmin),

according to Stoic ethics, is how we adapt ourselves to fate and live

in harmony with it. Valens argues that we cannot change immutable fate,

but we can control how we play the role we are given (5.9). He quotes

Cleanthes, Euripides, and Homer on Fate (6.9; 7.3), emphasizing that

one must not stray from the appointed course of Destiny. Valens

maintains a sense of "astral piety," treating astrology as a religious

practice, exemplified in the oath of secrecy upon the Sun, Moon,

planets and signs of the zodiac in his introduction to Book 7. He asks

his reader(s) to swear not to reveal the secrets of astrology to the

uneducated or the uninitiated (tois apaideutois ê amuêtois),

and to pay homage to one's initial instructor, otherwise bad things

will befall them. In Book 5.9, he provides a Stoic argument in favor of

prognostication through astrology. He considers the outcomes that Fate

decrees to be immutable, and the goddesses of Hope (Elpis) and Fortune (Tukhê)

acting as helpers of necessity and enslave men with the desires created

by the turns and expectations of fortune. Those however who engage with

prognostication have "calmness of soul" (atarakhôn), do not care for fortune or hope, are neither afraid of death nor prone to flattery, and are "soldiers of fate" (stratiôtai tês heimarmenês).

While other places, Valens gives techniques for katarchical astrology

(5.3; 9.6) he states that no amount of ritual or sacrifice can alter

that which is fated in one's birth chart. He also considers the time of

birth to account for dissimilar natures in two children born of the

same parents. In keeping with his religious approach to astrology, he

treats it as "a sacred and venerable learning as something handed over

to men by god so they may share in immortality." Like Ptolemy, Valens

also blames the imperfections of predictions on the astrologers –

particularly the inattentiveness and superficiality of some of the

learners.

Ptolemy and Valens stand as representatives of astrology in the

second century, but their works were not the most prominent.

Astrological concepts were also used in magic, Hermeticism, Gnosticism, Gnostic Christian sects such as the Ophites, and by the author of the Chaldaean Oracles.

Other known astrologers of the second century include Antiochus of

Athens and Manetho (not to be confused with the Egyptian historian).

One additional astrologer will be treated for his philosophical

position, Firmicus Maternus. Though because he was influenced by

Neoplatonic theories, he will be included below in the section on

Neoplatonism.

5. The Skeptics

Already mentioned is Pliny's acceptance of some methods of astrology

and rejection of others based on numerology. Similarly mentioned was

Ptolemy's rejection of various methods based on subdivisions of the

zodiac and manipulations based on planetary numbers. Both he and

Valens, as astrologers, criticized other practitioners for either

shoddy methods or deliberate deception, posing their forms of

divination as astrology. Valens went so far as to admonish those who

dress up their "Barbaric" teachings in calculations as though they were

Greek, perhaps in reference to the frequently maligned "Chaldaeans" (Anthologiarum,

2.35). Geminus of Rhodes, an astronomer of the mid-first century

B.C.E., accepts some tenets of astrology, particularly the influence of

aspects "geometrical relations" of planets, while rejecting others,

such as the causal influence of emanations from fixed stars. Midde

Stoic Panaetius is also known to have rejected astrology, most likely

under the influence of his astronomer friend Scylax, who like other

astronomers of the time, attempted to set the practice of astrology

apart from astronomy. Arguments against astrology can be grouped into

one of two categories (though there are other ways to classify them):

ones that deny the efficacy of astrology or astrologers; and ones that

admit that astrology "works" but question the morality of the practice.

Arguments of the latter type include those that see astrology as a type

of practice of living that assumes a strict fatalism. Some of the

earliest arguments against astrology were launched by the skeptical New

Academy in the second century B.C.E. Arguments against astrology on

moral or ethical grounds would proliferate in Christian theologians

such as Origen of Alexandria

and other Church Fathers. Astrology would become an important issue for

Neoplatonists, with some rejecting it and others embracing it, though

not within a context of strict fatalism.

a. The New Academy (Carneades)

The earliest arguments against the efficacy of astrology have been traced to the fourth head of the skeptical New Academy, Carneades

(c. 213-129 B.C.E.) (cf. Cramer, p. 52-56). As an advocate of free

will, primarily against Stoic determinism, Carneades is likely to have

influenced other philosophers who have argued against astrology. The

arguments by Carneades, who left no writings, have been reconstructed

as the following:

Precise astronomical observations at the moment of birth are impossible (and astrological techniques depend on such precision).Those born at the same time have different destinies (as empirically observed)Those born neither at the same time or place often share the same death time (as in the case of natural disasters)Animals born at the same time as humans (according to strict astrological fatalism) would share the same fate.The presence of diverse ethnicities, customs and cultural beliefs is incompatible with astrological fatalism.

Astrologers would respond to the last argument with the

incorporation of astro-geography or astro-chorography (perhaps as early

as Posidonius), indicating an astral typology of a people, and used for

the purpose of "mundane" astrology, predictions for entire nations,

which would also account for the second argument. Astro-chorography can

be found as early as Teukros of Babylon and Manilius, but might be

traced to Posidonius' predecessor Cratos of Mallos.

b. Sextus Empiricus

About three centuries later, Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus

would elaborate upon these arguments in "Against the Astrologers" (Pros astrologous, Book 5 of Pros mathêmatikous). He first outlines the procedure of drawing a birth chart, and the basic elements of astrology, the places (topoi),

the benefic and malefic nature of the planets, and the criteria for

determining the power of the planets. He also notes the disagreements

among astrologers, particularly regarding subdivisions of the signs, a

disagreement also noted by Ptolemy. Sextus first notes typical

arguments against astrology: 1) earthly things do not reallysympathize

with celestial. He uses an example from anatomy, namely, the head and

lower parts of body sympathize because they have unity, and this unity

is lacking in celestial/earthly correspondence; 2) It is held that some

events happen by necessity, some by chance, some according to our

actions. If predictions are made of necessary events, then they are

useless; if of chance events, then they are impossible; if of that

according to our will (para hêmas), then not predetermined at

all. If as he says, these are arguments by the majority, then there was

an attack on the theory of cosmic sympathy and on the use of prediction

(any form of divination) on events determined by any or all of the

three causes. This precludes the possibility that the planets and stars

are causes that determine necessity in the sublunary realm, and it

presents astrology as a form of strict determinism. Sextus continues by

offering a more specific set of criticisms, including the five thought

to originate with Carneades. He especially focuses on the inaccuracy of

instruments and measurements used for determining either the time of

birth or conception. To these criticisms he adds that astrologers

associate shapes and characters of men (tas morphas kai ta êthê)

with the characteristics of the zodiac signs, and questions, for

example, why a Lion could be associated with bravery while an equally

masculine animal, the Bull, is feminine in astrology. He also ridicules

physiognomic descriptions, such that those who have Virgo ascending are

straight-haired, bright-eyed, white-skinned; he wonders if there are no

Ethiopian Virgos. Sextus adds the argument that predictions from the

alignment of planets cannot be based on empirical observation since the

same configurations do not repeat for 9977 years (one calculation of

the Great Year. Many such calculations exist in the Hellenistic and

Late Hellenistic eras, for the exact length of the cycle was debated).

6. Hermetic and Gnostic Astrological Theories

The "philosophical" Hermetica, texts in the Hermetic tradition that

are typically of later origin than the "technical" astronomical and

magical fragments, share astrological imagery in common with another

heterogeneous group of texts known as "Gnostic." (See more on

Hermeticism and Gnosticism in Middle Platonism and Gnosticism). A

factor present in both collections is the role planets and stars play

in the cosmologies and eschatologies, one in which the planets and

other celestial entities are seen as oppressive forces or binding

powers from which the soul, by nature divine and exalted above the

cosmo, must break free. Fate (Heimarmenê) plays a major role

in the Hermetic texts, and astrology is sometimes taken for granted as

knowledge of the Fate by which the mortal part of a human being is

subjected to at birth (cf.Stobaei Hermetica, Excerpt VII). The planets are said to be subservient to Fate and Necessity, which are subordinate powers to God's providence (pronoia). In the Poimandres

text, God made man in his own image, but also made a creator god

(demiurge) who made seven administrators (the planets) whose government

is Fate. Man being two-fold, is both immortal, and above the celestial

government, and mortal, so also a slave within the system, for he

shares a bit of the nature of each of the planets. At death the soul of

the individual who recognizes their immortal, intellectual, and divine

self ascends, while gradually surrendering the various qualities

accumulated during the descent: the body is given to dissolution; the

character (êthos) is yielded to the daimon (cf. Heraclitus,

Fr. 119); and through each the seven planetary zones, a portion of the

incarnated self that is related to the negative astrological meaning of

each planet (e.g., arrogance to the Sun, greed to Jupiter) is given

back to that zone. Arriving at the eighth zone, the soul is clothed in

its own power (perhaps meaning its own astral body), while it is

deified (in God) in the zone above the eighth (some Gnostic texts also

refer to a tenth realm). Astrological fatalism, then, is modified by

the Platonic immortal soul whose proper place is above the cosmic

order. Astrology affects the temperament and life while in the mortal

body, but not ultimately the soul. Another Hermetic text that

incorporates astrology is the Secret Sermon on the Mount of

Hermes to Tat (Corpus Hermeticum, Book XIII). Here the life-bearing

zodiac is responsible for creating twelve torments or passions that

mislead human beings. These twelve are overcome by ten powers of God,

such as self-control, joy and light. In Excerpt XXIII of the Stobaei Hermetica,

the zodiac is again thought responsible for giving life (to animals)

while each planet contributes part of their nature to human being. In

this instance, as well as in Excerpt XXIX, what the planets contribute

is not all vice, but both good and bad in a way that corresponds with

the nature of each planet in astrological theory. The Discourses from Hermes to Tat

is a discussion of the thirty-six decans, a remnant of Egyptian

religion, which was incorporated into Hellenistic astrology. The decans

are guardian gods who dwell above the zodiac, and added by servants and

soldiers that dwell in the aether, they affect collective events such

as earthquakes, famines and political upheaval. Furthermore, the decans

are said to rule over the planets and to sow good and bad daimons on

earth. Although Fate is an integral part of these Hermetic writings, it

seems that the transmission of the Hermetic knowledge, which intends to

aid the soul to overcome Fate, is for the elect, because most men,

inclining towards evil, would deny their own responsibility for evil

and injustice (Excerpt VI). This is a rehashing of the Lazy Man

Argument used against Stoic determinism, though cast in the light of

astral fatalism.

Hippolytus, being mostly informed by Irenaeus, tells us that the

Christian Marcion and his followers used Pythagorean numerology and

astrology symbolism in their sect, and that they further divided the

world into twelve regions using astro-geography (6.47-48). They may

have used a table of astro-numerology like that found in Teukros of

Babylon. Some Gnostic sects such as the Phibionites, as did the

Christian Marcionites associated each degree of the zodiac with a

particular god or daimon. Single degrees of the zodiac (monomoiria)

were governed by each planets. The astrologers assigned each degree to

a planet by various methods as outlined in the compilation of Paul of

Alexandria. For the Gnostics, the degrees were hypostatized as beings

that did the dirty work of the planets, who themselves are governed by

higher beings on the ontological scale as produced by the Ogdoad, and

Decade, and Dodecade, and ultimately leading to a cosmic ruler or

demiurge, typically called Ialdabaoth, though varying based on the

specific version of the cosmo-mythology of each sect. It is likely that

the astrologers and the Gnostics did not use these divisions in the

zodiac in the same way. Assignment of planets to divisions of the

zodiac is typically used in astrology for determining the relative

strength of the planets, and in the case of Critodemus (cited in

Valens, 8.26), in a technique for determining length of life. The monomoiria

may have been used in the Gnostic and/or Hermetic writers for the sake

of gaining knowledge of the powers that oppress in order to overcome

them.

In the Chaldaean Oracles, a text of the second century and

thought to bear the influence of Numenius, one finds a view of the

cosmos similar to that found in the Hermetic corpus. However, the

divine influences from above are mediated by Hecate, who separates the

divine from the earthly realm and governs Fate. Fate is a force of

Nature and the irrational soul of a human being is bound to it, but the

theurgic practices of bodily and mental purification, utilizing the

rational soul, is preparation for the ascent through the spheres, the

dwelling place of the intelligible soul and the Father God. The Oracles

share with the Gnostic and Hermetic texts a hierarchy of powers

including the zodiac, planets and daimons.

7. Neoplatonism and Astrology

Neoplatonism is typically thought to have originated with Plotinus;

though his philosophy, like every Late Hellenistic philosophy and

religion, did not develop in a vacuum. Plotinus was acquainted with the

Middle Platonists Numenius and Albinus, as well as Aristotelian,

Neopythagorean, Gnostic, and Stoic philosophies. Numenius (fl. 160-180

C.E.) shares with the Hermetic and Gnostic cosmologies the notion that

the soul of human beings descends through the cosmos (through the

Gateway of Cancer), loses memory of its divine life, and acquires its

disposition from the planets. The qualities of the planets are again

astrological, but vary by degree based on the distance from the

intelligible realm – at the highest planetary sphere, Saturn confers

reason and understanding, while at the lowest, the Moon contributes

growth of the physical body. During the ascent, judges are placed at

each planetary sphere; if the soul is found wanting, it returns to

Hades above the waters between the Moon and Earth, then is reincarnated

for ages until it is set right in virtue (based on the Myth of Er in

Plato's Republic 10.614-621).

The cosmological schemes, particularly the ontological hierarchies,

in Middle Platonic, Gnostic and Neopythagorean thinkers typically

allows for the place of astrology, if not in a strictly deterministic

way for the entire human being, for the transcendent soul descends and

ascends through the cosmos and one's own actions determine future

ontological status. This context places Neoplatonic philosophy in a

difficult relationship with astrology and fatalism. Plotinus is unique

in that he reverses the ontological status of the soul and the cosmos,

for the All-Soul (World-Soul, Nous) is the creator and

governor of the cosmos, but not a part of it. His philosophy, which

exalts the soul above the cosmos and above the ordinance of time, forms

the basis for some of his arguments against astrology.

a. Plotinus

Plotinus (204-270 C.E.) takes up the issue of astrology in Ennead 3.1 "On Fate," and in more detail in the later Ennead

2.3, "Are the Stars Causes?" (chronologically, the 52nd treatise, or

third from the last). In the first text, Plotinus points out that some

hold the belief that the heavenly circuit rules over everything, and

the configurations of the planets and stars determine all events within

this whole fated structure (3.1.2). He then elaborates upon an

astrology based on Stoic cosmic sympathy theory (sumpnoia), in

which animals and plants are also under sympathetic influence of the

heavenly bodies, and regions of the earth are likewise influenced

(3.1.5). Many astrologers divided countries into astrological zones

corresponding to zodiac signs (cf. Manilius Astronomica,

4.744-817). Plotinus briefly presents the arguments that for one, this

strict determinism leaves nothing up to us, and leaves us to be

"rolling stones" (lithous pheromenois – this recalls the

rolling cylinder example in Stoicism). Secondly, he says the influence

of the parents is stronger on disposition and appearance than the

stars. Thirdly, recounting the New Academy argument, he says that

people born at the same time ought to share the same fate (but do not).

Given this, he does argue that planets can be used for predictive

purposes, because they can be used for divination like bird omens

(3.1.6; 3.3.6; 2.3.7-8). The diviner, however, has no place in calling

them causes since it would take a superhuman effort to unravel the

series of concomitant causes in the organism of the living cosmos, in

which each part participates in the whole.

In Ennead 2.3, his arguments can be divided into two types,

the first being a direct assault against the specific doctrines and

language used by astrologers, the second concerning the roles that the

stars have on the individual soul's descent into matter, as he sees in

accordance with Plato's Timaeus and Republic10. In

the first set of arguments, Plotinus displays more intimate familiarity

with the language of technical astrology. He turns around the

perspective of this language from the observer to the view from the

planets themselves. He finds it absurd, for instance, that planets

affect one another when they "see" one another and that a pair of

planets could have opposite affections for one another when in the

region of the other (2.3.4). Another example of the switched

perspective is his criticism of planetary "hairesis" doctrine, such

that each planet is naturally diurnal or nocturnal and rejoices in its

chosen domain. He counters that it is always day for the planets. More

pertinent to his philosophy, Plotinus then poses questions about the

ontological status of the planets and stars. If planets are not

ensouled, they could only affect the bodily nature. If they are

ensouled, their effects would be minor, not simply due to the great

distance from earth, but because their effects would reach the earth as

a mixture, for there are many stars and one earth (2.3.12). Plotinus

does think planets are ensouled because they are gods (3.1.5).

Furthermore, there are no bad planets (as astrologers claim of Mars and

Saturn) because they are divine (2.3.1). They do not have in their

nature a cause of evil, and do not punish human beings because we have

no effect on their own happiness (2.3.2). Countering moral

characteristics that astrologers attribute to the zodiac and planets,

Plotinus argues that virtue is a gift from God, and vice is due to

external circumstances that happen as the soul is immersed in matter

(2.3.9; 2.3.14).

Plotinus does concede that just as human beings are double in

nature, possessing the higher soul and the lower bodily nature, so are

planets. The planets in their courses are in a better place than beings

on earth, but they are not themselves completely unchanging, like

beings in the realm of Intellect (2.1). In this regard he attempts to

square the contribution of the stars to one's disposition in the

Spindle of Fate in Plato'sRepublic 10, to his belief in free will. From the stars we get our character (êthê), characteristic actions (êthê praxeis) and emotions (pathê). He asks what is left that is "we" (hêmeis), and answers that nature gave us the power to govern (kratein) passions (pathôn)

(2.3.9). If this double-natured man does not live in accordance with

virtue, the life of the intellect that is above the cosmos, then "the

stars do not only show him signs but he also becomes himself a part,

and follows along with the whole of which he is a part" (2.3.9, tr.

Armstrong).

In summary, Plotinus ridicules astrological technical doctrine for

what he sees as a belief in the direct causality of the planets and

stars on the fate of the individual. He also finds offensive the

attribution of evil or evil-doing to the divine planets. However, he

does believe that planets and stars are suited for divination because

they are part of the whole body of the cosmos, and all parts are

co-breathing (sumpnoia) and contribute to the harmony of the whole (2.3.7). The planets do not, then, act upon their own whims and desires.

b. Porphyry

Plotinus' best-known student, Porphyry of Tyre (c. 232/3-304/5),

held quite a different view on astrology. He wrote a lost work on

astrology, Introduction to Astronomy in Three Books (the word "astronomy" meaning "astrology"), and put together an Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos (Eisagôgê eis tên Apotelesmatikên tou Ptolemaiou).

In this work he heavily draws upon (and in some cases copies directly

from) Antiochus of Athens, an astrologer of the late second century

C.E. Antiochus' influence was considerable, and perhaps greater than

Ptolemy's in the third and fourth centuries, since he was referenced by

several later astrologers such as Firmicus Maternus, Hephaistion of

Thebes, Rhetorius, and the medieval "Palchus." It may be that Porphyry

encountered Antiochus' work when he studied in Athens under Longinus

(another student of Ammonius Saccas) before continuing his Platonic

education under Plotinus. Porphyry attempts to reconcile his belief in

astrology with the Platonic belief in a free an exalted soul that is

separable from the body. As a Pythagorean, Porphyry promoted abstinence

from meat and other methods of detachment from the body as promoting

virtue and a life of Nous. (cf. Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind; Letter to Marcella;On Abstinence). In an earlier work of which only fragments exist, Concerning Philosophy from Oracles,

Porphyry asserts that gods and the demons use observations of the

movements of stars to predict events decreed by Fate, a doctrine

originating with the Stoics. He claims astrologers are sometimes

incorrect in their predictions because they make faulty interpretations

(while assuming that the principles of astrology itself are not false)

(cf. Amand, p. 165-166; Eusebius Praeparatio evangelica, 6.1.2-5). In another fragment (Stobaeus, 2.8.39-42), Porphyry interprets Plato's Myth of Er (Republic

10.614-621) as justification for the compatibility of astrology and

free choice (Amand, p. 164-165). Before the souls descend to earth,

they are free to choose their guardian daimon. When on earth, they are

subject to Fate and necessity based on the lot chosen. Porphyry says

this is in agreement with the (Egyptian) astrologers who think that the

ascending zodiac sign (hôroskopos), and the arrangement of the

planets in the zodiac signify the life that was chosen by the soul

(Stobaeus, 2.8.39-42). He notes, as does Plotinus (Enn.,

2.3.7), that the stars are scribbling on the heavens that give signs of

the future. Both Porphyry and Plotinus discuss the Myth of Er and the

stars as giving divinatory signs (sêmainô), but Porphyry

accepts the astrological tradition filled with complicated calculations

and strange language, while Plotinus rejects it.

Porphyry's Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos contains

little content from Ptolemy, and purports to fill in the terminology

and concepts that Ptolemy had taken for granted. Porphyry says that by

explicating the language in as simple a way as possible, these concepts

will become clear to the uninitiated. His great respect for Ptolemy is

evident by his other work on the study of Ptolemy's Harmonics,

and by statements that he makes of his debt, but he includes in the

compilation numerous techniques that Ptolemy rejected. The debt he may

be paying though, may actually be to readers of Plotinus. It may be a

response to Plotinus' criticism of the language of astrology and the

belief that stars are causes. Porphyry seems to think that

understanding the complicated scientific language will give back the

credence to astrology that the naturalistic model by Ptolemy took away

(at least for his most respected teacher).

In the Letter to Anebo, Porphyry poses a series of

questions about the order of and distinctions between visible and

invisible Gods and daimons, and about the mantic arts. He mentions the

ability of some to judge, but the configurations of the stars, whether

or not divinatory predictions will be true and false, and if theurgic

activity will be fruitful or in vain (Epistula ad Anebonem,

2.6c – in reference to katarchical astrology). He also asks about the

symbolism of the images of the Sun that change by the hour (these

figures are twelve Egyptian forms that co-rise with the ascending signs

of the zodiac. The dôdekaôrai. These uneven hours were

measured by the time it took for each sign to rise; cf. Greek Magical

Papryi, PGM IV 1596-1715). In this work, though, he complains of

Egyptian priest/astrologers such as Chaeremon, who reduce their gods to

forces of nature, do not allow for incorporeals, and hold to a strict

deterministic astral fatalism (Epist. Aneb., 2.13a). Porphyry

concludes with questions about the practice of astrologers of finding

one's own daimon, and what sort of power it imparts to us (Epist. Aneb., 2.14a-2.16a; cf. Vettius Valens, Book 3.1; Hephaistion, Apotelesmatica,

13; 20). Again, reconciling his notions of virtue and free will with

astrology, he states that if it is possible to know one's daimon

(indicated by the planet derived through a set of rules and designated

as the oikodespotês) from the birth chart, then one can be

free from Fate. He notes the difficulties and disagreements among

astrologers about how to find this all-important indicator. In fact, in

Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos (30), he includes a lengthy chapter (again, borrowing from Antiochus of Athens) that explains a method for finding the oikodespotês) and for differentiating this from other ruling planets (such as the kurios and theepikratêtôr). As will be explicated, Iamblichus, who formed his own unique relationship to astrology, answered these questions in his De mysteriis.

c. Iamblichus

While Iamblichus (c. 240-325 C.E.) believed in the soul's exaltation

above the cosmos, he did not, like Plotinus, think that the embodied

soul of the human being is capable of rising above the cosmos and its

ordering principle of Fate through simple contemplation upon the One,

or the source of all things. Iamblichus responds to Porphyry's

accusation that Egyptian religion is only materialistic: just as the

human being is double-natured, an incorporeal soul immersed in matter,

this duality is replicated at each level of being (5.20). Theurgy, for

most people, should begin with the material gods that have dominion

over generation and corruption of bodies. He does not think the masses

are capable of intellectual means of theurgy (this is reserved for the

few and for a later stage in life), but that a theurgist must start at

their own level of development and individual inclinations. His complex

hierarchy of beings, including celestial gods, visible gods, angels and

daimons, justifies a practice of theurgy in which each of these beings

is sacrificed and prayed to appropriately, in a manner pleasing to and

in sympathy with their individual natures. Material means, i.e., use of

stones, herbs, scents, animals, and places, are used in theurgy in a

manner similar to magical practices common in the Late Hellenistic era,

with the notable difference that they are used simply to please and

harmonize with the order of the higher beings, rather than to obtain

either an earthy or intellectual desire. Divinity pervades all things,

and earthly things receive a portion of divinity from particular gods.

Answering Porphyry's question about the meaning of the Sun god

seated on the Lotus (an Egyptian astrological motif), Iamblichus

responds that the images that change with the zodiacal hours are

symbolic of an incorporeal (and unchanging) God who is unfolded in the

Light through images representing his multiple gifts. His position

above the Lotus (which, being circular, represents the motion of the

Intellect) indicates his transcendence over all things. Curiously,

Iamblichus also says that the zodiac signs along with all celestial

motions, receive their power from the Sun, placing them ontologically

subordinate to it (De mysteriis, 7.3).

Next addressing Porphyry's question about astral determinism of

Chaeremon (who is thought to be a first century Alexandrian

astrologer/priest versed in Stoic philosophy; cf. Porphyry, De abstinentia, 4.6; Origen Contra Celsum,

1.59; Cramer, p. 116-118) and others, Iamblichus indicates that the

Hermetic writings pertaining to natal astrology play a minor role in

the scope of Hermetic/Egyptian philosophy (De myst., 8.4)

Iamblichus does not deny the value of natal astrology, but considers it

to be concerned with the lower material life, hence subordinate to the

intellectual. Likewise, not all things are bound to Necessity because

theurgic exercises can elevate the soul above the cosmos and above Fate

(8.7). On Porphyry's question about finding one's personal daimon

through astrological calculation, Iamblichus responds that the

astrological calculations can say nothing about the guardian daimon.

Since the natal chart is a matter concerning one's fatedness, and the

daimon is assigned prior to the soul's descent (it is more ancient; presbutera)

and subjection to fate, such human and fallible sciences as astrology

are useless in this important matter (9.3-4). In general, Iamblichus

does not show much inclination for use of astrological techniques found

in Ptolemy, Antiochus, and other astrologers, but he does believe that

astrology is in fact a true science, though polluted by human errors

(9.4). He also accepts and uses material correspondences to celestial

gods (including planets), as well as katarchical astrology,

observations used for selecting the proper times (8.4).

d. Firmicus Maternus

Julius Firmicus Maternus was a fourth century Sicilian astrologer who authored an astrological work in eight books, Matheseos, and about ten years later, a Christian polemical work, On the Error of Profane Religions (De errore profanarium religionum).

Unlike Augustine (who studied astrology in his youth), Firmicus did not

launch polemics against astrology after his conversion to Christianity

He is mentioned briefly for his Neoplatonic justification for the

practice of astrology. While he claims only meager knowledge in

astrology, his arguments betray a passionate commitment to a belief in

astral fatalism. He treats astrological knowledge as a mystery

religion, and as Vettius Valens did before him, he asks his reader,

Mavortius, to take an oath of secrecy and responsibility concerning

astrological knowledge. He refers to Porphyry (along with Plato and

Pythagoras) as a likeminded keeper of mysteries (7.1.1). In De errore,

however, he attacks Porphyry for the same reason, that he was a

follower of the Serapis cult of Alexandria (Forbes' translation, p.

72). Firmicus' oath is upon the creator god (demiurge) who is

responsible for the order of the cosmos and for arranging the planets

as stations along the way of the souls' ascent and descent (7.1.2).

While outlining the arguments of astrology's opponents, (including

the first and second arguments of the New Academy, mentioned above),

Firmicus claims not to have made up his mind concerning the immortality

of the soul (Matheseos, 1.1.5-6), but he shortly betrays a

Platonic belief in an immortal soul separable from the body (1.3.4).

These souls follow the typical Middle Platonic ascent and descent

through the planetary spheres; as a variation on this theme, he holds

the notion that souls descend through the sphere of the Sun and ascend

through the sphere of the Moon (1.5.9). This sovereign soul is capable

of true knowledge, and, by retaining an awareness in spite of its

forgetful and polluted state on Earth, can know Fate imperfectly

through the methods of astrology handed down from Divine Mind (mentis treated as a Latin equivalent for nous,

1.4.1-5; 1.5.11). In response to the critics, he suggests that they do

not have first hand knowledge and that if they encountered false

predictions, the fault lies with the fraudulent pretenders to astrology

and not with the science itself (1.3.6-8). For Firmicus, the planets,

as administrators of a creator God, give each individual soul their

character and personality (1.5.6-7).

After offering profuse praise of Plotinus, Firmicus attacks his

belief that everything is in our powers and that superior providence

and reason can overcome fortune. He argues that Plotinus made this

claim in the prime of his health, but that he too accepted the powers

of Fate toward the end of his life, since all efforts to advert poor

health, such as moving to a better climate, failed him (1.7.14-18).

Following this and other examples offered to his reader of fated

events, he argues against the notion held by some, that fate (heimarmenê)

only controls birth and death. This argument may be a precursor of the

definition of fate that Hierocles offered a century later, which will

be discussed next.

e. Hierocles

Hierocles of Alexandria is a fifth century Neoplatonist who argued

against astrology, particularly an astrological theory based on a Stoic

view of Fate and Necessity. He also rejected magical and theurgical

practices prevalent in his time as a way to either escape or overcome

the fate set down in one's birth chart. His argument against these

practices is based on his view of Providence and Fate, found in his

work On Providence, which only survives in later summaries by

ninth century Byzantine Patriarch, Photius. In general, Hierocles saw

himself in line with the thinkers starting with Ammonius Saccas, who

argue for the compatibility between Plato and Aristotle, while he

rejects thinkers who emphasize their differences, such as Alexander of

Aphrodisias. His view of Fate is that it is an immutable ordering of

thinking according to divine Justice. Using, as do Plotinus and

Porphyry, Plato's Myth of Er (Rep., 10), fate is a system of

rewards and punishments the souls choose before reincarnation on earth.

He does not, though, like Porphyry, accept the transmigration of the

soul from human to animal body and vice versa. This view on

reincarnation had already been put forth by Cronius, a contemporary of

Numenius (cf. Dillon, p. 380). He considers astrology to be contrary to

this notion of Fate because it works by a principle of "mindless

necessity" (enepilogiston anagkên). Photius writes of Hierocles:

He does not at all accept the irrational "necessity"

spoken of by the astrologers, nor the Stoic "force," nor even what

Alexander of Aphrodisias supposed it to be, who identifies it with the

nature of Platonic Bodies. Nor does he accept that one' birth can be

altered by incantations and sacrifices. (Codex 214, 172b, tr. Schibli,

p. 333)

The astrological theory he is arguing against is supported by Stoic

fate and necessity, which assumes a chain of physical efficient causes.

The astrologers who most closely represent this view are Manilius and

Vettius Valens (link to above sections). There is nothing in the

surviving summary to indicate that Hierocles also argues against the

notion of Plotinus and Porphyry that the stars are signs rather than

causes, because they are part of the rational and divine order of all

things. Since he believed there is nothing outside of rational

Providence, including that which is in our power (to eph' hêmin),

the stars too would be a part of the rational ordering. His fate, being

quite deterministic but based on moral justice, does not allow for

magic and theurgic practices used to exonerate one from his Fate

revealed through astrology (cf. Porphyry's Letter to Anebo; Greek Magic Papyri,

XIII, 632-640). These practices he saw as unlawful attempts to

manipulate or escape the ordering of things by the Providence of God.

f. Proclus

Proclus (410/11-485) was the director of the Platonic School at

Athens, which called itself the "Academy" in order to maintain lineage

with Plato's fourth century school. In the absence of direct statements

about the astrology, Proclus' position on astral fatalism can be

surmised through his philosophy, particularly his metaphysical

hierarchy of beings. A paraphrase of Ptolemy's astrological work, Tetrabiblos,

is attributed to him, though there is little evidence to make a

substantial claim about the identity of the author/copyist. Proclus

did, however, take a keen interest in astronomy, and critiqued

Ptolemy's astronomical work,Syntaxis (or Almagest) in his Outline of Astronomical Hypotheses. In this work, he argues against Ptolemy's theory of precession of the equinox (Hyp. astr.,

234.7-22), although other Plato/Aristotle synthesizers, such as

Simplicius, accepted it along with the additional spheres the theory

would entail beyond the eighth (the fixed stars).

Proclus generally proposed three levels of being – celestial,

earthly, and in-between. The four elements exist at every level of

being, though fire (in the form of light) predominates in the celestial

realm. Celestial beings are independent, self-subsistent, divine, and

have their own will and power. As ensouled beings, celestial bodies are

self-moving (the Platonic notion of soul). In order to maintain a

consistency with Platonic doctrine, he argued against the notion that

celestial spheres are solid paths upon which the planets and stars are

carried along. Rather they are places possessing latitude, longitude,

and depth (bathos – a measure of proximity to earth), which

are projected by the free planets as their potential course. As visible

gods, he thought the planets to be intermediaries between the

intelligible realm and the sensible. In terms of planets being causes,

he accepts the Aristotelian notion that they cause physical changes

below (due to heat and light). However, he also accepted another type

of non-physical causality, more akin to cosmic sympathy, in which

several causes come together to form a single effect at a proper time

and place. Everything lower in the hierarchy is dependent upon the

higher, and is given its proper lot (klêros) and signature (sunthêma) of the higher beings. The celestial gods also have a ruling power over lower beings (Institutio theological, 120-122). This notion of properness (epitêdeiotês)

extends from the celestial realm to all things below, including plants

and metals (cf. Siovanes, p. 128-129). This is much akin to

astrological theory, in which each planet and sign contributes, in

varying proportions, to a single effect, the individual. The planetary

gods are not the only actors, for they have invisible guardians (doruphoroi

– not to be confused with the planets who guard the Sun and the Moon in

astrological doctrine) who populate that the space of the planets'

courses, and who act as administrators. Proclus, though, is not a

strict astral determinism, for as a theurgist, he also thought these

allotments can be changed through theurgic knowledge (In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 1.145).

8. Astrology and Christianity

Astrology's relationship with early Christianity has a very complex

history. Prior to being established as the official religion of the

Roman Empire, the attitude of Jews and Christians toward astrology

varied greatly. Philo of Alexandria and various Jewish pseudepigraphical writers condemned the practice of astrology (1 Enoch, Sibylline Oracles), while other texts accept portions of it and depict biblical figures such as Abraham and Noah as astrologers (cf. Barton, Ancient Astrology,

p. 68-70). As mentioned above, early Christians such as Marcion and

Basilides incorporated some aspects of astrology into their belief

systems. In general, though, for the earliest Christian polemicists and

theologians, astrology was incompatible with the faith for a number of

reasons, mostly pertaining to the immorality of its fatalism. Some of

the Christian arguments against astrology were borrowed from the

skeptical schools. Hippolytus of Rome (170-236 C.E.) dedicating nearly

an entire book (4) of his Refutations Against All Heresies,

closely followed the detailed arguments from Sextus Empiricus,

particularly concerning the lack of accurate methods for discerning the

time of birth, which is required for establishing the natal chart. He

is particularly troubled by the associations between signs of the

zodiac and physiognomical features. Hippolytus outlines a list very

similar to that of Teukros of Babylon (as contained in the latter's De duodecim signis)

containing correspondences between physiological and psychological

characteristics; and he argues that the constellations were merely

markers for star recognition, bear no resemblance to the animals by

which they are named, and can bear no resemblance to human

characteristics (Refutatio omnium haeresium, 4.15-27).

Bardaisan/Bardesanes (c 154-222 C.E.) was a converted Syriac

Christian, who, like Augustine, studied astrology in his youth. It

appears that in his conversion he did not give up all astrological

thinking, for he accepts the role of the planets and stars as

administrators of God. He wrote against astro-chorography, particularly

the association of regions with planets based on seven climata

or zones, stating that laws and customs of countries are based on

institution of human free will and not on the planets. Along with free

will, though, he accepts a degree of governance of nature and of

chance, indicated by the limit of things in our control. Bardesanes is

thought to be a forerunner of Mani, for he accepted a dualism of two

world forces, dark and light (cf. Rudolf, Gnosis, p. 327-329).

Origen of Alexandria's (185-254 C.E.) relationship to astrology was equally, if not more, complex than that of Plotinus. In his Commentary on Genesis

he, in a manner similar to Plotinus, offers arguments against stars as

causes, but in favor of stars as signs, divine writings in the sky.

These writings are available for divine powers to gain knowledge and to

participate in the providential aide of human beings (Philocalia, 23.1-23.21; cf. Barton, Power and Knowledge,

p. 63-64). Origen believed that all beings, celestial, human or

in-between, have the role of helping all creatures attain salvation.

Celestial beings play a particular role in this cosmological paideia of educating creatures toward virtue. These signs, however, are imperfect at the human level, and cannot give exact knowledge (Philocalia, 23.6). Elsewhere (De oratione,

7.1), Origen urges us to pray for the Sun, Moon and stars (rather than

to them), for they are also free beings (so he surmises by interpreting

Psalm 148:3) and play a unique role in the salvation of the cosmos.

Quite uniquely, Origen also appears to have been one of the first

philosophers (if not the first) to use the theory of precession of the

equinox as an argument against astrological prediction (Philocalia, 23.18).

Origen argued against those in antiquity who interpreted the Star of

Bethlehem as an astrological prediction of the birth of Christ made by

the Chaldaeans. He first notes that the Magi (from Persia) are to be

distinguished from Chaldaeans (a word which at the time generally

referred to Babylonian astrologers or simply astrologers). Secondly, he

argues that the star was unlike any other astral phenomenon they had

observed, and they perceived that it represented someone (Christ)

superior to any person known before, not simply by the sign of the

star, but by the fact that their usual sorcery and knowledge from evil

daimons had failed them (Contra Celsum, 59-60). In general,

regardless of the intentions of the gospel writers of including the

myth of the Star of Bethlehem, it was interpreted by Christians not as

a prediction by astrological methods of divination, but as a symbol of

Christ transcending the old cosmic order, particularly fate oppressing

the divinely granted human free will, and replacing it with a new order

(cf. Denzey, "A New Star on the Horizon," in Prayer, Magic, and the Stars, p. 207-221).

Three fourth century theologians, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory

Nazianzen, and Basil, known as the Cappadocians, rejected astrology as

a part of an overall rejection of irrational Chance (Tukhê) and deterministic Necessity (Anankê)

(see Pelikan, p. 154-157). Random chance had no place in the economy of

God's universe, while blind necessity denies human free will. They

differentiated astrology from astronomy, which was an appropriate study

for admiration of creation. Unlike Origen and Plotinus,

Gregory Nazianzen rejected the notion of that stars give signs for

reading the future. He feared that those who interpret the biblical

notion that the stars were created for giving signs (Genesis 1:14)

would use this as justification for horoscopic astrology (Pelikan, p.

156).

In the Latin west, Augustine (354-430 C.E.) took up polemics against astrology in conjunction with his arguments against divination (De civitate dei,

5.1-7). His distain for astrology is related to his early exposure to

it as a Manichean prior to his conversion to Christianity. In De civitate dei (City of God), he borrowed freely from Cicero's arguments against Stoic fate and divination. He particularly elaborated upon the New Academy

argument that people born at the same time having different destinies

(the twin argument). He includes in his attack on astrology the

futility of katarchic astrology (choosing the proper moments for

activities) as well as its contradiction with deterministic natal

astrology. If persons are predestined by their natal charts, how can

they hope to change fate by choosing the proper time for marriage,

planting crops, etc? In addition, he attributes correct predictions by

astrologers to occasional inspiration of evil daimons rather than the

study of astrological techniques (De civ., 5.7).

As Christianity gained political and cultural ascendancy, decrees

against astrology multiplied. With the closing of the "pagan" schools

in 529, Neoplatonists and the astrology attached to them fled to

Persia. Substantial debate exists about whether or not they set up a

new school in Persia, specifically Harran, and likely, later, in

Baghdad; but one thing that is certain is that astrological texts and

astronomical tables (such as the Pinax of Ptolemy) used for

casting charts were translated into Persian and adjusted for the sixth

century. The astrological writings, particularly of Ptolemy, Dorotheus,

and Vettius Valens, were then translated into Arabic and would become a

part of Islamic philosophy. The Greek texts, in combination with

developments in Persia and the astrology of India, would form the basis

of medieval astrology. Astrology from that point on would continued its

unique history, both combining with and striving against philosophical

and scientific theories, up to the present day.

9. References and Further Reading

Amand, David. Fatalisme et Liberté dans L'Antiquité Grecqué (Lovain: Bibliothèque de L'Université, 1945)Barton, Tamsyn. Ancient Astrology (London: Routledge, 1994)Barton, Tamsyn. Power and Knowledge: Astrology, Physiognomics, and Medicine under the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994)Bobzien, Susanne. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1998)Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum, ed. D. Olivieri, et al., 12 Volumes (Brussels: Academie Royale, 1898-1953)Cramer, Frederick H. Astrology in Roman Law and Politics (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1959)Denzey, Nicola. "A New Star on the Horizon: Astral Christologies and Stellar Debates in the Early Christian Discourse," in Prayer, Magic, and the Stars, ed. Scott B Noegel (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003).Dillon, John. The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977)Dillon, John and A. A. Long, eds. The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988)Edelstein, L. and I. G. Kidd, eds. Posidonius: I. The Fragments (Cambridge University Press, 1972)Firmicus Maternus, The Error of the Pagan Religions, tr. Clarence A. Forbes (NY: Newman Press, 1970)Firmicus Maternus. Mathesis, Vol. I and II, ed. W. Kroll and F. Skutsch (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1968)Firmicus Maternus, Matheseos Libri VIII, tr. Jean Rhus Bram (Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press, 1975)Fowden, Garth. Egyptian Hermes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)Green, William Chase. Moira: Fate, Good, & Evil in Greek Thought (Harper & Row, 1944)Gundel, W. and Gundel, H. G. Astrologumena: die astrologische Literatur in der Antike und ihre Geschichte (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1966)Holden, James Herschel. A History of Horoscopic Astrology (Tempe, AZ: American Federation of Astrologers, Inc, 1996)Hunger, Hermann, and David Pingree. Astral Science in Mesopotamia (Leiden: Brill, 1999).Iamblichus. On the Mysteries, tr. Thomas Taylor (San Francisco: Wizards Bookshelf, 1997)Layton, Bentley, tr. and ed. The Gnostic Scriptures (New York: Doubleday, 1987).Long, A. A. ed. Problems in Stoicism (London: Athlone Press, 1971).Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)Manilius. Astronomica, tr. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977)Neugebauer, Otto. Astronomy and History: Selected Essays (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983)Pelikan, Jaroslav. Christianity and Classical Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993)Plutarch. Plutarchi moralia (Leipzig: Teubner, 1929-1960)Claudius Ptolemy. Tetrabiblos, tr. F. E. Robbins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956)Reiner, Erica. Astral Magic in Babylonia (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1995)Rochberg, F. Babylonian Horoscopes, trans. Amer. Philos. Soc., Vol. 99, 1 (Philadelphia, 1998)Rudolf, Kurt. Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism, tr. Robert McLachlan Wilson (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 1987)Sandbach, F. H. The Stoics (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975)Schibli, Hermann S. Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).Scott, Walter, ed. and tr. Hermetica Vol 1. (Boston: Shambala, 1985)Sextus Empiricus. Against the Professors, Vol IV (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949)Shaw, Gregory. Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)Siovanes, Lucas. Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903)Vettius Valens. Anthology, ed. David Pingree (Leipzig: Teubner, 1986)

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Marilynn Lawrence

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West Chester University of Pennsylvania

 

Last updated on March 27, 2005 | Categories: Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics

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