Guest guest Posted January 17, 2008 Report Share Posted January 17, 2008 NOTE: Readers having difficulty in reading the text may need to change their encoding to UTF-8. ------------ srI: SrI upakAra sangraham – 47 --- adikAram – 1 poorva upakAra paramparai (The Foremost Series of Favours) --- SECTION – 5 (11) [continued] (27 Favours of the Lord leading to the means for MOKSHAM) ----- After mentioning the cArvAka theory, SwAmi Desikan next refers to Buddhism, which also does not accept the authority of the Vedas. 2) Buddhism: Buddhism was founded by Gautama who was a prince at KapilAvastu before renouncing the royal life. According to Gautama Buddha, life is a stream of becoming and nothing is permanent. One thing is dependent on another. Even the self is a composite of perception (samjn~A), feeling (vedanA ), volitional dispositions (samskAras), intelligence (vijnAna) and form (roopa). All these change according to the law of karma. Buddha’s four truths are: there is suffering, it has a cause, it can be suppressed and there is way to accomplish this. The cause of suffering is ignorance and selfish craving. When one gets rid of ignorance and its practical consequence of selfishness, he attains nirvana. He postulated an eight-fold path of morality for the attainment of nirvAna. The Buddha does not believe in a positive reality underlying the world which is continuously changing. He also does not affirm a self underlying the mental happenings and the positive character of nirvana. As time passed two forms of Buddhism, namely, the HeenayAna (early) and the MahAyAna (later) emerged. The HeenayAna developed the theory of transitoriness of substances or individuals, and nirvAna is liberation from suffering. The MahAyAna developed a positive philosophy which believes in the reality of an Absolute, the essence of existence. It personified Buddha himself as the law. The fundamental points of distinction between the HeenayAna and the MahAyAna concern the ultimate goal of the religion, the instructions, the means and the realization. The ultimate good of a follower of the HeenayAna is to attain his own salvation whereas that of a MahAyAna follower is not to seek his own salvation but to seek the salvation of all beings. Hence the goal of the HeenayAna was lower than that of the MahAyAna. In the course of development of the Buddhist theory, many philosophical schools emerged. Four are the main among them: the VaibhAshika, the sautrAntika, the YogAcAra, and the MAdhyamika. They differ among themselves in sub-theories. a) VaibhAshika School: This does not accept the existence of atma. It says that only objects which appear to the perception and the perception alone are true. They are momentary like a light’s effervescent or the flood waters of a river. They appear to be same but as the light of a lamp burning from moment to moment and the water in a river flows out and new water flows in. The external objects, therefore, appear to be the same, whereas they are changing every moment. [The VaibhAshikas are said to be the followers of the VibhAshA, an ancient commentary on the philosophical teachings of the Buddha known as the Abhidhamma. They are known as realists.] b) SautrAntika School: According to this school of Buddhism, the external objects do exist. But they cannot be perceived, but can be known through inference, just like knowing the objects from the reflections in a mirror. An object is a conglomeration of atoms. This theorist, therefore, does not accept the objects but says they are only paramANus, big atoms, which are alone true. [The VaibhAsika and the SautrAntika schools belong to HInayAna.] c) YogAcara: This school rejects the theory of soonyavAda, total void. Even the external objects are all true. Knowledge is the cause for both suffering and enjoyment. Both objects and the knower are only aspects of knowledge and both do not exist as separate entities. As no outside object exists independent of knowledge, it is soonya, void. [The YogAcaras are idealists. They evidently derive their name from their association with yoga practices.] d) The MAdhyamika: This is also known as the treatise on the Middle Doctrine. This was expounded by NAgArjuna. According to him, whatever is perceptible in unreal like those seen in dreams. The outside objects are changing every moment. The world can not be said to be true nor untrue. At the same time it cannot be said to be true as well as untrue. This theory is known as soonyavAda, theory of void. However, he differed from the main Buddhism by saying that the inner knowledge is true and only the outside objects are untrue. [The MAdhyamikas claim to hold a middle position in various ways. But they arer extreme nihilists. ] [The YOgAcAra and the MAdhyamika Schools belong to the MahAyAna Buddhism.] SrIbhAshyakara has dealt with these theories in his works on VedAnt Sootras, SrIbhAshyam, VedAnta Deepa and VedAnt sAra. Besides, SwAmi Desikan himself has clarified our stand in his “Paramatabhangam”. We shall see with the help of these grantams, the un-tenability of these theories. In the Brahmasutra, the second quarter of the second Chapter deals with various theories of philosophies which do not accept the authority of the Vedas. Among the different theories within the Bhuddhist philosophy, the doctrine of two classes, namely, VaibhAshika and SautrAntika are taken up first by SrIBhAshyakAra for consideration. The reason is that it is almost similar to the doctrine of the NaiyAyika-VaishEShika that has been discussed in the previous AdhikaraNa. Both are based on the theory of paraMaNu (big atom or molecule) being the source for the origin of this world. a & b) VaibhAshika & SautrAntika Schools: The third adhikaraNa, “samudAyAdhikaraNam”, of the second quarter of the second Chapter of the Brahmasutra discusses the doctrine of these two Buddhist schools. It covers as many as ten sutras (17 to 26). These two schools accept the existence of the world, but say it is only momentary. Their view is rejected in this AdhikaraNa. In very first sutra, SrIbhAshyakAra demolishes their theory. Sutra – (2-2-17) – “samudAya ubhayahEtukE api tad aprAptih” -- The creation of the aggregate does not become established even in the aggregates caused by its two causes, i.e., atoms and earth and others. The theory that the aggregate is caused by these two, i.e., atoms and elements cannot be established. These do not become established by the reason of the assertion of momentariness to all entities. Because, atom, earth etc., exist for a moment only according their theory. When an object joins with another, it should happen at the first moment itself. In the next moment it has to mingle with yet another. In the third moment, a body or a world should emerge. If the atoms disappear at the very moment they appear, when they will do the act of joining together? Similar is the case with the elements which are supposed to form the body or the world by joining, according to the Buddhist theory. Hence, as this philosophy proposes the destruction of things within a moment of their existence, there cannot be a world nor can be a body. Also, there will not be any activity because things will not exist the next moment after their appearance. Therefore, for the creation of the world and the physical matter, one has to accept the Brahman as the cause. In this way, SrIbhAshyakAra demolishes the theory of momentary existence of matter and as propounded by these two Schools of Buddhism. c) YogAcara School: The fourth AdhikaraNa, namely, “upalabdhyadhikaraNa”, of the second quarter of the Second Chapter of the Brahmasutra deals with the doctrine of this Buddhist School. Three sutras come in this adhikaraNa: i) “nA-bhAva uplabdEh //” (2-2-27) – There is no non-existence (of things other than knowledge), because it (i.e., the external world) is perceived. This sutra discusses whether the doctrine of the YogAchAras that vijnAnam alone is real, is based on valid reasons or not. SrIbhAshyakAra says that it is not. The person who says, “I know the jar”, the knowledge and the jar which is being known – as these are known separately, to say that only knowledge exists and not the other two, is not based on valid means of knowledge. Such a theory deserves to be rejected by scholars. Knowledge of all persons in the world is experienced as related to a knowing subject and an object that is being known. Hence, only a mad cap will assert that only consciousness exists unrelated to the subject and the object. The second Sutra says: “vaidharmyacca na svapnAdivat” (2-2-28) – The perceptions of waking state too are not like dream perceptions, because of differences in their nature. The YogAcAra theory says that the knowledge in waking state is devoid of objects as it is of the nature of knowledge, like that in dreaming state. SrIbhAshyakAra’s reply to this is that knowledge is devoid of objects only under certain circumstances like dreaming etc. Another notion of the YogAcAra is that knowledge in general is devoid of objects as it is of the nature of knowledge. The reply given to this is: This inference which is also knowledge about an object. So, knowledge is seen, even according to the YogAcAra, to be both with an object and without it. Thus the nature of knowledge is not without an object. The third Sootra says: “na bhAvO anupalabdhEh //” (2-2-29) – There is no existence (of such knowledge as is devoid of objects), because it is not cognized. Everywhere in this world, knowledge devoid of knower and the object is not at all seen. Hence, nowhere knowledge devoid of an existing object is possible. It is concluded that the doctrine of YogAcArya is totally inappropriate. d) MAdhyamika School: The fifth AdhikaraNa, namely, “sarvathApapattyadhikaraNam” deals with the inappropriateness of the MAdhyamika Buddhist theory. The Sutra (30) says: “sarvathAnupapathEsca” – meaning, “Because also it (i.e., the theory of the MAdhyamikas is altogether inappropriate.” SriBhashyakAra first raises the question whether the doctrine of total void propounded by the MAdhyamika is possible. The prima facie view of the MAdhyamika is that it is possible. How? Consciousness and the external objects like jars etc. do not exist, as their origin cannot be proved. An object cannot originate from another object. For example, jars cannot originate from the lump of clay that is not destroyed. Nor they can originate from nothing. Therefore, the doctrine of total void is the reality. Whatever appears is all myth. The destruction of this myth is the salvation. The MAdhyamika argues that the Buddha had proposed the theory of momentariness of consciousness and the external objects for those who are not mature enough to accept the void theory. They are the VaibhAshikas. SrIbhAshyakAra now states his reply: The view of the MAdhyamika that all things are nothing, is not possible, because it is completely inappropriate. The terms “being” and “non-being” and the related ideas are referring to different states of a thing or an object which is perceived by the means of valid knowledge. In this world, if it is said that a jar is not there, it means that the form of jar is absent. But it is in the form of pot-pieces. That way it is perceived. If it is said the jar exists, it refers to the form of the jar and it is perceived as such. Therefore, the terms “being” and “non-being” refer only to the respective form that is perceived. Both terms proves the existence of the object and not a void. Here, one recalls a pAsuram of SrI nammAzhvAr in TiruvAimozhi: “uLan enil uLan, avan uruvam ivvuruvukaL, uLan, alan enil, avan aruvam ivvaruvukaL, uLan ena, ilan ena, ivai kuNmudaimaiyil uLan irutakaimaiyodu ozhivilan parantE.” (Tiruvaimozhi, 1-1-9) (If it is stated that the Lord exits, He exists with a form and all the attributes. If it is stated that He does not exist (as stated by nihilists), then also He exists; these formless things are His own; being and non-being are the two facets and attributes of the Lord. In such two ways, He has spread all over leaving nothing uncovered.) Here, we may refer to SrI ParAsara Bhattar’s verses on these theories. “yOgAcArO jagadapalapatyatra sautrAntikah tat dhee vaicitryAt anumitipadam vakti vaibhAShikastu / pratyakSham tatkShaNikayati tE ranganAtha! trayOpi jnAnAtmatvakShaNbhiduratE cakShatE tAn kShipAmah //” (SrIrangarAjastavam,2-8) (Oh RanganAtha! This yOgAcAra Buddhist denies this world; SautrAntika Buddhist says that world can be inferred, because of various appearances; VaibhAshika Buddhist dismisses this perceptive world as momentary. All these three say that knowledge is the Atma and it is also momentary. We reject their views.) “jagadbhanguram bhangurA buddhirAtmEti asadvEtrabhAvE tathA vEdyavittyOah / kShaNadhvamsatashca smrutipratyabhij~nAdaridam jagatsyAdidam rangacandra! // ” (-do-, 2-9) (Oh Rangachandra! To say that the world is momentary and the momentary knowledge is the Atma, is false. Because, if there is no a knower different from knowledge and so are the objects and the knowledge, this world will be devoid of cognition and remembrance.) SwAmi Desikan says that the Lord saved the jIva from being confused by these Buddhist theories. [books consulted: 1) Indian Philosophy by Dr. S.Radhakrishnan 2) The VedAnta Sutras with the SrI-Bhashya: Translated by M.Rangacharya & M.B.Varadaraja Iyengar (Vol ii); 3) VedAnta Deepa, (vol i) of Bhagavad Ramanjacharya: English Translation by Dr.N.S.Anantha Rangachary, Bangalore. 4) ShAreekakArikAvaLi, with Tamil Commentary by Sri S.Krishnaswami Iyengar, Puthur AgrahAram, Tiruchirapalli.] (To continue) dAsan Anbil S.SrInivAsan ------------ ______________________________\ ____ Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Search. http://tools.search./newsearch/category.php?category=shopping Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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