Guest guest Posted July 23, 2004 Report Share Posted July 23, 2004 > Thu, 22 Jul 2004 06:18:59 -0700 > Halliburton: Profits of war > > > <http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1266328,00.html> > Profits of war > > Halliburton has become a byword for the cosy links > between the White > House and Texan big business. But how did the > company run in the 90s by > Dick Cheney secure a deal that guaranteed it > millions in profit every > time the US military saw action? In this exclusive > extract from his new > book, Dan Briody reveals how the firm made a killing > on the battleground > > Thursday July 22, 2004 > The Guardian > > > Buy The Halliburton Agenda at Amazon.co.uk > > On January 12 1991, Congress authorised President > George HW Bush to > engage Iraq in war. Just five days later, Operation > Desert Storm > commenced in Kuwait. As with the more recent war in > the Gulf, it did not > take long for the US to claim victory - it was all > over by the end of > February - but the clean-up would last longer, and > was far more > expensive than the military action itself. In a > senseless act of > desperation and defeat, Iraqi troops set fire to > more than 700 Kuwaiti > oil wells, resulting in a constant fog of thick, > black smoke that turned > day into night. > > It was thought the mess would take no less than five > years to clean up, > as lakes of oil surrounding each well blazed out of > control, making it > nearly impossible to approach the burning wells, let > alone extinguish > them. But with the fighting over, Halliburton angled > its way into the > clean-up and rebuilding effort that was expected to > cost around $200bn > (£163bn) over the next 10 years. > > The company sent 60 men to help with the > firefighting effort. Meanwhile, > its engineering and construction subsidiary Kellogg > Brown & Root (KBR) > won an additional $3m contract to assess the damage > that the invasion > had done to Kuwait's infrastructure - a contract > whose value had > multiplied seven times by the end of KBR's > involvement. More > significantly still, KBR won a contract to extract > troops from Saudi > Arabia after their services were no longer needed in > the Gulf. > Halliburton was back in the army logistics business > in earnest for the > first time since Vietnam. The end of the Gulf war > saw nothing less than > the rebirth of the military outsourcing business. > Advertiser links > Donate Your Car to an Animal Charity > > Donate your car to a animal charity. Choose from 1 > of dozens... > donationline.com > Adopt a Panda - World Wildlife Fund > > Adopt a panda to help save this cuddly animal. Your > $25, $50... > secure.worldwildlife.org > Ark RAIN Wildlife Sanctuary and Rescue > > With your charitable contributions, lions, primates, > and... > arkrain.org > > Military outsourcing was not new. Private firms had > been aiding in war > efforts since long before KBR won its first naval > shipbuilding contract. > But the nature of military outsourcing has changed > dramatically in the > last decade. The trend towards a " downsized " > military began because of > the " peace dividend " at the end of the cold war, and > continued > throughout the 1990s. This combination of a reduced > military but > continued conflict gave rise to an unprecedented new > industry of private > military firms. These firms would assist the > military in everything from > weapons procurement and maintenance to training of > troops and logistics. > > In the decade after the first Gulf war, the number > of private > contractors used in and around the battlefield > increased tenfold. It has > been estimated that there is now one private > contractor for every 10 > soldiers in Iraq. Companies such as Halliburton, > which became the fifth > largest defence contractor in the nation during the > 1990s, have played a > critical role in this trend. > > The story behind America's " super contract " begins > in 1992, when the > department of defence, then headed by Dick Cheney, > was impressed with > the work Halliburton did during its time in Kuwait. > Sensing the need to > bolster its forces in the event of further conflicts > of a similar > nature, the Pentagon asked private contractors to > bid on a $3.9m > contract to write a report on how a private firm > could provide > logistical support to the army in the case of > further military action. > > The report was to examine 13 different " hot spots " > around the world, and > detail how services as varied as building bases to > feeding the troops > could be accomplished. The contractor that would > potentially provide the > services detailed in the report would be required to > support the > deployment of 20,000 troops over 180 days. It was a > massive contingency > plan, the first of its kind for the American > military. > > Thirty-seven companies tendered for the contract; > KBR won it. The > company was paid another $5m later that year to > extend the plan to other > locations and add detail. > > The KBR report, which remains classified to this > day, convinced Cheney > that it was indeed possible to create one umbrella > contract and award it > to a single firm. The contract became known as the > Logistics Civil > Augmentation Programme (Logcap) and has been called > " the mother of all > service contracts " . It has been used in every > American deployment since > its award in 1992 - at a cost of several billion > dollars (and counting). > The lucky recipient of the first, five-year Logcap > contract was the very > same company hired to draw up the plan in the first > place: KBR. > > The Logcap contract pulled KBR out of its late 1980s > doldrums and > boosted the bottom line of Halliburton throughout > the 1990s. It is, > effectively, a blank cheque from the government. The > contractor makes > its money from a built-in profit percentage, > anywhere from 1% to 9%, > depending on various incentive clauses. When your > profit is a percentage > of the cost, the more you spend, the more you make. > > Before the ink was dry on the first Logcap contract, > the US army was > deployed to Somalia in December 1992 as part of > Operation Restore Hope. > KBR employees were there before the army even > arrived, and they were the > last to leave. The firm made $109.7m in Somalia. In > August 1994, they > earned $6.3m from Operation Support Hope in Rwanda. > In September of that > same year, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti > netted the company $150m. > And in October 1994, Operation Vigilant Warrior made > them another $5m. > > In the spirit of " refuse no job " , the company was > building the base > camps, supplying the troops with food and water, > fuel and munitions, > cleaning latrines, even washing their clothes. They > attended the staff > meetings and were kept up to speed on all the > activities related to a > given mission. They were becoming another unit in > the US army. > > The army's growing dependency on the company hit > home when, in 1997, KBR > lost the Logcap contract in a competitive rebid to > rival Dyncorp. The > army found it impossible to remove Brown & Root from > their work in the > Balkans - by far the most lucrative part of the > contract - and so carved > out the work in that theatre to keep it with KBR. In > 2001, the company > won the Logcap contract again, this time for twice > the normal term > length: 10 years. > > To the uninitiated, the appointment of Cheney to the > chairman, > president, and chief executive officer positions at > Halliburton in > August 1995, made little sense. Cheney had almost no > business > experience, having been a career politician and > bureaucrat. Financial > analysts downgraded the stock and the business press > openly questioned > the decision. > > Cheney has been described by those who know him as > everything from > low-key to downright bland, but the confidence he > inspired and the > loyalty he professed made him an indispensable part > of Donald Rumsfeld's > rise to power. In the 1970s, Rumsfeld became Gerald > Ford's White House > chief of staff, with Cheney as his deputy. In those > days, Cheney was > assigned a codename by the secret service that > perfectly summed up his > disposition: " Backseat " . > > But Halliburton understood Cheney's value. With him > as CEO, the company > gained considerable leverage in Washington. Until > Cheney's appointment > in the autumn of 1995, Halliburton's business > results had been decent. > After a loss of $91m in 1993, the company had > returned to profitability > in 1994 with an operating profit of $236m. With the > new revenue coming > in from Logcap, Halliburton and its prize > subsidiary, KBR, were back on > track. Though Logcap was producing only modest > revenues, it was > successful in reintegrating KBR into the military > machine. > > The big opportunity came in December 1995, just two > months after Cheney > assumed the post of CEO, when the US sent thousands > of troops to the > Balkans as a peace-keeping force. As part of > Operation Joint Endeavour, > KBR was dispatched to Bosnia and Kosovo to support > the army in its > operations in the region. The task was massive in > scope and size. > > One example of the work KBR did in the Balkans was > Camp Bondsteel. The > camp was so large that the US general accounting > office (GAO) likened it > to " a small town " . The company built roads, power > generation, water and > sewage systems, housing, a helicopter airfield, a > perimeter fence, guard > towers, and a detention centre. Bondsteel is the > largest and most > expensive army base since Vietnam. It also happens > to be built in the > path of the Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil (Ambo) > Trans-Balkan > pipeline, the pipeline connecting the oil-rich > Caspian Sea region to the > rest of the world. The initial feasibility project > for Ambo was done by KBR. > > KBR's cash flow from Logcap ballooned under Cheney's > tenure, jumping > from $144m in 1994 to more than $423m in 1996, and > the Balkans was the > driving force. By 1999, the army was spending just > under $1bn a year on > KBR's work in the Balkans. The GAO issued a report > in September 2000 > charging serious cost-control problems in Bosnia, > but KBR retains the > contract to this day. > > Meanwhile, Cheney was busy developing Halliburton's > business in other > parts of the world. " It is a false dichotomy that we > have to choose > between our commercial and other interests, " he told > the [public policy > research foundation] Cato Institute in 1998, > speaking out against > economic sanctions levied by the Clinton > administration against > countries suspected of terrorist activity. " Our > government has become > sanctions-happy, " he continued. > > In particular, Cheney objected to sanctions against > Libya and Iran, two > countries with which Halliburton was already doing > business regardless. > Even more disconcerting, though, was the work the > company did in Iraq. > Between his stints as secretary of defence and > vice-president, Cheney > was in charge of Halliburton when it was > circumventing strict UN > sanctions, helping to rebuild Iraq and enriching > Saddam Hussein. > > In September 1998, Halliburton closed a $7.7bn stock > merger with Dresser > Industries (the company that gave George HW Bush his > first job). The > merger made Halliburton the largest oilfield > services firm in the world. > It also brought with it two foreign subsidiaries > that were doing > business with Iraq via the controversial Oil for > Food programme. The two > subsidiaries, Dresser Rand and Ingersoll Dresser > Pump Co, signed > $73m-worth of contracts for oil production > equipment. > > Cheney told the press during his 2000 run for > vice-president that he had > a " firm policy " against doing business with Iraq. He > admitted to doing > business with Iran and Libya, but " Iraq's > different, " he said. Cheney > told ABC TV: " We've not done any business in Iraq > since UN sanctions > were imposed on Iraq in 1990, and I had a standing > policy that I > wouldn't do that. " > > Three weeks later, Cheney was forced to admit the > business ties, but > claimed ignorance. He told reporters that he was not > aware of Dresser's > business in Iraq, and that besides, Halliburton had > divested itself of > both companies by 2000. In the meantime, the > companies had done another > $30m-worth of business in Iraq before being sold > off. > > The Dresser merger was, it appeared, the crowning > achievement of the > Cheney years at Halliburton. But Cheney left > Halliburton several other > legacies. David Gribbin, Cheney's former chief of > staff, became > Halliburton's chief lobbyist in Washington. Admiral > Joe Lopez, a former > commander of the sixth fleet, was hired to be KBR's > governmental > operations expert. Together, Cheney's team made > Halliburton one of the > top government contractors in the country. KBR had > nearly doubled its > government contracts, from $1.2bn in the five years > prior to his > arrival, to $2.3bn during his five years as CEO. > Halliburton soared from > 73rd to 18th on the Pentagon's list of top > contractors. > > After 9/11, KBR went to work on the war on > terrorism, building the 1,000 > detention cells at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for > terrorist suspects, at a > cost of $52m. The work had to feel familiar to KBR: > it had done the > exact same job 35 years earlier in Vietnam. When > troops were deployed to > Afghanistan, so was KBR. It built US bases in Bagram > and Kandahar for > $157m. As it had done in the past, KBR had men on > the ground before the > first troops even arrived in most locations. They > readied the camps, fed > the troops, and hauled away the waste. And they did > it like the military > would have done it: fast, efficient, and effective. > It was good work, > solid revenues, but nothing like the windfall the > company had > experienced in the Balkans. > > In addition, Halliburton won the contract for > restoring the Iraqi oil > infrastructure - a contract that was not > competitively bid. It was given > to Halliburton out of convenience, because it had > developed the plan for > fighting oil fires (all, by this time, > extinguished). Despite the new > business, the fortunes of Halliburton and its > subsidiary have not > prospered. The stock that Cheney cashed in near its > peak, when he > renewed his political career in 2000, has since > plummeted. The main > culprit was the 1998 merger with Dresser, which > saddled the company with > asbestos liabilities that ultimately led to two > Halliburton subsidiaries > - one of them KBR - having to file for bankruptcy. > > When Cheney left to become Bush's running mate, he > took a golden > parachute package - in addition to the stock options > he was obliged to > sell for $30m. In September 2003, Cheney insisted: > " Since I've left > Halliburton to become George Bush's vice-president, > I've severed all my > ties with the company, gotten rid of all my > financial interests. I have > no financial interest in Halliburton of any kind and > haven't now for > over three years. " > > The Congressional Research Service (CRS), a > non-partisan agency that > investigates political issues at the request of > elected officials, says > otherwise. Cheney has been receiving a deferred > salary from Halliburton > in the years since he left the company. In 2001, he > received $205,298. > In 2002, he drew $162,392. He is scheduled to > receive similar payments > through 2005, and has an insurance policy in place > to protect the > payments in the event that Halliburton should fold. > In addition, Cheney > still holds 433,333 unexercised stock options in > Halliburton. He has > agreed to donate any profits to charity. > > · The Halliburton Agenda by Dan Briody is published > by John Wiley and > Sons Ltd at £16.99. To order a copy for £14.99 plus > p & p, call Guardian > Book Service on 0870 836 0875. > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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