Vedarthasangraha of Ramanuja -31- the concept of the world as illusion refuted-

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31. The concept of the world as an illusion refuted – scriptural testimony

 

The explanation

given by the advaitin is that, the asatkaaryavadha denying the reality of the

cause as well as the effect is refuted because

according to advaita, though the effect is illusory the cause is real. This was to refute the view of

madhyamika or Sunyavadha Buddhism whose

asathvadha denies any real substratum. This branch of Buddhisn does not accept

any reality such as Brahman as everything is illusory for them.

 

bhavathpakshe niraDhishTaana bhrama asambhavasya dhurupapaadhathvaath cha.

yasya hi chethanagathaH paaramaarThikaH

dhoshaaSrayathvam cha paaramaarThikam;paaramaarThika dhosheNa yukthasya apaaramaarThika ganDharvanagaradhi

dharsanam upapannam. Yasya thu dhoshaScha apaaramaarThikaH,dhoshaaSrayathvam

cha apaaramaarThikam, thasya apaaramaarThikena api aaSrayeNa thath upapannam

ithi bhavath pakshe na niraDhishTaana bhramaasambhavaH.

 

Ramanuja says

that it is not valid and the sunyavadha could not be refuted by the advaita

doctrine. He explains further.

 

bhavathpakshe niraDhishTaana bhrama asambhavasya dhurupapaadhathvaath cha.

 

In your(advaita)

theory, it is not possible to prove that the illusion has a substratum which is

real.

 

yasya hi chethanagathaH paaramaarThikaH

dhoshaaSrayathvam cha paaramaarThikam;paaramaarThika dhosheNa yukthasya apaaramaarThika ganDharvanagaradhi

dharsanam upapannam.

 

It is possible to explain that the illusion

like seeing a castle in the sky, if the defect in a sentient being which causes

the illusion is real and also the substratum on which the defect rests is also

real.

 

That is, if one

sees a castle in the sky or two moons , it is because there is a defect in the

eye which gives the illusion. The defect is real and not itself an illusion. The

substatum on which the defect rests, the eye, is also real.

 

 

Yasya thu dhoshaScha apaaramaarThikaH,dhoshaaSrayathvam cha

apaaramaarThikam, thasya apaaramaarThikena api aaSrayeNa thath upapannam ithi

bhavath pakshe na niraDhishTaana bhramaasambhavaH

 

One to whom the

defect as well as the substratum of the defect is also unreal it is not possible to maintain that illusion cannot

arise without a real substartum.

 

That is,

according to the advaita point of view, the defect in perception which gives

rise to an illusion of the world, is that of the mind which is also unreal,

being the product of avidhya, nescience. So the substratum of the defect is not

Brahman which is real but avidhya which is not real as otherwise Brahman cannot

be cited as the only reality. So the defect

is unreal and the substratum is also unreal and this could not therefore refute

the asatkaarya vaadha.

 

SoDhakeshu api `sathyam jnaanam anantam brahma,' `aanandhee brahma,'

ithyaadhishu saamaanaaDhikaraNya vyuthpatthi sidDha aneka guNa viSishta

ekaarThaabhiDhaanam avirudDham ithi,sarvaguNa viSishtam brahmaabhiDheeyatha

ithi poorvameva uktham. `aThaatha aadheso nethi netni'ithi bahuDhaa nisheDho

dhrSyatah ithi cheth, kim athra nishiDhyatah ithi vakthavyam.'dhve vaava brahmaNaH

roope moortham cha amoorthameva cha' ithi moorthaamoorthaathmikaH prapanchaH

sarvopi nishiDhyatha ithi cheth, brahmaNaH roopathayaa aprajnaatham sarvam roopathayaa

upadhiSya punaH thadheva neshedDhum ayuktham. `prakshaalaanaath hi pankasya

dhooraath asparsanam varam' ithi nyaayaath.

 

Ramanuja then

examines the scriptural texts quoted to support the view of advaita.

 

SoDhakeshu api `sathyam jnaanam anantam brahma,' (thait.2.2.) `aanandhee brahma,'( Thaith.3.6)

ithyaadhishu saamaanaaDhikaraNya vyuthpatthi sidDha aneka guNa viSishta

ekaarThaabhiDhaanam avirudDham ithi,sarvaguNa viSishtam brahmaabhiDheeyatha

ithi poorvameva uktham,

 

The texts which

determine the nature of Brahman such as `sathyam

jnanam anantam brahma,' `Brahman is bliss,' has been explained already that

they define Brahman as possessed of multitudes of qualiries like truth,

knowledge and bliss etc. based on the

priniciple of samaanaaDhikaraNya.

 

`aThaatha aadheso nethi netni' (Brhd.2.3.6) ithi bahuDhaa nisheDho

dhrSyatah ithi cheth, kim athra nishiDhyatah ithi vakthavyam

 

 

If it is

contended that the differentiation in Brahman is negated by texts such as ; `then

there is the instruction, "not so. not so," it

must be specified as to what it is that is negated.

 

'dhve vaava brahmaNaH roope moortham cha amoorthameva cha' (Brhd.2 .3.1)

ithi moorthaamoorthaathmikaH prapanchaH sarvopi nishiDhyatha ithi cheth,

 

If according to

the text that says, `there are two aspects of Brahman, with form and without

form,' the world of forms and without form is negated,

 

brahmaNaH roopathayaa aprajnaatham sarvam roopathayaa upadhiSya punaH

thadheva neshedDhum ayuktham. `prakshaalaanaath hi pankasya dhooraath

asparsanam varam' ithi nyaayaath.

 

Then, imparting

knowledge about Brahman which is not known otherwise, namely, Brahman has two

aspects, with form and without form, and then negating it, is not right as per

the maxim, "it is better to avoid mire from a distance rather than getting into

it and washing it off later."

 

What Ramanuja

means is that the sruti would not first declare that the Brahman has two

aspects, with form and without form and then proceed to deny that. The

scriptures would not deny what has been expressed specifically earlier. So what

is the real implication of the text on negation? Ramanuja clarifies

subsequently.

 

 

kastharhi nisheDha vaakyaarThaH ? suthrakaaraH svayam eva vadhathi-

`prakrtha ethaavathvam hi prathishedhathi thatho braveethi cha bhooyaH,'

ithi.uttharathra aTha naamaDheyam sathyasya sathyam ithi praanaavai sathyam

theshaam eva sathyam ithyaadhinaa guna gaNasya prathipaadhithathvaath poorvaprakrtha

ethaavanmaathram na bhavathi brahma ithi.brahmaNah thaavanmaathrathaa

prathishiDhyatha ithi soothraarThaH.

 

Ramanuja explains

what is meant by the so called nisheDha vakyas, the texts quoted as above.

 

kastharhi nisheDha vaakyaarThaH ? suthrakaaraH svayam eva vadhathi-

`prakrtha ethaavathvam hi prathishedhathi thatho braveethi cha bhooyaH,' (BS.

3.2.21) ithi

 

What is then

negated by the nishedhavakyas? It is given in the Brahmsuthra thus.The text

denies that much-ness of Brahman as described earlier and says Brahman is much more than that.

 

 

The text quoted

earlier dhve vaava

brahmaNo roope –moortham chauiva amoorthamcha, meaning that there are

two aspects of Brahman , with form and without form is further expalined in the

upanishad (Brhad.2.1to3) as the moortham, gross world other than air and

space and amoortham, subtle ,that is,

air and space.and the subsequent passage `aThaatha aadheso nethi nethi, nahyethasmaath ithi na

ithi anyath param asthi (Brhd.2.3.6)

 

This Ramanuja

interprets as to mean that these two forms, namely, gross and subtle do

not exhaust the qualities of Brahman since the text speaks of further qualities

than this, by saying nahyethasmaath ithi na ithi anyath param asthi, meaning there

is nothing higher than this which is described. That is, there is nothing

higher to Brahman either in nature or in qualities.

 

uttharathra `aTha naamaDheyam sathyasya sathyam ithi praanaa vai sathyam

theshaam eva sathyam,' (Brhd.2.3.6) ithyaadhinaa guna gaNasya prathipaadhithathvaath

poorvaprakrtha ethaavanmaathram na bhavathi brahma ithi

 

The text continues

as `aTha naamaDheyam

sathyasya sathyam ithi praanaa vai sathyam theshaam eva sathyam,' meaning, then comes the name, the truth of truth;

for the praNas are true and it is the truth of them. Thus the subsequent

portion of the passage describes Brahman with more qualities. Hence the

expression `nethi nethi,' does not deny Brahman of any attributes but it denies

the limiting the nature of Brahman by

the two aspects, with form and without form.

 

Next Ramanuja

examines the text `neha naanasthi kimchana,' which is claimed to be negating plurality.

 

 

 

`neha naanaasthi kimchana' ithyaadhinaa naanaathvaprathisheDha eva

dhrSyatha ithi cheth, anyathra api uttharthra sarvasya vaSee sarvasya eeSaanaH

ithi sathyasankalpathva sarveSvarathva prathipaadhanaath chethanaachethnavasthu SareeraH eeSvaraH ithi sarvaprakaara samsThithaH sarveSvaraH sa

eka eva ithi thath prathyaneekaabrahmaathmaka naanaathvam prathishidDham na

bhavath abimatham. Sarvaasu evam praakaaraasu Sruthishu iyam eva sThithiH ithi na

kvachidhapi brahmaNaH saviSeshathvaniSheDha vaachee koapi SabdhaH dhrSyathe.

 

Ramanuja explains

the texts denying plurality next.

 

`neha naanaasthi kimchana' (Brhd.4.4.19) ithyaadhinaa

naanaathvaprathisheDha eva dhrSyatha ithi cheth

 

If it is argued

that the text which declares `there is no plurality here,' denies plurality,

 

anyathra api uttharthra `sarvasya vaSee sarvasya eeSaanaH,'

(Brhd.4.4.22)ithi sathyasankalpathva sarveSvarathva prathipaadhanaath

 

the subsequent

text in the same passge says, "He is the controller of all, the Lord of all," which declares the attribute of Brahman as

true-willed and being the master of all.

 

chethanaachethnavasthu SareeraH eeSvaraH

ithi sarvaprakaara samsThithaH sarveSvaraH

 

Hence the Lord

has the sentient and insentint beings as His body and as modes.

 

sa eka eva ithi thath prathyaneeka abrahmaathmaka naanaathvam

prathishidDham na bhavath abimatham.

 

Thus Brahman

being one only, what is here negated is the existence of anything other than

those which have Him as their innerself and are controlled by Him. And not what

is explained by you (advaita.)

 

Sarvaasu evam praakaaraasu Sruthishu iyam eva sThithiH ithi na kvachidhapi

brahmaNaH saviSeshathvaniSheDha vaachee koapi SabdhaH dhrSyathe.

 

In all the sruthi

texts of this nature this is the import and hence nowhere is the

differentiation of Brahman is reudiated by any sruti texts.

 

Ramanuja next

refutes the illusion theory of advaita through rasoning.