Guest guest Posted December 20, 1999 Report Share Posted December 20, 1999 PART = 10. 6. THE SAGUNA AND NIRGUNA TEXTS : The Nirguna texts have greater force and they are cancelling the Saguna texts according to the mimansa principle, i.e., Appacchadanyaya. 7. The text of Taithiriya describing Brahman as Satyam, Jananam, Anantham does not define qualities of Brahman. All the terms namely, Satya, Jnana and Anantha have the same meaning. Here there is no non distinction. They are not synonyms. The unity of purport is the same but yet these words are expressing what is opposite in nature. The word 'Satya' distinguishes Brahma from whatever is Asatya. The word 'Jnanam' or knowledge distinguishes that from whatever is non-sentient. The word 'Anantha' distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space or space or nature. This distinction is not either a positive attribute or a negative attribute of Braman and all terms are just Brahman itself. So the one Brahman which is self luminous and free from all differences is declared by this text. Other Upanishadic texts also declare the oneness of Brahman. So we understand from the principle that all branches of the Veda which teach the same doctrine that all these speak of the one non - second Brahman itself. An objection may be raised like this - If we accept your interpretation than the words Satya, Jnana and Anantha will be losing their primary sense and will have to be taken in a secondary sense. Is this not a fault ? To this, we answer that the general purport of a sentence is more powerful than the direct meanings of the simple terms. According to the principle of coordination oneness is the purport and so there is no fault. If, on this, another objection is raised that all the words of a sentence are not to be understood in a secondary sense, we say that there is not fault in it. If the purport of the sentence is ascertained why should we not take one word or all words in the secondary sense to make it fit with the general purport. So, the Upanishadic statements are expounding Brahman that is not qualified by any attribute. 8. SASTRA IS NOT ALL CONTRADICTING PRATYAKSHA : We pointed out that in the case of a conflict or contradiction between Sastra and Pratyaksha, the Sastra is of greater force. But, there is not such conflict because even in perception the non - differnciated Brahman alone is apprehended. OBJECTION : Are we not preceiving different things of different kinds as in the form of 'Here is a jar', 'Here is a piece of cloth' etc. ? When it is so, how could it be said that perception causes the apprehension of ''Tan Matra'. ANSWER : Let us examine the judgement. " Here is a jar " , There are two things (1) the nature of the jar and (2) its difference from other things. These two cannot be the object of perception because perceptual cognition takes place in one moment and these two are related to different moments of time. So, it has to be admitted that the object of perception is the essential nature of the thing. For the apprehension of difference from other things remembrance of other things different from it is necessary. So difference is not apprehended by perception. 9. BHEDA CANNOT BE DESCRIBED (ADMITTED) LOGICALLY : Logicians cannot give a definition of such a thing as difference. Difference cannot be the essential nature because it would result in the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing and at the same time judgements as to its difference from everything. It may be said that the judgement " This is different from other things " depends upon the remembrance of its counter entities and as long as there is no such remembrance there is not the judgement of difference formed so long. We say this reasoning is not admissible because you maintain that difference is nothing but essential nature. So you have no right to assume a dependence on remembrance of counter entities etc. As you do not depend upon the remembrance of counter entities for the apprehension of essential nature, in the same way you should not depend on counter entities for apprehension of difference also. Therefore difference is not the nature of the entity. Nor, can you argue that difference is an attribute or Dharma of an entity. In that case you have to admit that is different from essential nature. Difference is incapable of a logical definition and we conclude that perception reveals only " Being - Tanmatra " . 10. PURE BEING ALONE IS THE ULTIMATE REALITY : We observe that the pure being alone persists in all cognitions - like " Here is a jar " , " Here is a piece of cloth " , The jar is perceived " , etc. The differences which do not persist are on the other hand not real. This is also like the rope - snake analogy. The rope which persists as the substrate is real while such things that are wrongly superimposed on it as a snake, a cleft in the ground or a water course are unreal. OBJECTION : This is not a proper example because the non-reality of the snake is the result of the cognition of the true nature of the rope. It is not due to the non persisting nature of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persistence but from the fact that it is not sublated by another cognition. THE ANSWER for this is the varying of jars and pieces of cloth is established like this. The judgement " This is a jar " implies the negation of the cloth and others. Other things are sublated by the jar and that proves the non - reality of whatever has non - continuous existence. Just like the rope pure being persists not sublated therefore it is real. Syllogism : To continue........ Pranamams dAsI Padmini Thousands of Stores. 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