Dr PK Iyengar's clear analysis of the nuclear deal

[Guest guest]

P. K. Iyengar

 

Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission

 

 

 

Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal

 

 

In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the

national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it

because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.

 

The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the US

government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India.

 

 

Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement

is not a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us

with uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits

nuclear cooperation with India because we have not signed the

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant

a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can now pursue

nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at any

time, the waiver is revoked.

 

Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and cost-effective.

Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of

uranium and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces – there

are no guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the

contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be expensive.

The cost of uranium in the international market has gone up four-fold

in the last few years, and will rise further with further demand. The

same is true of the cost of steel and other materials used in a

reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the West. The example of

the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that importing power

plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We would do

well to learn from that experience.

 

The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security.

 

 

It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore

essential for our long-term energy security. But this does not

translate into the nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power

from the nuclear reactors that we buy will definitely be more

expensive than indigenous nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors

running, we will always be dependent on imported uranium, which is

controlled by a cartel – the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore,

the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel, will only

compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power

programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for

the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our total

electricity production.

 

Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present power

crisis.

 

 

Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes

through, it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have

examples of the French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in

Kudankulam, India. It will actually take longer to setup foreign

reactors compared to indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal

formalities could take years. It will be at least eight years before

we see the first power. So importing reactors is certainly no quick

solution. For the short term, we will still have to rely on coal and

hydroelectricity.

 

 

The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing, and

therefore does not compromise our national security.

 

 

It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to

national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123

Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very

clearly states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further

nuclear trade is to stop, and the nuclear materials that have already

been sold to us have to be returned. No future Indian government would

dare to jeopardise such a huge investment in nuclear power, by

testing. So, for all practical purposes the nuclear deal caps our

strategic programme – which is precisely what the Americans intend.

 

We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will

protect our strategic programme.

 

 

Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on

the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable

participation of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a

law saying that we will retain the right to test, it will have no

influence on the actions of the US. If and when we test, they can

simply quote the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, and pull out all

their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated. The only option here

is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause inserted

there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since it

goes against their non-proliferation policy.

 

The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status of

a nuclear power.

 

 

While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India

being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the

IAEA Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements.

In fact, the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is

closely based on the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear

weapon states. The safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon

countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put very few

reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of

safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors

under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly not being

treated as a nuclear weapons country.

 

Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our

domestic nuclear programme.

 

 

The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have

enough indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years.

We are not yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium

availability for operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning,

and inadequate prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing

40,000 MW of nuclear power, which will cost not less than $100 billion

or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If even 10% of this money were spent on uranium

mining in existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching

for new uranium deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries,

there will be enough uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power

programme, until such time as thorium reactors takes over.

 

 

The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even

if India conducts a nuclear test.

 

 

The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's

concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies.

However, the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such

commitment is given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that

India may take 'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of

foreign fuel supplies. It does not specify what these measures will

be, it does not provide for any role for the IAEA in this, and it does

not bestow legitimacy on any such measures that India may take. It may

well be that any such measures that we suggest, such as importing fuel

from another country, will be disallowed by the nuclear cartel (the

NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and

mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment capability to provide

fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.

 

The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy.

 

 

The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure

India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including

its capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that

Iran, as an NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in

light-water reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal,

and can only be related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent

statements by Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs

Committee, regarding Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such

suspicions.

 

It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not

in the national interest. It presents the very serious danger of

capping our strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go

forward with the deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy

security that we are seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us

as vulnerable to the nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.

 

It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At

virtually no cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies,

they can cap our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net,

through the back door, as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our

nuclear activities, including R & D, through intrusive IAEA inspections,

and subjugate us to the wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no

cartel, we could have easily extended the Kudankulam agreement for

more reactors, and avoided the present situation. If these are not

reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear deal, then there are

no reasons that reason can find.

 

 

P. K. Iyengar

 

Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission