Ethics of culling elephants

[Guest guest]

*Dear Edwin,*

* Please find attached a paper on the ethics of elephant culling.

I agree with John that culling needs to be debated in the Asian context.

After all, it has been suggested in my own home state of West Bengal by a

noted elephant expert. And I do know culling has sympathisers in Asia and

India.*

* Hope you get an useful insight from the article.*

* Regards and good wishes,*

**

* *

 

*http://hdgc.epp.cmu.edu/misc/Summary%20Saleim%20Fakir.pdf*

 

*Notes on the Ethics of Elephant Culling *

 

*Saliem Fakir, Talk at the Ethics Society Congress of South Africa, 30**th

March 20041 *

 

**

1. *1. My comments will neither suggest what is right or wrong about

culling, but rather speak to approaches we can take in resolving untidy and

complex ethical issues that encumber the elephant culling issue. It must be

noted that the issue of elephant culling holds parallels for other types of

ethical questions that concern wildlife, and how humans should manage them.

What is of interest to me is the institutional mechanisms or processes we

need to create to manage diversity and conflict of opinion and interest.

When I speak of institution, I really mean ways of making dialogue, handling

of disputations, and intellectual confrontation that is a natural order of

pluralistic and democratic societies. The project therefore before us is

really one of creating a tolerant society rather than consensual one,

although out of toleration consensus may be one of the benefits as an

outcome of ethical reflection. Our focus as result should be both the

process of moral reflection, and the manner in which we interrogate the

substance of what informs such moral reflection. My other intention is

really to offer a language to this ethical debate, which in my humble

opinion is lacking at the moment. *

 

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2. *2. Secondly, I hold the view that only humans are capable of moral

judgement and decisions. The de facto reality is that while humans must show

respect, and empathy for the pain and suffering of other beings, it is only

within the ambit of human reason that we can find solutions to beings that

exist outside of the domain of human society. It is only human reason, and

power that can preside over what is to occur to other lives beyond our own.

I consider this inescapable reality when considering moral problems that are

specific to humans, and those outside of human society. I do not suggest as

result that anthropocentrism must be ingratiated with human being's sense of

superiority and hence arrogance. Rather, such fortitude of reason and power

should be humbling, and we must use the choices and freedom of will we have

with the greatest of responsibility. However, humans are final arbiters over

the choice of life that we and others not of us live or may have to live.

The point of moral reflection is ultimately about necessary choices we have

to make in a complex world. *

 

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3. *3. Thirdly, I am also of the view that even if there are humans

that want to confer intrinsic and existential value to other beings other

than their own, this does not suggest that in doing so one is being

non-anthropocentric. Or to claim that one is being biocentric or eco-centric

that you are not being tautological. These values in reality, because they

exist within the sphere of human reason, and systems, are actually just

different versions of anthropocentrism. Because they are dependent on human

judgement and derived from human reason and reflection, does not *

 

**

 

*1 The notes for my presentation are inspired by the tele-seminar which was

held at the EWT offices on the 18.3.2004. My notes were developed from a

summation I made, and I have the speakers: Hennie Lotter, Brian Child and

Michelle Pickover to thank for giving me the intellectual fodder for the

current thoughts that I present before you. *

 

*2 *

 

**

1. *suggest they are separate or transcendental from human life. They

are in fact part of the existential experience of humans. They are mere

preferences, forms of human sacrifice, choice, and expressions of bondship

with other beings that we are encouraged to adopt. They merely establish a

relational context with other beings. But, they are deeply human centric in

the way they are constructed and conferred. I think by defining them as

non-anthropocentric there is an attempt to make the purported

non-anthropocentric value a higher-order value. A way of saying

anthropocentrism is archaic and therefore can't enjoy a right or status as

acceptable virtue to establish a shared value and community. The only

difference, it is presumed and purported by the non-anthropocentric

worldview is that the sense of community is extended to that of other beings

as well. I am not here to suggest whether anthropocentrism, or biocentrism

are superior to each other. Just to make the point that all values are

centered around the establishment of virtue through the application of human

reason. It is up to society to decide which should gain primacy in any given

period in the evolution of human society. I am not certain that arguments

about the superiority of anthropocentric vs non-anthropocentric values and

virtues will help us resolve an immediate problem. *

 

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2. *4. We must accept, like it is the case on issues such as cloning,

GMOs and others that in non-totalitarian societies, different voices will

emerge and will want to cast their vote on the rights and wrongs of a

particular decision. We live in what philosophers call a world of moral

pluralism. Moral pluralism also is more pronounced and amplified in a

society that has a democratic constitutional framework that guarantees

rights before the law. This is not to suggest in the same token, there is

not moral pluralism in a society that has no democratic constitutional

framework. In fact, all societies have moral pluralism, because people

disagree over which values should gain prominence, and dictate the norms of

that society. However, in a democratic system, different rights are put

before us upfront. They are formalized, and guaranteed. Which simply means

one has the right to be heard as a result. In non-constitutional societies

it simply means that often these rights are suppressed-it does not mean

these rights and their voices have disappeared. They may be marginal and

silent, but certainly not dead. In a democratic society the pursuit of

various rights that are received by its citizens as entitlements allow the

subjects of that of sovereign society to pursue whatever interest they may

hold. *

 

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3. *5. In recognizing that there are different rights, and as a result

different interest can be associated with these rights, does not as a result

also imply that every right is absolute and inviolable. Competing rights

cannot be said to be inviolable. Inviolability simply revolves around which

right should be given priority before the other depending on the

circumstance. Or what I call context. Which amongst the various rights

should take precedence over the other. Context is defined, and in the case

of the situation of culling, by perspective (s) that govern the value

orientation, technology, and economics. Perspective can reign if the view is

dominant, suggesting that the rightness of it is determined by a simply

majority. This of course is fraught with difficulties of its own as there

are many cases in *

 

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*3 *

 

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1. *history where majority rulings have led to disastrous outcomes.

Majoritarianism does not always imply that the basis of the decision is

correct. I think, I use it merely here as a way of suggesting that it

defines the political milieu, and can be an influencing factor for a

decision and therefore provide clues to political trade-offs that are

likely. But, a perspective can easily be that of a minority, and can thus be

persuasive if it is morally compelling. Technology and economic

circumstances can dictate which options are available to us, and will have

to be taken into account in any moral deliberation. *

 

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*

 

2. 6. **It is worth noting though that for many years the issue of

culling was presided over by a dominant perspective, and that is of

sustainable

use. Culling of elephants in general was justified by this paradigm or

ideological perspective. With the arrival of animal rights groups, a new

perspective has been introduced into the debate. The sustainable use debate,

I believe, has been transformed as a result of the growing influence of

animal rightist. In general the animal rights perspective straddles between

the less extreme that has a welfarist nuance, to the more extreme which

holds that animals have rights of their own, and hence an intrinsic and

sacred value that is no different to values that humans attach to

themselves. This is referred to as a non-speciesiast position.

However, it is worth making the observation that the extreme view transfers

to charismatic animal species every human feeling and attribute whether they

exist in reality or not. All these human like metaphors may not be

warranted. *

 

**

 

*In fact, animals can be respected and dealt with humanity, without us

having to confer onto them anthropomorphic attributes so as to appeal to our

empathy and humaneness. I find such a tendency amongst the animal rights

groups rather disturbing. I do not want to debate the merits of this

argument. I think this is not really the place for this. But, it is

important to interrogate this convergence of traits that is mounted as

defence against the speciest. I am not sure that humans and animals are

comparable, even if we find within them features that resemble human

qualities. There is simply a philosophical solipsism that we cannot bridge

no matter what we attempt with reason and science. Largely, the canvassing

of human qualities within the animal kingdom is to reinforce the position of

those wanting to develop a rights charter for animals that is equivalent and

enjoys the same treatment and status as the human rights charter. I think we

may be entering a world of philosophical absurdity. **Does it mean that if I

do not recognize a chimp as being human, that somehow I can't love and care

for my chimp?

 

*

 

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1. *7. Sustainable use as a notion perhaps is not strictly applicable

to culling, because culling from a pure management view suggests resolving a

potential ecological crises as a result of the rise of elephant numbers. If,

we are strictly confined to resolving an ecological problem than the issue

is one of conservation. However, when ecological concerns converge with

socio-economic benefits and commercial interest that's when sustainable use

as a principle is more appropriate. It is important to distinguish between

the one and the other, because they are often unwittingly or deliberately

confused. We have a here situation of two motivations *

 

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*4 *

 

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1. *collapsed as if they are in one. Which in my opinion is clearly

not the case, although the one may well support the pursuit of the other. At

present, the rationale for culling-which Kruger Park managers have to make

soon-is simply ecological. How is it then all of sudden a sustainable use

issue? *

 

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2. *8. It would be also opportune to take this occasion in also

suggesting some of the problems that the sustainable use principle has

caused us over time. When it first originated, it was devised to solve a

very practical problem in a pragmatic manner. At the time of its early

conception it was evident that a puritanical conservationist stance was not

tenable. You couldn't suggest to people who had no alternative that they

could not derive benefits from nature if the consequences of them not having

access would lead to further hardship, poverty and destitution. In the place

of a pure preservationist stance-where nothing was allowed to be touched or

taken-arose the sustainable use paradigm. It is worth noting that the

principle applied to both plants and animals. And, in the case of animals

that certain forms of subsistence hunting was necessary as it was

intertwined with the sustainability of livelihoods. However, I am not

certain whether the inclusion of hunting, sale of wildlife, and their

products for commercial purposes has not muddied or muddled the issue of

sustainable use. All of a sudden issues such as hunting and the

commercialism have managed to find root and fix themselves in the

sustainable use paradigm with human preferences and interest that it was not

originally designed to accommodate and cater for. Today, the sustainable use

principle is in fact defended by powerful gun and hunting lobbies, and game

farmers. The sudden widening of the ambit of the sustainable use principle

stands to undermine the pragmatic utility of the principle. I hold that

activities such as hunting, and other socio-economic benefits from wildlife

cannot be equated or are equivalent to sustainable use for subsistence use

and securing of livelihoods. The reasons for hunting, or the

commercialization of wildlife and their products are clearly different to

subsistence use. I think this confusion needs to be dealt with. I would

argue that the concerns around hunting and commercial benefit from wildlife

should not be encapsulated within the principle of sustainable use. They

should be treated like we treat other industries, and deal with the ethical

issues that arise out of them on the grounds of commercial utility in a

distinct way. For too long this confusion has been dragged on. It is about

time for a radical rupture. I don't think that the principle of sustainable

use should be straddled with the ethical burdens that arise out of

activities such as hunting, the sale of wildlife or their products. There is

a need to clean this mess. *

 

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3. *9. Both, animal rightist and sustainable use interest groups tend

to nurture a political discourse, and hence transform themselves from

holders of certain principles, and guides to ethical conduct, into organized

lobby groups, and if you want ideological perspectives. By ideology I

mean the estrangement from first principles as ways of thinking about the

world and giving moral input into moral discussion, to organized

political processes for the sake of establishing a hegemony. Where

hegemony implies seeking to ensure that all human relations, ways of

behaving and thoughts are governed by that specific worldview. This is

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*5 *

 

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1. *perhaps why we need to treat them not has morally superior

positions, but rather perspectives and holders of specific interests. Within

their discourse and ideological jockeying, are grains of right and wrong.

But, on their own they cannot be the basis of deriving what is ethically

right or wrong. Because of their organized existence they have a way of

making a presence, and therefore hard to ignore by any decision maker. This

is neither to suggest that because of the dominance of these two groups,

other perspectives do not exist in society and should not be heard or

imputed within ethical reflection. The fact of an absent voice should not

suggest that ethical reflection or processes of reflection should not take

into account or bring these views within the ambit of decision making. And,

even that the fact that no such interest group exists, a new perspective

can't be generated. In most cases a new perspective and way of dealing with

an ethical issue may be necessary. *

 

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2. *10. We must note that managed wildlife in conservation areas is

less than ideal or can be described as being more humane than situations

where animals are left completely free, like it once was where humans were

nestled within wilderness as hunter-gatherers. Currently, human

interventions in the creation of protected areas has entailed that wildlife

in general are not in pristine wilderness, but in confined space. We must

conclude I suppose that their relative state of well-being and happiness in

confined space is lesser than when they were in absolute wilderness where

human interference was minimal. So, it is worth harping on the point that we

cannot restore the original balance or existential experience that wildlife

may have enjoyed in prehistoric periods. Whatever our present choices, what

humans will have to offer as solutions can't be anything, but the lesser

taste of the former life. The present existential experience of wildlife is

wholly, human-dependent. They are by dint of this in a position of lesser

beings when once they simply roamed freely, died naturally, and at the death

of their predators. We simply can't restore this primitive form of

existence. Therefore, any claim that we can restore the original form of

existence and state of happiness must be construed as complete nonsense. We

must make do with imperfect situations and solutions, and we can endlessly

dispute the reasons for this, because they will also be academic, and of no

practical value. *

 

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1. *11. How then is one to deal with the issue of culling in the

present and immediate? I have suggested context matters. Animal rightist

hold onto intrinsic principles, and sustainable use groups suggest that we

must look at consequences as defining the reasons for culling. Both I

suggest are unsatisfactory. The first, is too principled, unwieldy and

difficult to bend, because there is a certain undercurrent that if we bend

and compromise here, the entire edifice of the animal rights course stands

in danger of collapsing on itself. So, it is my view that it strong

adherence to principle makes compromise impossible. There will always be the

urge to be uncompromising. As regards the sustainable use perspective, there

is a tendency to converge the ecological with the socio-economic, i.e.

the consequentialist arguments are consistently punctuated in various

variations with ecological and socio-economic interest. Again, the reasons

are quite obvious, if you de-link the *

 

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*6 *

 

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1. *ecological from the socio-economic, you threaten an operative

principle-the sustainable use paradigm. I am suggesting that in the case we

have now, about the Kruger needing to deal with the over-abundance of

elephants that the socio-economic is not paramount, but the ecological is. I

want to even go further that the socio-economic concerns are political, and

could suggest that they could undermine the ecological reasons for they draw

suspicion as to why this subject of elephant culling is mooted in the year

when a CITES meeting is taking place? Could others not suggest that elephant

culling has to do with the need to generate revenue from ivory, and could it

not be possible as a result that numbers are inflated so that culling can be

justified on ecological grounds when the real interest is trade in ivory and

other parts of elephants that are 'harvested'? As we all know most

conservation agencies are struggling to finance their operations and so

there must as a result be a little bit of a conflict of interest between the

ecological rationales vs the drive to increase revenue? This has in my

opinion resulted in a situation of conflicting agendas. With the true intent

for the action existing within the front or shadowing that which appears to

be on the surface as ecological reasons and the mainstay of the purported

rationale for the need for culling. I am not suggesting that conservation

agencies don't have a right to trade in ivory or wildlife. All I am

suggesting is that the case for both stands to be endangered by deliberately

confusing the two. I am holding on the position that they are not the same,

and should be treated on their own merits. *

 

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2. *12. All decision makers are always faced with the question of how

do I know that I am making the right decision? What sources of information

should I rely on to help me make the right choice, and determine the right

priorities? When a reality stares one starkly in the face then the immediate

options of what one can do can be limited by circumstance and context. So on

the question of elephants the correctness of whether to cull or not to cull

will be dependent on a number of considerations: *

 

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1. *• The independently verification of the

scientific/ecological case. *

 

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2. *• The exploration of alternative solutions and the

exhaustion of these options. *

 

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3. *• The consequences of not acting, i.e. the ability to

stretch this, and its likely impact. *

 

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4. *• The different values and perspectives that are likely to

influence or encumber a political decision and have substantial

interest at

stake. *

 

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5. *• The identification of trade-offs that need to be made and

their consequences: both long-term and short-term. *

 

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*As you will note I am not taking recourse to the intrinsic value of the

existence of elephants nor that of sustainable use as a guiding premise.

Both seem to prescribe perpetual outcomes, i.e. the adherence to their core

principles in the absence of context. And, as a result they become

unimpeachable by context because they have the inherent feature of being

perpetual principles irrespective of context. Both, seem to be about the

protection of turf, and hence easily lend themselves to value conflicts.

Both, in this kind of political milieu-one of competition between different

groupings *

 

*7 *

 

*(or ideologies)- will not give a desired outcome without a victory won for

either point of view. What is one to do in this situation? If it is found

that the elephant numbers are correct, the ecology and other wildlife impact

in an irreparable manner, and that alternatives such as translocation and

contracentives to be long-term rather than immediate solutions, then it is

evident that a solution must be found that is based on its sensibleness. The

only thing that can dictate a solution, that is temporal and immediate is

the principle of necessity. The principle of necessity abrogrates the

prevailing rule. The rule is also further premised on the idea of easing

hardship and burden in the immediate with the hope of finding a long-term

solution. It is also evident that the rule of necessity is not a perpetual

one. It cannot be so because it is derived from the immediacy of the

context. Under a further rule, that complements and deepens the rule of

necessity, is the choice of a lesser evil, i.e. therefore doing the ignoble

for now, is the lesser of two sins. And, if we are to carry with the rule

for longer than its intended life-span it is likely to lead to more harm

than good. Its application therefore has to be circumscribed for a specific

context and period. *

 

*13. It would seem to me that the rule of necessity is the only rule that

can be applied in a non-ideological or conflict prone manner. It does not

resolve however, the long-term question of how we should deal with wild

animals in the future. This strikes me that even if we find a solution for

an immediate problem, long-term solutions still have to be found. I suppose

as a result the battle over fundamental values intrinsic vs consequentialist

premises for moral actions will have to be fought over. I don't know if this

is necessary either. It is evident that culling, in its very essence is not

the most desirable solution for the problems that elephants are likely to

generate in the future. The only two options worth considering and seriously

investing in whether we agree with an intrinsic or consequentialist value

orientation to guide our moral decisions is the options of translocation

(and hence the expansion of the conservation estate) and contraceptives

(although the verdict on this is not as of yet final). However, it is worth

stating that any moral rule, and choice we make, must by its nature not be

seen as permanently fixed that it is not immovable. A change in circumstance

may necessitate a change in rule and choice.

*

 

*14. If culling is the option, it would seem to me as well, that the methods

of culling will be guided in itself, my another moral decision, i.e. to cull

in the most non-violent manner as possible, or what some would call a more

humane form of culling. Here, the prevalence of technological options should

be no excuse for not applying the least violent form of application when

culling. It is evident that the primary rule in itself, must be supported by

subsidiary rules that complement rather than contradict its intent and

rationale. On the basis of this logic, it is evident that culling has to be

pursued-if that is the final option we are left with-with the most humane

methods at our disposal. This too will reinforce an important value: that

culling is a result of a no-choice scenario, and not culling for the sake of

it, or the derivation of other pleasures and benefits. *

 

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1. *15. Running concurrently with the elephant culling debate is the

issue of whose views should count? There has been the accusation that those

opposed to culling *

 

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1. *somehow hold Eurocentric views-meaning that the animal rights

groups have been infiltrated with European interests and concerns. Which

suggests that culling as a decision is not Eurocentric, but African. And,

since this is the African way of doing things we should be left to do what

is in our best interest. The logic seems to be that declaring the Africaness

of our decision, we assert African sovereignty and will over important

ethical issues and choices that occur within our neighbourhood. Implying you

Europeans don't interfere with what Africans happen to know what is best for

themselves. Europeans area always as a result accused of not being

value-neutral, and exercising a form of cultural imperialism through

Eurocentric ideas. There is a lot wrong with this Eurocentric vs.

Afrocentric contestation. I think this conflict is really fiction. It is a

useful diversion. It is not really the issue at hand, and neither is it

helpful in resolving the problem of whether to cull or not? In fact, it is a

complete side-show. There are several reasons for this: *

 

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1. *a. The elephant problem is fact a result of a very

'Eurocentric' construct and that is of keeping wildlife within a

protected

space. It arose specifically out of another 'Eurocentric' problem-the

widespread decimation of wildlife by European hunters. The notion of

protected areas is a foreign import into Africa. *

 

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2. *b. Secondly, we have to ask what is Eurocentric and what is

truly Afrocentric. It would be completely illogical to suggest

that Europe

is dominated and concentrated with animal rights views: this

would give far

too much credence to the animal rights movement. It would also

be spurious

to suggest that to cull is located in some kind of African

value, tradition

or norm. It clearly is not. Culling as a practice is a management tool

developed by conservationist, who quite interestingly, happen to be pale

males of European origin speaking on behalf of Africans. This

contradiction

is hardly spoken of in the debates. *

 

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3. *c. One has to be even more cynical when it is suggested that

the need to cull is because poor Africans living adjacent to parks are

constantly harassed by elephants that come to eat their crops. Well, what

has elephants trampling on crops got to do with the decision to cull? Or

give reason to suggest that as a result the Africanness of

culling has got

to do with rural communities living close to protected areas.

Somehow, the

bringing into the picture of poor black rural communities by white

conservation managers, or even black managers does not give it an

Africanness. I fail to see the logic of all these arguments.

They are as I

am convinced just side-shows, convenient digressions, but add no value to

the ethical debates that are at hand or the finding of

acceptable solutions.

In most instances the heckle about Eurocentrism is really a fear about

alternative voices and solutions. *

 

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*16. However, we are still left with the pressing question: How do we deal

with the views, perceptions and interest of 'absentee citizens'? Those

regarded as non-Africans who do not live on our shores. Who come

occasionally to visit our game reserves, and pay-viewing fees to get a sight

of a few of the large and small animals that roam this wilderness? Should

their voice be heard? Do their opinions count? These very people whose tax

money is appropriated by their governments so that these funds can be used

widely in Africa to keep protected areas going, or to fund research in

wildlife management in countries that are less fortunate and whose state

coffers are empty. These penniless African states that are made to carry the

burden of managing what I regard as global common goods and a shared

resource. It is evident that simply on these terms-because of their

willingness to pay to keep conservation areas going that their views will

have to be given regard, whether it is out of courtesy or the threat of the

removal of funds. Their voice will resonate within our own political space

directly or via proxy. It would seem that Africa's wildlife cannot do

without global support. In fact, it is benefiting already a great deal from

global support. As far as North America and European support goes for the

intermediate period we simply do not have many alternatives if we are so

adamant about our sovereignty. *

 

*In so doing, I am not suggesting that because we have the support of others

that their views should have greater weight than our own. I am simply saying

it is that we cannot rationalize the need to disregard their voice. For them

to disappear as it were. Most debates about ethical choices in the world

today are transnational in nature. In fact, many human rights courses around

the world have high regard because other humans have cared to show concern

and empathy. Here, is a good example of the universalisation of a moral set

of tools and principles which all humans across the planet charge the

actions of others against. The question is not whether we ignore these

external voices at our own peril, but more about how we allow them to

co-mingle in the stew of opinion that is a natural product of contentious

issues. In general, the rejection of these voices, is really a view of

opposing voices having currency. If, you don't want these views to have

currency, because one fears they are likely to affect the outcome you try to

shut them up or ignore them. This I don't believe is a characteristic we

should encourage if we are to build a morally plural and tolerant society. *

 

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1. *17. However, in as much as we would like to create a global

community where conservation management is a shared responsibility, there is

though a principle that may override other voices, the voices of the

'absentee citizens', this is simply the conditions of inordinate burden and

risk. Surely, those who are living with the problem on a daily basis should

have more say than others who do not have to suffer the consequences of

problems that hinder, diminish or threaten to harm the well-being of nature

and human society? This rule of first priority has to take precedence

if the immediate harm to those living adjacent to the problem is higher

where the pain or consequences are least likely to felt to those at a

distance. However, the rule of first priority, does not suggest that the

opinions of others-these distant others-should not or cannot be considered.

They may well contain a *

 

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1. *solution that we had not thought about before. Under well reasoned

and justifiable circumstances, those who bare the most risk and burden must

be given first preference in what is best. But, in looking for alternative

and creative solutions, we need to be bold enough to find them anywhere in

the world. *

 

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2. *18. Finally, two points are worth reflecting on. The first, is the

way in which animal rights activist position themselves visa vie

conservationist. Often in the culling debate conservation managers can be

made out to be cold-blooded and murderous. I do not think they are. In fact,

if one to were to speak to many of them, they find culling difficult and

often traumatic. Conservationists are in the business of conservation

because they love wildlife. It would be cynical to suggest that therefore

their decision to cull has to do with some ingrained murderous trait within

them. A dark malevolence. It is evident that culling is done not

intentionally, but rather as a result of having to be faced with difficult

choices. So, I do think that the binary construct of good vs. evil, that

arises as a result of a conflict between animal rights activist and

conservationist is an unfortunate one and often an emotional one. The

tactics of animal rights groups is aimed at shaming conservationist. It is

clear that such tactics merely polarize the debate, rather than advance it.

*

 

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3. *19. Secondly, there are good reasons for toleration, as much as it

is about a building a listening society, it is also about building

a learning

society. Often, when we hear others, we can find solutions we have not

thought of before. Intolerance, strikes me as rather a way to dispose of the

views of others, by relying on power and numbers as a basis to legitimate a

view and establish a hegemony. The Italian intellectual Primo Levi,

beautifully, suggested is that intolerance is really about the consolidation

of the 'we' against, the will and influence of the 'they'. In all of this a

vast array of interest- from monetary, personal prestige, to power- lay

nested. If all of this stands to be lost, it is understandable why

intolerance can often live even under the cover of democracy. But, you would

agree with me then, perspectives that are intolerant of each other, are

hardly a platform to support the resolution of difficult ethical issues. We

will be forced to find other ways of resolving big ethical questions.

Questions that affect all of us irrespective of our religions, values or

ideologies. As much as we are about finding ethical solution, there is a

greater task ahead of us, and that is how do we as a result of our ethical

problems simultaneously build an ethical society and methods of dialogue.

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