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Investigation

 

Monsanto’s Harvest of Fear

 

Monsanto already dominates America’s food chain with its genetically modified

seeds. Now it has targeted milk production. Just as frightening as the

corporation’s tactics–ruthless legal battles against small farmers–is its

decades-long history of toxic contamination.

 

by Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele 2008

 

An anti-Monsanto crop circle in the Philippines

 

No thanks: An anti-Monsanto crop circle made by farmers and volunteers in the

Philippines. By Melvyn Calderon/Greenpeace HO/A.P. Images.

 

 

 

Gary Rinehart clearly remembers the summer day in 2002 when the stranger walked

in and issued his threat. Rinehart was behind the counter of the Square Deal,

his “old-time country store,†as he calls it, on the fading town square of

Eagleville, Missouri, a tiny farm community 100 miles north of Kansas City.

 

The Square Deal is a fixture in Eagleville, a place where farmers and

townspeople can go for lightbulbs, greeting cards, hunting gear, ice cream,

aspirin, and dozens of other small items without having to drive to a big-box

store in Bethany, the county seat, 15 miles down Interstate 35.

 

Everyone knows Rinehart, who was born and raised in the area and runs one of

Eagleville’s few surviving businesses. The stranger came up to the counter and

asked for him by name.

 

“Well, that’s me,†said Rinehart.

 

As Rinehart would recall, the man began verbally attacking him, saying he had

proof that Rinehart had planted Monsanto’s genetically modified (G.M.)

soybeans in violation of the company’s patent. Better come clean and settle

with Monsanto, Rinehart says the man told him—or face the consequences.

 

Rinehart was incredulous, listening to the words as puzzled customers and

employees looked on. Like many others in rural America, Rinehart knew of

Monsanto’s fierce reputation for enforcing its patents and suing anyone who

allegedly violated them. But Rinehart wasn’t a farmer. He wasn’t a seed

dealer. He hadn’t planted any seeds or sold any seeds. He owned a small—a

really small—country store in a town of 350 people. He was angry that somebody

could just barge into the store and embarrass him in front of everyone. “It

made me and my business look bad,†he says. Rinehart says he told the

intruder, “You got the wrong guy.â€

 

When the stranger persisted, Rinehart showed him the door. On the way out the

man kept making threats. Rinehart says he can’t remember the exact words, but

they were to the effect of: “Monsanto is big. You can’t win. We will get

you. You will pay.â€

 

Scenes like this are playing out in many parts of rural America these days as

Monsanto goes after farmers, farmers’ co-ops, seed dealers—anyone it

suspects may have infringed its patents of genetically modified seeds. As

interviews and reams of court documents reveal, Monsanto relies on a shadowy

army of private investigators and agents in the American heartland to strike

fear into farm country. They fan out into fields and farm towns, where they

secretly videotape and photograph farmers, store owners, and co-ops; infiltrate

community meetings; and gather information from informants about farming

activities. Farmers say that some Monsanto agents pretend to be surveyors.

Others confront farmers on their land and try to pressure them to sign papers

giving Monsanto access to their private records. Farmers call them the “seed

police†and use words such as “Gestapo†and “Mafia†to describe their

tactics.

 

When asked about these practices, Monsanto declined to comment specifically,

other than to say that the company is simply protecting its patents. “Monsanto

spends more than $2 million a day in research to identify, test, develop and

bring to market innovative new seeds and technologies that benefit farmers,â€

Monsanto spokesman Darren Wallis wrote in an e-mailed letter to Vanity Fair.

“One tool in protecting this investment is patenting our discoveries and, if

necessary, legally defending those patents against those who might choose to

infringe upon them.†Wallis said that, while the vast majority of farmers and

seed dealers follow the licensing agreements, “a tiny fraction†do not, and

that Monsanto is obligated to those who do abide by its rules to enforce its

patent rights on those who “reap the benefits of the technology without paying

for its use.†He said only a small number of cases ever go to trial.

 

Some compare Monsanto’s hard-line approach to Microsoft’s zealous efforts to

protect its software from pirates. At least with Microsoft the buyer of a

program can use it over and over again. But farmers who buy Monsanto’s seeds

can’t even do that.

 

The Control of Nature

 

For centuries—millennia—farmers have saved seeds from season to season: they

planted in the spring, harvested in the fall, then reclaimed and cleaned the

seeds over the winter for re-planting the next spring. Monsanto has turned this

ancient practice on its head.

 

Monsanto developed G.M. seeds that would resist its own herbicide, Roundup,

offering farmers a convenient way to spray fields with weed killer without

affecting crops. Monsanto then patented the seeds. For nearly all of its history

the United States Patent and Trademark Office had refused to grant patents on

seeds, viewing them as life-forms with too many variables to be patented.

“It’s not like describing a widget,†says Joseph Mendelson III, the legal

director of the Center for Food Safety, which has tracked Monsanto’s

activities in rural America for years.

 

Indeed not. But in 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,

turned seeds into widgets, laying the groundwork for a handful of corporations

to begin taking control of the world’s food supply. In its decision, the court

extended patent law to cover “a live human-made microorganism.†In this

case, the organism wasn’t even a seed. Rather, it was a Pseudomonas bacterium

developed by a General Electric scientist to clean up oil spills. But the

precedent was set, and Monsanto took advantage of it. Since the 1980s, Monsanto

has become the world leader in genetic modification of seeds and has won 674

biotechnology patents, more than any other company, according to U.S. Department

of Agriculture data.

 

Farmers who buy Monsanto’s patented Roundup Ready seeds are required to sign

an agreement promising not to save the seed produced after each harvest for

re-planting, or to sell the seed to other farmers. This means that farmers must

buy new seed every year. Those increased sales, coupled with ballooning sales of

its Roundup weed killer, have been a bonanza for Monsanto.

 

This radical departure from age-old practice has created turmoil in farm

country. Some farmers don’t fully understand that they aren’t supposed to

save Monsanto’s seeds for next year’s planting. Others do, but ignore the

stipulation rather than throw away a perfectly usable product. Still others say

that they don’t use Monsanto’s genetically modified seeds, but seeds have

been blown into their fields by wind or deposited by birds. It’s certainly

easy for G.M. seeds to get mixed in with traditional varieties when seeds are

cleaned by commercial dealers for re-planting. The seeds look identical; only a

laboratory analysis can show the difference. Even if a farmer doesn’t buy G.M.

seeds and doesn’t want them on his land, it’s a safe bet he’ll get a visit

from Monsanto’s seed police if crops grown from G.M. seeds are discovered in

his fields.

 

Most Americans know Monsanto because of what it sells to put on our lawns— the

ubiquitous weed killer Roundup. What they may not know is that the company now

profoundly influences—and one day may virtually control—what we put on our

tables. For most of its history Monsanto was a chemical giant, producing some of

the most toxic substances ever created, residues from which have left us with

some of the most polluted sites on earth. Yet in a little more than a decade,

the company has sought to shed its polluted past and morph into something much

different and more far-reaching—an “agricultural company†dedicated to

making the world “a better place for future generations.†Still, more than

one Web log claims to see similarities between Monsanto and the fictional

company “U-North†in the movie Michael Clayton, an agribusiness giant

accused in a multibillion-dollar lawsuit of selling an herbicide that causes

cancer.

 

Gary Rinehart

 

Monsanto brought false accusations against Gary Rinehart—shown here at his

rural Missouri store. There has been no apology. Photographs by Kurt Markus.

 

 

 

Monsanto’s genetically modified seeds have transformed the company and are

radically altering global agriculture. So far, the company has produced G.M.

seeds for soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton. Many more products have been

developed or are in the pipeline, including seeds for sugar beets and alfalfa.

The company is also seeking to extend its reach into milk production by

marketing an artificial growth hormone for cows that increases their output, and

it is taking aggressive steps to put those who don’t want to use growth

hormone at a commercial disadvantage.

 

Even as the company is pushing its G.M. agenda, Monsanto is buying up

conventional-seed companies. In 2005, Monsanto paid $1.4 billion for Seminis,

which controlled 40 percent of the U.S. market for lettuce, tomatoes, and other

vegetable and fruit seeds. Two weeks later it announced the acquisition of the

country’s third-largest cottonseed company, Emergent Genetics, for $300

million. It’s estimated that Monsanto seeds now account for 90 percent of the

U.S. production of soybeans, which are used in food products beyond counting.

Monsanto’s acquisitions have fueled explosive growth, transforming the St.

Louis–based corporation into the largest seed company in the world.

 

In Iraq, the groundwork has been laid to protect the patents of Monsanto and

other G.M.-seed companies. One of L. Paul Bremer’s last acts as head of the

Coalition Provisional Authority was an order stipulating that “farmers shall

be prohibited from re-using seeds of protected varieties.†Monsanto has said

that it has no interest in doing business in Iraq, but should the company change

its mind, the American-style law is in place.

 

To be sure, more and more agricultural corporations and individual farmers are

using Monsanto’s G.M. seeds. As recently as 1980, no genetically modified

crops were grown in the U.S. In 2007, the total was 142 million acres planted.

Worldwide, the figure was 282 million acres. Many farmers believe that G.M.

seeds increase crop yields and save money. Another reason for their attraction

is convenience. By using Roundup Ready soybean seeds, a farmer can spend less

time tending to his fields. With Monsanto seeds, a farmer plants his crop, then

treats it later with Roundup to kill weeds. That takes the place of

labor-intensive weed control and plowing.

 

Monsanto portrays its move into G.M. seeds as a giant leap for mankind. But out

in the American countryside, Monsanto’s no-holds-barred tactics have made it

feared and loathed. Like it or not, farmers say, they have fewer and fewer

choices in buying seeds.

 

And controlling the seeds is not some abstraction. Whoever provides the

world’s seeds controls the world’s food supply.

 

Under Surveillance

 

After Monsanto’s investigator confronted Gary Rinehart, Monsanto filed a

federal lawsuit alleging that Rinehart “knowingly, intentionally, and

willfully†planted seeds “in violation of Monsanto’s patent rights.†The

company’s complaint made it sound as if Monsanto had Rinehart dead to rights:

 

During the 2002 growing season, Investigator Jeffery Moore, through surveillance

of Mr. Rinehart’s farm facility and farming operations, observed Defendant

planting brown bag soybean seed. Mr. Moore observed the Defendant take the brown

bag soybeans to a field, which was subsequently loaded into a grain drill and

planted. Mr. Moore located two empty bags in the ditch in the public road

right-of-way beside one of the fields planted by Rinehart, which contained some

soybeans. Mr. Moore collected a small amount of soybeans left in the bags which

Defendant had tossed into the public right-of way. These samples tested positive

for Monsanto’s Roundup Ready technology.

 

Faced with a federal lawsuit, Rinehart had to hire a lawyer. Monsanto eventually

realized that “Investigator Jeffery Moore†had targeted the wrong man, and

dropped the suit. Rinehart later learned that the company had been secretly

investigating farmers in his area. Rinehart never heard from Monsanto again: no

letter of apology, no public concession that the company had made a terrible

mistake, no offer to pay his attorney’s fees. “I don’t know how they get

away with it,†he says. “If I tried to do something like that it would be

bad news. I felt like I was in another country.â€

 

Gary Rinehart is actually one of Monsanto’s luckier targets. Ever since

commercial introduction of its G.M. seeds, in 1996, Monsanto has launched

thousands of investigations and filed lawsuits against hundreds of farmers and

seed dealers. In a 2007 report, the Center for Food Safety, in Washington, D.C.,

documented 112 such lawsuits, in 27 states.

 

Even more significant, in the Center’s opinion, are the numbers of farmers who

settle because they don’t have the money or the time to fight Monsanto. “The

number of cases filed is only the tip of the iceberg,†says Bill Freese, the

Center’s science-policy analyst. Freese says he has been told of many cases in

which Monsanto investigators showed up at a farmer’s house or confronted him

in his fields, claiming he had violated the technology agreement and demanding

to see his records. According to Freese, investigators will say, “Monsanto

knows that you are saving Roundup Ready seeds, and if you don’t sign these

information-release forms, Monsanto is going to come after you and take your

farm or take you for all you’re worth.†Investigators will sometimes show a

farmer a photo of himself coming out of a store, to let him know he is being

followed.

 

Lawyers who have represented farmers sued by Monsanto say that intimidating

actions like these are commonplace. Most give in and pay Monsanto some amount in

damages; those who resist face the full force of Monsanto’s legal wrath.

 

Scorched-Earth Tactics

 

Pilot Grove, Missouri, population 750, sits in rolling farmland 150 miles west

of St. Louis. The town has a grocery store, a bank, a bar, a nursing home, a

funeral parlor, and a few other small businesses. There are no stoplights, but

the town doesn’t need any. The little traffic it has comes from trucks on

their way to and from the grain elevator on the edge of town. The elevator is

owned by a local co-op, the Pilot Grove Cooperative Elevator, which buys

soybeans and corn from farmers in the fall, then ships out the grain over the

winter. The co-op has seven full-time employees and four computers.

 

In the fall of 2006, Monsanto trained its legal guns on Pilot Grove; ever since,

its farmers have been drawn into a costly, disruptive legal battle against an

opponent with limitless resources. Neither Pilot Grove nor Monsanto will discuss

the case, but it is possible to piece together much of the story from documents

filed as part of the litigation.

 

Monsanto began investigating soybean farmers in and around Pilot Grove several

years ago. There is no indication as to what sparked the probe, but Monsanto

periodically investigates farmers in soybean-growing regions such as this one in

central Missouri. The company has a staff devoted to enforcing patents and

litigating against farmers. To gather leads, the company maintains an 800 number

and encourages farmers to inform on other farmers they think may be engaging in

“seed piracy.â€

 

Once Pilot Grove had been targeted, Monsanto sent private investigators into the

area. Over a period of months, Monsanto’s investigators surreptitiously

followed the co-op’s employees and customers and videotaped them in fields and

going about other activities. At least 17 such surveillance videos were made,

according to court records. The investigative work was outsourced to a St. Louis

agency, McDowell & Associates. It was a McDowell investigator who erroneously

fingered Gary Rinehart. In Pilot Grove, at least 11 McDowell investigators have

worked the case, and Monsanto makes no bones about the extent of this effort:

“Surveillance was conducted throughout the year by various investigators in

the field,†according to court records. McDowell, like Monsanto, will not

comment on the case.

 

Not long after investigators showed up in Pilot Grove, Monsanto subpoenaed the

co-op’s records concerning seed and herbicide purchases and seed-cleaning

operations. The co-op provided more than 800 pages of documents pertaining to

dozens of farmers. Monsanto sued two farmers and negotiated settlements with

more than 25 others it accused of seed piracy. But Monsanto’s legal assault

had only begun. Although the co-op had provided voluminous records, Monsanto

then sued it in federal court for patent infringement. Monsanto contended that

by cleaning seeds—a service which it had provided for decades—the co-op was

inducing farmers to violate Monsanto’s patents. In effect, Monsanto wanted the

co-op to police its own customers.

 

In the majority of cases where Monsanto sues, or threatens to sue, farmers

settle before going to trial. The cost and stress of litigating against a global

corporation are just too great. But Pilot Grove wouldn’t cave—and ever

since, Monsanto has been turning up the heat. The more the co-op has resisted,

the more legal firepower Monsanto has aimed at it. Pilot Grove’s lawyer,

Steven H. Schwartz, described Monsanto in a court filing as pursuing a

“scorched earth tactic,†intent on “trying to drive the co-op into the

ground.â€

 

Even after Pilot Grove turned over thousands more pages of sales records going

back five years, and covering virtually every one of its farmer customers,

Monsanto wanted more—the right to inspect the co-op’s hard drives. When the

co-op offered to provide an electronic version of any record, Monsanto demanded

hands-on access to Pilot Grove’s in-house computers.

 

Monsanto next petitioned to make potential damages punitive—tripling the

amount that Pilot Grove might have to pay if found guilty. After a judge denied

that request, Monsanto expanded the scope of the pre-trial investigation by

seeking to quadruple the number of depositions. “Monsanto is doing its best to

make this case so expensive to defend that the Co-op will have no choice but to

relent,†Pilot Grove’s lawyer said in a court filing.

 

With Pilot Grove still holding out for a trial, Monsanto now subpoenaed the

records of more than 100 of the co-op’s customers. In a “You are Commanded

… †notice, the farmers were ordered to gather up five years of invoices,

receipts, and all other papers relating to their soybean and herbicide

purchases, and to have the documents delivered to a law office in St. Louis.

Monsanto gave them two weeks to comply.

 

Whether Pilot Grove can continue to wage its legal battle remains to be seen.

Whatever the outcome, the case shows why Monsanto is so detested in farm

country, even by those who buy its products. “I don’t know of a company that

chooses to sue its own customer base,†says Joseph Mendelson, of the Center

for Food Safety. “It’s a very bizarre business strategy.†But it’s one

that Monsanto manages to get away with, because increasingly it’s the dominant

vendor in town.

 

Chemicals? What Chemicals?

 

The Monsanto Company has never been one of America’s friendliest corporate

citizens. Given Monsanto’s current dominance in the field of bioengineering,

it’s worth looking at the company’s own DNA. The future of the company may

lie in seeds, but the seeds of the company lie in chemicals. Communities around

the world are still reaping the environmental consequences of Monsanto’s

origins.

 

Monsanto was founded in 1901 by John Francis Queeny, a tough, cigar-smoking

Irishman with a sixth-grade education. A buyer for a wholesale drug company,

Queeny had an idea. But like a lot of employees with ideas, he found that his

boss wouldn’t listen to him. So he went into business for himself on the side.

Queeny was convinced there was money to be made manufacturing a substance called

saccharin, an artificial sweetener then imported from Germany. He took $1,500 of

his savings, borrowed another $3,500, and set up shop in a dingy warehouse near

the St. Louis waterfront. With borrowed equipment and secondhand machines, he

began producing saccharin for the U.S. market. He called the company the

Monsanto Chemical Works, Monsanto being his wife’s maiden name.

 

The German cartel that controlled the market for saccharin wasn’t pleased, and

cut the price from $4.50 to $1 a pound to try to force Queeny out of business.

The young company faced other challenges. Questions arose about the safety of

saccharin, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture even tried to ban it.

Fortunately for Queeny, he wasn’t up against opponents as aggressive and

litigious as the Monsanto of today. His persistence and the loyalty of one

steady customer kept the company afloat. That steady customer was a new company

in Georgia named Coca-Cola.

 

Monsanto added more and more products—vanillin, caffeine, and drugs used as

sedatives and laxatives. In 1917, Monsanto began making aspirin, and soon became

the largest maker worldwide. During World War I, cut off from imported European

chemicals, Monsanto was forced to manufacture its own, and its position as a

leading force in the chemical industry was assured.

 

After Queeny was diagnosed with cancer, in the late 1920s, his only son, Edgar,

became president. Where the father had been a classic entrepreneur, Edgar

Monsanto Queeny was an empire builder with a grand vision. It was

Edgar—shrewd, daring, and intuitive (“He can see around the next corner,â€

his secretary once said)—who built Monsanto into a global powerhouse. Under

Edgar Queeny and his successors, Monsanto extended its reach into a phenomenal

number of products: plastics, resins, rubber goods, fuel additives, artificial

caffeine, industrial fluids, vinyl siding, dishwasher detergent, anti-freeze,

fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides. Its safety glass protects the U.S.

Constitution and the Mona Lisa. Its synthetic fibers are the basis of Astroturf.

 

During the 1970s, the company shifted more and more resources into

biotechnology. In 1981 it created a molecular-biology group for research in

plant genetics. The next year, Monsanto scientists hit gold: they became the

first to genetically modify a plant cell. “It will now be possible to

introduce virtually any gene into plant cells with the ultimate goal of

improving crop productivity,†said Ernest Jaworski, director of Monsanto’s

Biological Sciences Program.

 

Over the next few years, scientists working mainly in the company’s vast new

Life Sciences Research Center, 25 miles west of St. Louis, developed one

genetically modified product after another—cotton, soybeans, corn, canola.

From the start, G.M. seeds were controversial with the public as well as with

some farmers and European consumers. Monsanto has sought to portray G.M. seeds

as a panacea, a way to alleviate poverty and feed the hungry. Robert Shapiro,

Monsanto’s president during the 1990s, once called G.M. seeds “the single

most successful introduction of technology in the history of agriculture,

including the plow.â€

 

By the late 1990s, Monsanto, having rebranded itself into a “life sciencesâ€

company, had spun off its chemical and fibers operations into a new company

called Solutia. After an additional reorganization, Monsanto re-incorporated in

2002 and officially declared itself an “agricultural company.â€

 

In its company literature, Monsanto now refers to itself disingenuously as a

“relatively new company†whose primary goal is helping “farmers around the

world in their mission to feed, clothe, and fuel†a growing planet. In its

list of corporate milestones, all but a handful are from the recent era. As for

the company’s early history, the decades when it grew into an industrial

powerhouse now held potentially responsible for more than 50 Environmental

Protection Agency Superfund sites—none of that is mentioned. It’s as though

the original Monsanto, the company that long had the word “chemical†as part

of its name, never existed. One of the benefits of doing this, as the company

does not point out, was to channel the bulk of the growing backlog of chemical

lawsuits and liabilities onto Solutia, keeping the Monsanto brand pure.

 

But Monsanto’s past, especially its environmental legacy, is very much with

us. For many years Monsanto produced two of the most toxic substances ever

known— polychlorinated biphenyls, better known as PCBs, and dioxin. Monsanto

no longer produces either, but the places where it did are still struggling with

the aftermath, and probably always will be.

 

“Systemic Intoxicationâ€

 

Twelve miles downriver from Charleston, West Virginia, is the town of Nitro,

where Monsanto operated a chemical plant from 1929 to 1995. In 1948 the plant

began to make a powerful herbicide known as 2,4,5-T, called “weed bug†by

the workers. A by-product of the process was the creation of a chemical that

would later be known as dioxin.

 

The name dioxin refers to a group of highly toxic chemicals that have been

linked to heart disease, liver disease, human reproductive disorders, and

developmental problems. Even in small amounts, dioxin persists in the

environment and accumulates in the body. In 1997 the International Agency for

Research on Cancer, a branch of the World Health Organization, classified the

most powerful form of dioxin as a substance that causes cancer in humans. In

2001 the U.S. government listed the chemical as a “known human carcinogen.â€

 

On March 8, 1949, a massive explosion rocked Monsanto’s Nitro plant when a

pressure valve blew on a container cooking up a batch of herbicide. The noise

from the release was a scream so loud that it drowned out the emergency steam

whistle for five minutes. A plume of vapor and white smoke drifted across the

plant and out over town.Residue from the explosion coated the interior of the

building and those inside with what workers described as “a fine black

powder.†Many felt their skin prickle and were told to scrub down.

 

Within days, workers experienced skin eruptions. Many were soon diagnosed with

chloracne, a condition similar to common acne but more severe, longer lasting,

and potentially disfiguring. Others felt intense pains in their legs, chest, and

trunk. A confidential medical report at the time said the explosion “caused a

systemic intoxication in the workers involving most major organ systems.â€

Doctors who examined four of the most seriously injured men detected a strong

odor coming from them when they were all together in a closed room. “We

believe these men are excreting a foreign chemical through their skins,†the

confidential report to Monsanto noted. Court records indicate that 226 plant

workers became ill.

 

According to court documents that have surfaced in a West Virginia court case,

Monsanto downplayed the impact, stating that the contaminant affecting workers

was “fairly slow acting†and caused “only an irritation of the skin.â€

 

In the meantime, the Nitro plant continued to produce herbicides, rubber

products, and other chemicals. In the 1960s, the factory manufactured Agent

Orange, the powerful herbicide which the U.S. military used to defoliate jungles

during the Vietnam War, and which later was the focus of lawsuits by veterans

contending that they had been harmed by exposure. As with Monsanto’s older

herbicides, the manufacturing of Agent Orange created dioxin as a by-product.

 

As for the Nitro plant’s waste, some was burned in incinerators, some dumped

in landfills or storm drains, some allowed to run into streams. As Stuart

Calwell, a lawyer who has represented both workers and residents in Nitro, put

it, “Dioxin went wherever the product went, down the sewer, shipped in bags,

and when the waste was burned, out in the air.â€

 

In 1981 several former Nitro employees filed lawsuits in federal court, charging

that Monsanto had knowingly exposed them to chemicals that caused long-term

health problems, including cancer and heart disease. They alleged that Monsanto

knew that many chemicals used at Nitro were potentially harmful, but had kept

that information from them. On the eve of a trial, in 1988, Monsanto agreed to

settle most of the cases by making a single lump payment of $1.5 million.

Monsanto also agreed to drop its claim to collect $305,000 in court costs from

six retired Monsanto workers who had unsuccessfully charged in another lawsuit

that Monsanto had recklessly exposed them to dioxin. Monsanto had attached liens

to the retirees’ homes to guarantee collection of the debt.

 

Monsanto stopped producing dioxin in Nitro in 1969, but the toxic chemical can

still be found well beyond the Nitro plant site. Repeated studies have found

elevated levels of dioxin in nearby rivers, streams, and fish. Residents have

sued to seek damages from Monsanto and Solutia. Earlier this year, a West

Virginia judge merged those lawsuits into a class-action suit. A Monsanto

spokesman said, “We believe the allegations are without merit and we’ll

defend ourselves vigorously.†The suit will no doubt take years to play out.

Time is one thing that Monsanto always has, and that the plaintiffs usually

don’t.

 

Poisoned Lawns

 

Five hundred miles to the south, the people of Anniston, Alabama, know all about

what the people of Nitro are going through. They’ve been there. In fact, you

could say, they’re still there.

 

From 1929 to 1971, Monsanto’s Anniston works produced PCBs as industrial

coolants and insulating fluids for transformers and other electrical equipment.

One of the wonder chemicals of the 20th century, PCBs were exceptionally

versatile and fire-resistant, and became central to many American industries as

lubricants, hydraulic fluids, and sealants. But PCBs are toxic. A member of a

family of chemicals that mimic hormones, PCBs have been linked to damage in the

liver and in the neurological, immune, endocrine, and reproductive systems. The

Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and

Disease Registry, part of the Department of Health and Human Services, now

classify PCBs as “probable carcinogens.â€

 

Today, 37 years after PCB production ceased in Anniston, and after tons of

contaminated soil have been removed to try to reclaim the site, the area around

the old Monsanto plant remains one of the most polluted spots in the U.S.

 

People in Anniston find themselves in this fix today largely because of the way

Monsanto disposed of PCB waste for decades. Excess PCBs were dumped in a nearby

open-pit landfill or allowed to flow off the property with storm water. Some

waste was poured directly into Snow Creek, which runs alongside the plant and

empties into a larger stream, Choccolocco Creek. PCBs also turned up in private

lawns after the company invited Anniston residents to use soil from the plant

for their lawns, according to The Anniston Star.

 

So for decades the people of Anniston breathed air, planted gardens, drank from

wells, fished in rivers, and swam in creeks contaminated with PCBs—without

knowing anything about the danger. It wasn’t until the 1990s—20 years after

Monsanto stopped making PCBs in Anniston—that widespread public awareness of

the problem there took hold.

 

Studies by health authorities consistently found elevated levels of PCBs in

houses, yards, streams, fields, fish, and other wildlife—and in people. In

2003, Monsanto and Solutia entered into a consent decree with the E.P.A. to

clean up Anniston. Scores of houses and small businesses were to be razed, tons

of contaminated soil dug up and carted off, and streambeds scooped of toxic

residue. The cleanup is under way, and it will take years, but some doubt it

will ever be completed—the job is massive. To settle residents’ claims,

Monsanto has also paid $550 million to 21,000 Anniston residents exposed to

PCBs, but many of them continue to live with PCBs in their bodies. Once PCB is

absorbed into human tissue, there it forever remains.

 

Monsanto shut down PCB production in Anniston in 1971, and the company ended all

its American PCB operations in 1977. Also in 1977, Monsanto closed a PCB plant

in Wales. In recent years, residents near the village of Groesfaen, in southern

Wales, have noticed vile odors emanating from an old quarry outside the village.

As it turns out, Monsanto had dumped thousands of tons of waste from its nearby

PCB plant into the quarry. British authorities are struggling to decide what to

do with what they have now identified as among the most contaminated places in

Britain.

 

“No Cause for Public Alarmâ€

 

What had Monsanto known—or what should it have known—about the potential

dangers of the chemicals it was manufacturing? There’s considerable

documentation lurking in court records from many lawsuits indicating that

Monsanto knew quite a lot. Let’s look just at the example of PCBs.

 

The evidence that Monsanto refused to face questions about their toxicity is

quite clear. In 1956 the company tried to sell the navy a hydraulic fluid for

its submarines called Pydraul 150, which contained PCBs. Monsanto supplied the

navy with test results for the product. But the navy decided to run its own

tests. Afterward, navy officials informed Monsanto that they wouldn’t be

buying the product. “Applications of Pydraul 150 caused death in all of the

rabbits tested†and indicated “definite liver damage,†navy officials told

Monsanto, according to an internal Monsanto memo divulged in the course of a

court proceeding. “No matter how we discussed the situation,†complained

Monsanto’s medical director, R. Emmet Kelly, “it was impossible to change

their thinking that Pydraul 150 is just too toxic for use in submarines.â€

 

Ten years later, a biologist conducting studies for Monsanto in streams near the

Anniston plant got quick results when he submerged his test fish. As he reported

to Monsanto, according to The Washington Post, “All 25 fish lost equilibrium

and turned on their sides in 10 seconds and all were dead in 3½ minutes.â€

 

Jeff Kleinpeter, of Baton Rouge

 

Jeff Kleinpeter, of Baton Rouge, was accused by Monsanto of making misleading

claims just for telling customers his cows are free of artificial bovine growth

hormone.

 

 

 

When the Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A.) turned up high levels of PCBs in

fish near the Anniston plant in 1970, the company swung into action to limit the

P.R. damage. An internal memo entitled “confidential—f.y.i. and destroyâ€

from Monsanto official Paul B. Hodges reviewed steps under way to limit

disclosure of the information. One element of the strategy was to get public

officials to fight Monsanto’s battle: “Joe Crockett, Secretary of the

Alabama Water Improvement Commission, will try to handle the problem quietly

without release of the information to the public at this time,†according to

the memo.

 

Despite Monsanto’s efforts, the information did get out, but the company was

able to blunt its impact. Monsanto’s Anniston plant manager “convinced†a

reporter for The Anniston Star that there was really nothing to worry about, and

an internal memo from Monsanto’s headquarters in St. Louis summarized the

story that subsequently appeared in the newspaper: “Quoting both plant

management and the Alabama Water Improvement Commission, the feature emphasized

the PCB problem was relatively new, was being solved by Monsanto and, at this

point, was no cause for public alarm.â€

 

In truth, there was enormous cause for public alarm. But that harm was done by

the “Original Monsanto Company,†not “Today’s Monsanto Company†(the

words and the distinction are Monsanto’s). The Monsanto of today says that it

can be trusted—that its biotech crops are “as wholesome, nutritious and safe

as conventional crops,†and that milk from cows injected with its artificial

growth hormone is the same as, and as safe as, milk from any other cow.

 

The Milk Wars

 

Jeff Kleinpeter takes very good care of his dairy cows. In the winter he turns

on heaters to warm their barns. In the summer, fans blow gentle breezes to cool

them, and on especially hot days, a fine mist floats down to take the edge off

Louisiana’s heat. The dairy has gone “to the ultimate end of the earth for

cow comfort,†says Kleinpeter, a fourth-generation dairy farmer in Baton

Rouge. He says visitors marvel at what he does: “I’ve had many of them say,

‘When I die, I want to come back as a Kleinpeter cow.’ â€

 

Monsanto would like to change the way Jeff Kleinpeter and his family do

business. Specifically, Monsanto doesn’t like the label on Kleinpeter

Dairy’s milk cartons: “From Cows Not Treated with rBGH.†To consumers,

that means the milk comes from cows that were not given artificial bovine growth

hormone, a supplement developed by Monsanto that can be injected into dairy cows

to increase their milk output.

 

No one knows what effect, if any, the hormone has on milk or the people who

drink it. Studies have not detected any difference in the quality of milk

produced by cows that receive rBGH, or rBST, a term by which it is also known.

But Jeff Kleinpeter—like millions of consumers—wants no part of rBGH.

Whatever its effect on humans, if any, Kleinpeter feels certain it’s harmful

to cows because it speeds up their metabolism and increases the chances that

they’ll contract a painful illness that can shorten their lives. “It’s

like putting a Volkswagen car in with the Indianapolis 500 racers,†he says.

“You gotta keep the pedal to the metal the whole way through, and pretty soon

that poor little Volkswagen engine’s going to burn up.â€

 

Kleinpeter Dairy has never used Monsanto’s artificial hormone, and the dairy

requires other dairy farmers from whom it buys milk to attest that they don’t

use it, either. At the suggestion of a marketing consultant, the dairy began

advertising its milk as coming from rBGH-free cows in 2005, and the label began

appearing on Kleinpeter milk cartons and in company literature, including a new

Web site of Kleinpeter products that proclaims, “We treat our cows with love

… not rBGH.â€

 

The dairy’s sales soared. For Kleinpeter, it was simply a matter of giving

consumers more information about their product.

 

But giving consumers that information has stirred the ire of Monsanto. The

company contends that advertising by Kleinpeter and other dairies touting their

“no rBGH†milk reflects adversely on Monsanto’s product. In a letter to

the Federal Trade Commission in February 2007, Monsanto said that,

notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that there is no difference in the

milk from cows treated with its product, “milk processors persist in claiming

on their labels and in advertisements that the use of rBST is somehow harmful,

either to cows or to the people who consume milk from rBST-supplemented cows.â€

 

Monsanto called on the commission to investigate what it called the “deceptive

advertising and labeling practices†of milk processors such as Kleinpeter,

accusing them of misleading consumers “by falsely claiming that there are

health and safety risks associated with milk from rBST-supplemented cows.†As

noted, Kleinpeter does not make any such claims—he simply states that his milk

comes from cows not injected with rBGH.

 

Monsanto’s attempt to get the F.T.C. to force dairies to change their

advertising was just one more step in the corporation’s efforts to extend its

reach into agriculture. After years of scientific debate and public controversy,

the F.D.A. in 1993 approved commercial use of rBST, basing its decision in part

on studies submitted by Monsanto. That decision allowed the company to market

the artificial hormone. The effect of the hormone is to increase milk

production, not exactly something the nation needed then—or needs now. The

U.S. was actually awash in milk, with the government buying up the surplus to

prevent a collapse in prices.

 

Monsanto began selling the supplement in 1994 under the name Posilac. Monsanto

acknowledges that the possible side effects of rBST for cows include lameness,

disorders of the uterus, increased body temperature, digestive problems, and

birthing difficulties. Veterinary drug reports note that “cows injected with

Posilac are at an increased risk for mastitis,†an udder infection in which

bacteria and pus may be pumped out with the milk. What’s the effect on humans?

The F.D.A. has consistently said that the milk produced by cows that receive

rBGH is the same as milk from cows that aren’t injected: “The public can be

confident that milk and meat from BST-treated cows is safe to consume.â€

Nevertheless, some scientists are concerned by the lack of long-term studies to

test the additive’s impact, especially on children. A Wisconsin geneticist,

William von Meyer, observed that when rBGH was approved the longest study on

which the F.D.A.’s approval was based covered only a 90-day laboratory test

with small animals. “But people drink milk for a lifetime,†he noted. Canada

and the European Union have never approved the commercial sale of the artificial

hormone. Today, nearly 15 years after the F.D.A. approved rBGH, there have still

been no long-term studies “to determine the safety of milk from cows that

receive artificial growth hormone,†says Michael Hansen, senior staff

scientist for Consumers Union. Not only have there been no studies, he adds, but

the data that does exist all comes from Monsanto. “There is no scientific

consensus about the safety,†he says.

 

However F.D.A. approval came about, Monsanto has long been wired into

Washington. Michael R. Taylor was a staff attorney and executive assistant to

the F.D.A. commissioner before joining a law firm in Washington in 1981, where

he worked to secure F.D.A. approval of Monsanto’s artificial growth hormone

before returning to the F.D.A. as deputy commissioner in 1991. Dr. Michael A.

Friedman, formerly the F.D.A.’s deputy commissioner for operations, joined

Monsanto in 1999 as a senior vice president. Linda J. Fisher was an assistant

administrator at the E.P.A. when she left the agency in 1993. She became a vice

president of Monsanto, from 1995 to 2000, only to return to the E.P.A. as deputy

administrator the next year. William D. Ruckelshaus, former E.P.A.

administrator, and Mickey Kantor, former U.S. trade representative, each served

on Monsanto’s board after leaving government. Supreme Court justice Clarence

Thomas was an attorney in Monsanto’s corporate-law department in the 1970s. He

wrote the Supreme Court opinion in a crucial G.M.-seed patent-rights case in

2001 that benefited Monsanto and all G.M.-seed companies. Donald Rumsfeld never

served on the board or held any office at Monsanto, but Monsanto must occupy a

soft spot in the heart of the former defense secretary. Rumsfeld was chairman

and C.E.O. of the pharmaceutical maker G. D. Searle & Co. when Monsanto acquired

Searle in 1985, after Searle had experienced difficulty in finding a buyer.

Rumsfeld’s stock and options in Searle were valued at $12 million at the time

of the sale.

 

From the beginning some consumers have consistently been hesitant to drink milk

from cows treated with artificial hormones. This is one reason Monsanto has

waged so many battles with dairies and regulators over the wording of labels on

milk cartons. It has sued at least two dairies and one co-op over labeling.

 

Critics of the artificial hormone have pushed for mandatory labeling on all milk

products, but the F.D.A. has resisted and even taken action against some dairies

that labeled their milk “BST-free.†Since BST is a natural hormone found in

all cows, including those not injected with Monsanto’s artificial version, the

F.D.A. argued that no dairy could claim that its milk is BST-free. The F.D.A.

later issued guidelines allowing dairies to use labels saying their milk comes

from “non-supplemented cows,†as long as the carton has a disclaimer saying

that the artificial supplement does not in any way change the milk. So the milk

cartons from Kleinpeter Dairy, for example, carry a label on the front stating

that the milk is from cows not treated with rBGH, and the rear panel says,

“Government studies have shown no significant difference between milk derived

from rBGH-treated and non-rBGH-treated cows.†That’s not good enough for

Monsanto.

 

The Next Battleground

 

As more and more dairies have chosen to advertise their milk as “No rBGH,â€

Monsanto has gone on the offensive. Its attempt to force the F.T.C. to look into

what Monsanto called “deceptive practices†by dairies trying to distance

themselves from the company’s artificial hormone was the most recent national

salvo. But after reviewing Monsanto’s claims, the F.T.C.’s Division of

Advertising Practices decided in August 2007 that a “formal investigation and

enforcement action is not warranted at this time.†The agency found some

instances where dairies had made “unfounded health and safety claims,†but

these were mostly on Web sites, not on milk cartons. And the F.T.C. determined

that the dairies Monsanto had singled out all carried disclaimers that the

F.D.A. had found no significant differences in milk from cows treated with the

artificial hormone.

 

Blocked at the federal level, Monsanto is pushing for action by the states. In

the fall of 2007, Pennsylvania’s agriculture secretary, Dennis Wolff, issued

an edict prohibiting dairies from stamping milk containers with labels stating

their products were made without the use of the artificial hormone. Wolff said

such a label implies that competitors’ milk is not safe, and noted that

non-supplemented milk comes at an unjustified higher price, arguments that

Monsanto has frequently made. The ban was to take effect February 1, 2008.

 

Wolff’s action created a firestorm in Pennsylvania (and beyond) from angry

consumers. So intense was the outpouring of e-mails, letters, and calls that

Pennsylvania governor Edward Rendell stepped in and reversed his agriculture

secretary, saying, “The public has a right to complete information about how

the milk they buy is produced.â€

 

On this issue, the tide may be shifting against Monsanto. Organic dairy

products, which don’t involve rBGH, are soaring in popularity. Supermarket

chains such as Kroger, Publix, and Safeway are embracing them. Some other

companies have turned away from rBGH products, including Starbucks, which has

banned all milk products from cows treated with rBGH. Although Monsanto once

claimed that an estimated 30 percent of the nation’s dairy cows were injected

with rBST, it’s widely believed that today the number is much lower.

 

But don’t count Monsanto out. Efforts similar to the one in Pennsylvania have

been launched in other states, including New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Kansas,

Utah, and Missouri. A Monsanto-backed group called afact—American Farmers for

the Advancement and Conservation of Technology—has been spearheading efforts

in many of these states. afact describes itself as a “producer organizationâ€

that decries “questionable labeling tactics and activism†by marketers who

have convinced some consumers to “shy away from foods using new technology.â€

afact reportedly uses the same St. Louis public-relations firm, Osborn & Barr,

employed by Monsanto. An Osborn & Barr spokesman told The Kansas City Star that

the company was doing work for afact on a pro bono basis.

 

Even if Monsanto’s efforts to secure across-the-board labeling changes should

fall short, there’s nothing to stop state agriculture departments from

restricting labeling on a dairy-by-dairy basis. Beyond that, Monsanto also has

allies whose foot soldiers will almost certainly keep up the pressure on dairies

that don’t use Monsanto’s artificial hormone. Jeff Kleinpeter knows about

them, too.

 

He got a call one day from the man who prints the labels for his milk cartons,

asking if he had seen the attack on Kleinpeter Dairy that had been posted on the

Internet. Kleinpeter went online to a site called StopLabelingLies, which claims

to “help consumers by publicizing examples of false and misleading food and

other product labels.†There, sure enough, Kleinpeter and other dairies that

didn’t use Monsanto’s product were being accused of making misleading claims

to sell their milk.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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  • 10 months later...
Guest guest

All good info and I agree with you 100%, People NEED TO KNOW. Thank you for

I will save you the trouble of getting a link past the auto moderator by posting this to herbal remedies myself.

Dear list:

The link below teaches you some truth. You may not want it to be true but it is so face it. You need to know so that you do not accidentally support the criminal activities of the company called Monsanto.

http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2009/03/07/Monsantos-Many-Attempts-to-Destroy-All-Seeds-but-Their-Own.aspx

 

 

 

On Sun, 2009-03-08 at 12:47 +0000, jarusso7 wrote:

 

http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2009/03/07/Monsantos-Many-Attempts-to-Destroy-All-Seeds-but-Their-Own.aspx

 

 

 

Bryan I really wanted to past this on to the group, because it needs to get out there how truly evil Monsanto is, but I wasn't sure how you guys felt about the source. So I thought that I would ask you first before posting.

 

 

 

Anella

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