Can Science Prove that God Does Not Exist?

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Posted by Raguraman

 

I found a wonderful article from an atheist. This is an exercise on logic and probably a test on intellectual honesty of some of us here.

 

This exercise should be helpful in removing erroneous conceptions about GOD.

 

Is it possible to prove a negative ?

 

by Theodore Schick, Jr.

 

The following article is from Free Inquiry magazine, Volume 21, Number 1.

 

 

"No one can prove an unrestricted negative" is the reply usually given to those who claim that science can prove that God does not exist. An unrestricted negative is a claim to the effect that something doesn't exist anywhere. Since no one can exhaustively examine every place in the universe, the reply goes, no one can conclusively establish the non-existence of anything.

 

The principle that no one can prove an unrestricted negative, however, is itself an unrestricted negative. It says, in effect, that there are no proofs of unrestricted negatives. But, if there are no proofs of unrestricted negatives, then no one can prove that no one can prove an unrestricted negative. And if no one can prove that no one can prove an unrestricted negative, then it must be logically possible to prove an unrestricted negative. So the claim that no one can prove a universal negative is self-refuting-if it's true, it's false. What I intend to show here is not only that unrestricted negatives can be proven, but that a number of them have been proven.

 

Parmenides realized over 2,500 years ago that anything that involves a logical contradiction cannot exist. We know that there are no married bachelors, no square circles, and no largest number because these notions are self-contradictory. They violate the most fundamental law of logic-the law of noncontradiction-which says that nothing can both have a property and lack it at the same time. So one way to prove a universal negative is to show that the notion of a thing is inconsistent.

 

To prove that God does not exist, then, one only has to demonstrate that the concept of God is inconsistent. Traditional theism defines God as a supreme being-a being than which none greater can be conceived, as St. Anselm would have it. We know, however, that there is no supreme number because such a notion involves a logical contradiction. Every number is such that the number 1 can be added to it. If there were a supreme number, it would be such that the number 1 can and cannot be added to it, and that's impossible. Many believe that the notion of a supreme being is just as incoherent as the notion of a supreme number.

 

Consider, for example, the claim that god is all-good and thus both perfectly merciful and perfectly just. If he is perfectly just, he makes sure that everyone gets exactly what's coming to them. If he is perfectly merciful, he let's everyone off. But he can't do both. So the notion of a supreme being may be internally inconsistent.

 

This is just one of many inconsistencies that have been found in the traditional concept of God. For a more complete review of them, see Theodore Drange, "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey" in Philo (Fall/Winter 1998). Theists, of course, will claim that, properly understood, there is no contradiction. What if they're right? What if it's logically possible for the God of traditional theism to exist? Does that mean that one cannot prove that he does not exist? No, for in order to prove that something does not exist, one need not show that it is logically impossible. One need only show is that it is epistemically unnecessary-that it is not required to explain anything. Science has proven the non-existence of many things in this way, such as phlogiston, the luminiferous ether, and the planet Vulcan. Scientific proofs, unlike logical proofs, do not establish their conclusions beyond any possibility of doubt. But they are proofs nonetheless, for they establish their conclusions beyond a reasonable doubt and that is all that is needed to justify them.

 

Phlogiston, the luminiferous ether, and the planet Vulcan are theoretical entities that were postulated in order to explain various phenomena. Phlogiston was postulated to explain heat, the luminiferous ether was postulated to explain the propagation of light waves through empty space, and Vulcan was postulated to explain the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. Science has shown, however, that these phenomena can be explained without invoking these entities. By demonstrating that these entities are not needed to explain anything, science has proven that they do not exist.

 

God is a theoretical entity that is postulated by theists to explain various phenomena, such as the origin of the universe, the design of the universe, and the origin of living things. Modern science, however, can explain all of these phenomena without postulating the existence of God.1 In the words of Laplace, science has no need of that hypothesis.2 By demonstrating that God is not needed to explain anything, science has proven that there is no more reason to believe in the existence of God than to believe in the existence of phlogiston, the luminiferous ether, or Vulcan. This may explain why more than 90% of the world's top scientists disbelieve or doubt the existence of God.3

 

Scientists prefer natural explanations to supernatural ones, not because of any metaphysical bias on their part, but because natural explanations produce more understanding than supernatural ones. As Plato realized, to say that God did it is not to explain anything, but simply to offer an excuse for not having an explanation.4

 

The goodness of an explanation is determined by how much understanding it produces, and the amount of understanding produced by an explanation is determined by how well it systematizes and unifies our knowledge. The extent to which an explanation systematizes and unifies our knowledge can be measured by various criteria of adequacy such as simplicity (the number of assumptions made), scope (the types of phenomena explained), conservatism (fit with existing theory), and fruitfulness (ability to make successful novel predictions).

 

Supernatural explanations are inherently inferior to natural ones because they do not meet the criteria of adequacy as well. For example, they are usually less simple because they assume the existence of at least one additional type of entity. They usually have less scope because they don't explain how the phenomena in question are produced and thus they raise more questions than they answer. They are usually less conservative because they imply that certain natural laws have been violated. And they are usually less fruitful because they don't make any novel predictions. That is why scientists avoid them.

 

The realization that the traditional God of theism is not needed to explain anything-that there is nothing for him to do-has led a number of theologians to call for the rejection of this notion of god. In Why Believe in God? Michael Donald Goulder argues that the only intellectually respectable position on the god question is atheism.5 In Why Christianity Must Change or Die, Reverend Spong, former Episcopal Bishop of New Jersey, argues that the traditional theistic conception of God must be replaced by one grounded in human relationships and concerns.6 Both agree with Stephen J. Gould that religion should not be in the business of trying to explain the world.7

 

What if there was no plausible natural explanation for some phenomena? Would that justify the claim that god caused it? No, for our inability to provide a natural explanation may simply be due to our ignorance of the operative natural forces. Many phenomena that were once attributed to supernatural beings such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and disease can now be explained in purely natural terms. As St. Augustine realized, apparent miracles are not contrary to nature but contrary to our knowledge of nature.8

 

Given the inherent inferiority of supernatural explanations and the incompleteness of our knowledge, theists would be justified in offering a supernatural explanation for a phenomenon only if they could prove that it is in principle impossible to provide a natural explanation of it. In other words, to undermine the scientific proof for the non-existence of god, theists have to prove an unrestricted negative, namely, that no natural explanation of a phenomenon will be found. And that, I believe, is an unrestricted negative that no theist will ever be able to prove.

 

 

 

Notes

 

1. See, for example, Richard Dawkins, Climbing Mount Improbable (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996); Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam, 1998); Lee Smolin, The Life of the Cosmos (London: Oxford, 1997).

2. When the French physicist Pierre Simon de Laplace explained his theory of the universe to Napoleon, Napoleon is said to have asked, "Where does God fit into your theory?" to which Laplace replied, "I have no need of that hypothesis."

3. E. J. Larson and L. Witham, "Leading Scientists Still Reject God," Nature 394 (July 23, 1998).

4. Plato, Cratylus, 426 a.

5. Michael Donald Goulder, Why Believe in God? (London: SCM Press, 1983).

6. John Shelby Spong, Why Christianity Must Change or Die (San Francisco: Harper, 1999).

7. Stephen J. Gould, Rock of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York: Ballantine, 1999).

8. St. Augustine, The City of God, XXI, 8.

 

Theodore Schick, Jr., is professor of philosophy at Muhlenberg College. He is the co-author of How to Think About Weird Things.

[Guest guest]

Post by Raguraman

 

Volume 1, Number 2

 

Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey

 

by Theodore M. Drange

 

Abstract: Ten arguments for the nonexistence of God are formulated and discussed briefly. Each of them ascribes to God a pair of properties from the following list of divine attributes: (a) perfect, (b) immutable, © transcendent, (d) nonphysical, (e) omniscient, (f) omnipresent, (g) personal, (h) free, (i) all-loving, (j) all-just, (k) all-merciful, and (1) the creator of the universe. Each argument aims to demonstrate an incompatibility between the two properties ascribed. The pairs considered are: 1. (a-1), 2. (b-1), 3. (b-e), 4. (b-i), 5, (c-f), 6. (c-g), 7. (d-g), 8. (f-g), 9. (e-h), and 10. (j-k). Along the way, several other possible pairs are also mentioned and commented upon.

 

Atheological arguments (arguments for the nonexistence of God) can be divided into two main groups. One group consists of arguments which aim to show an incompatibility between two of God's properties. Let us call those "incompatible-properties arguments." The other group consists of arguments which aim to show an incompatibility between God's existence and the nature of the world. They may be called "God-vs.-world arguments." A prime example of one of those would be the Evidential Argument from Evil. This paper will survey only arguments in the first group. Arguments in the second group are discussed elsewhere.1

 

To generate incompatible-properties arguments, it would be most helpful to have a list of divine attributes. I suggest the following. God is:

(a) perfect

(b) immutable

© transcendent

(d) nonphysical (e) omniscient

(f) omnipresent

(g) personal

(h) free (i) all-loving

(j) all-just

(k) all-merciful

(1) the creator of the universe

 

This is certainly not a complete list, for there are other properties that have been ascribed to God. For example, the list excludes omnipotence. Furthermore, I am not claiming here that there is any one person who has ascribed all of these properties to God. I would say, though, that each of the properties has been ascribed to God by someone or other.

 

It would be of interest to consider whether there are pairs of properties from the given list which are incompatible with each other. For each such pair, it would be possible to construct an incompatible-properties argument for God's nonexistence. The present essay aims to study that issue in the style of a survey. It will not go into the relevant philosophical issues in any great depth. Nor will it consider the further matter of whether anyone has actually claimed the existence of a being which possesses any of the incompatible pairs. It is assumed in the background, however, that there are indeed such people. Let us proceed, then, to consider various possible incompatible-properties arguments.

1. The Perfection-vs.-Creation Argument

 

Consider the pair a-l, which takes God to be perfect and also to be the creator of the universe. It seems that those properties might be shown to be incompatible in two different ways. The first way is as follows:

Version 1

 

1. If God exists, then he is perfect.2

2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.

3. A perfect being can have no needs or wants.

4. If any being created the universe, then he must have had some need or want.

5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).

6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

 

Premise 3 might be challenged on the grounds that a perfect being, full of love, could desire to share his love with others. Thus, a perfect being could have a want, which would make premise 3 false. I suppose the only problem with this is that, if a being wants something that he does not have, then he cannot be perfect, for he would be in a certain way incomplete. Whether or not this adequately defends premise 3 is hard to say. There is a certain unclarity, and perhaps subjectivity, in the idea of "perfection" which poses an obstacle to any sort of rigorous reasoning about the concept.3

 

Premise 4 might also be challenged. Perhaps God created the universe accidentally. For example, he "slipped and fell," thereby creating a mess, which turned out to be our universe. In that case, God would not have had any need or want in creating the universe, and premise 4 would be false. There are difficulties with this, however. First, almost every theist who takes God to have created the universe takes it to have been done deliberately, not accidentally. And second, if the creation were accidental, then that in itself would imply that God is imperfect (since perfect beings do not have accidents), and that would be another basis for the Perfection-vs.-Creation Argument. Thus, this sort of challenge to premise 4 itself runs into problems.

Version 2

 

1. If God exists, then he is perfect.

2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.

3. If a being is perfect, then whatever he creates must be perfect.

4. But the universe is not perfect.

5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).

6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

 

The usual reply to this line of thought is that, whatever imperfections the universe may contain, they are the fault of mankind, not God. Thus, the universe was indeed perfect when God first created it, but it later became imperfect because of the actions of humans. This could be taken as an attack on the argument's premise 3, construed to imply that what is perfect must remain so indefinitely. I shall not pursue the many twists and turns that this issue might take. It is essentially the same as what is called the "Deductive Argument from Evil," which is a topic beyond the scope of the present survey. Let us instead move on to a new argument.

2. The Immutability-vs.-Creation Argument

 

Let us now consider the pair b-l, which takes God to be immutable (unchangeable) and also the creator of the universe. This argument, too, comes in different versions.4 However, I shall consider just one of them here:

 

1. If God exists, then he is immutable.

2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.

3. An immutable being cannot at one time have an intention and then at a later time not have that intention.

4. For any being to create anything, prior to the creation he must have had the intention to create it, but at a later time, after the creation, no longer have the intention to create it.

5. Thus, it is impossible for an immutable being to have created anything (from 3 and 4).

6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

 

Premise 3 might be challenged on the grounds that the loss of an intention through the satisfaction of it is not a genuine change in a being. If a man wants something, X, and then obtains it, he has not thereby changed his attitude towards X. It is not that he once had a pro-attitude towards X but now he has a con-attitude towards it. So long as he is satisfied with X, his attitude remains unchanged. This may very well be true, but why claim that the only genuine change there can be in a being is a change in attitude? Why not allow that there can be other sorts of genuine change, and one of them is the loss of an intention through the satisfaction of it? Until some clear answer to this question is given, premise 3 seems to have some merit.

 

Premise 4 might be attacked in at least two different ways. It has been claimed that both the concept of "prior to the existence of the universe" and the concept of "God existing within time" are bogus. Time is a part or aspect of the universe itself and so there cannot be a time "before the universe." And God is a timeless being, so the idea of God having a certain property at one time but lacking it at a later time is misguided. Since God is not within time, he cannot have properties at particular times.

 

My response to both objections is that creation is a temporal concept. This is built into the very definition of "create" as "to cause to come into being." X cannot cause Y to come into being unless X existed temporally prior to Y. Thus, if indeed there was no time prior to the existence of the universe, then it is logically impossible for the universe to have been created. In that case, there could not possibly be a creator of the universe. And, furthermore, if indeed God does not exist within time, then he could not have been the creator of the universe, because, by the very concept of creation, if the universe was created at all, then its creator must have existed temporally prior to it. So if God, being timeless, did not exist temporally prior to anything, then God cannot have been the creator of the universe.

 

There is another objection to premise 4 which is similar to one we considered in relation to argument 1. It is that 4 would be false if the universe were created unintentionally. Again, it should be mentioned that people who believe that the universe was created also believe that it was created intentionally. But I would like to point out another possible response here. In place of the concept of intention, it would be possible to appeal to some other concept in the construction of argument 2. One candidate for that would be the concept of performing an action. In order for someone to create something, even if it is done unintentionally, the creator must perform an action, and that action must take time. Thus there must be a time during which a creator is performing a certain action and a later time (after the action has been performed) during which he is no longer performing that action. It could be argued that this, too, represents a change in the being who is performing the action. Thus, this would be another reason for maintaining that an immutable being cannot create anything (whether intentionally or not).

3. The Immutability-vs.-Omniscience Argument

 

This argument is based on an alleged incompatibility between attributes (b) and (e) on our list. It, too, comes in different versions, one of which is the following5:

 

1. If God exists, then he is immutable.

2. If God exists, then he is omniscient.

3. An immutable being cannot know different things at different times.

4. To be omniscient, a being would need to know propositions about the past and future.

5. But what is past and what is future keep changing.

6. Thus, in order to know propositions about the past and future, a being would need to know different things at different times (from 5).

7. It follows that, to be omniscient, a being would need to know different things at different times (from 4 and 6).

8. Hence, it is impossible for an immutable being to be omniscient (from 3 and 7).

9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 8).

 

The usual place at which this argument is attacked is its premise 4. It is claimed that a timeless being can know everything there is to know without knowing propositions about the past and future. Consider the following two propositions as examples:

 

A. The origin of the planet Earth is in the past.

B. The end (or destruction) of the planet Earth is in the future.

 

The claim is that a timeless being need not know propositions A and B in order to know everything there is to know, because such a being could know the exact dates of both the origin and the end of the earth and that would suffice for complete knowledge. That is, A and B would be "covered," and so it would not be necessary for the omniscient being to know A and B in addition to those dates.

 

But, of course, this claim can be challenged. To know the dates of the origin and the end of the earth does not entail knowing propositions A and B. To know A and B requires being situated within time (somewhere between the origin and end of the earth), so they are not anything that a timeless being could know. However, they certainly are things that an omniscient being must know. Thus, the given objection to premise 4 of the argument above is a failure.

 

It should be noted that a somewhat different incompatible-properties argument could also be constructed using the divine attribute of transcendence instead of immutability. The argument would focus on the point that a transcendent being must be timeless and a timeless being cannot know propositions about the past and future. However, an omniscient being, as shown above, must know propositions about the past and future. Therefore, it is impossible for a transcendent being to be omniscient. The incompatibility would be between attributes © and (e) on our list. Such an argument could be called "the Transcendence-vs.-Omniscience Argument." The same issues would be raised in it as were raised, above, in connection with the Immutability-vs.-Omniscience Argument.

4. The Immutability-vs.-All-Loving Argument

 

Here the alleged incompatibility is between attributes (b) and (i). The argument may be expressed as follows:

 

1. If God exists, then he is immutable.

2. If God exists, then he is all-loving,

3. An immutable being cannot be affected by events.

4. To be all-loving, it must be possible for a being to be affected by events.

5. Hence, it is impossible for an immutable being to be all-loving (from 3 and 4).

6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

 

To be affected is to be changed in some way, so premise 3 is pretty much true by definition. Premise 4 might be challenged, but when the nature of love is contemplated, it is seen that 4 must also be true. The concept of love that is relevant here is that of agape, which is the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of others. If events were to call for some sacrifice on God's part, then, to be loving in the relevant sense, he must go ahead and perform the sacrifice. Since that requires being affected, the truth of premise 4 is assured.

 

This argument is a particularly forceful one. There is another argument which is very similar to it, which pits immutability against the property of being a person (property [g] on our list). It could be called the "Immutability-vs.-Personhood Argument." The basic idea behind it would be that in order to genuinely be a person (or personal being), it is necessary that one be capable of being affected by what happens. I think that that one, too, is quite forceful, but I shall not pursue it here. (For a similar argument, see section 6 below.) We have done quite enough with the divine attribute of immutability.

5. The Transcendence-vs.-Omnipresence Argument

 

Here the incompatibility is between properties © and (f). The argument may be formulated as follows:

 

1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).

2. If God exists, then he is omnipresent.

3. To be transcendent, a being cannot exist anywhere in space.

4. To be omnipresent, a being must exist everywhere in space.

5. Hence, it is impossible for a transcendent being to be omnipresent (from 3 and 4).

6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

 

The usual place at which this argument is attacked is premise 3. It is claimed that to transcend space does not entail being totally outside space. A being could be partly inside space and partly outside. Consider the Flatland analogy: a three-dimensional object transcends Flatland, and yet it exists within the Flatland dimensions (as well as outside). So, God could be like that. He exists within space (and, indeed, everywhere in space!) but he also exists outside space, the latter feature being what warrants calling him "transcendent."

 

My only objection here is that the Flatland analogy does not quite make the idea of transcendence intelligible. We understand perfectly well how a three-dimensional object might "transcend" Flatland while still being (partly) within it. However, this is still talking about objects in space. To try to extend the analogy so as to talk about something that is "outside space as well as within it" is unsuccessful. That is something that we are totally unable to comprehend. In the end, the very concept of transcendence that is appealed to here is incoherent. This illustrates the point that defenses against incompatible-properties arguments may very well lead to incoherence or other objections to theism.

6. The Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument

 

This is an even better argument for bringing out the relevant incoherence. It pits property © against property (g), instead of against (f):

 

1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).

2. If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).

3. If something is transcendent, then it cannot exist and perform actions within time.

4. But a person (or personal being) must exist and perform actions within time.

5. Therefore, something that is transcendent cannot be a person (or personal being) (from 3 and 4).

6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

 

Again, premise 3 might be challenged on the grounds that a transcendent being could be both partly inside time and partly outside time, with the latter feature being what warrants the label "transcendent." That is, God is said to perform actions within time but also to have a part or aspect that extends outside time. However, this notion of "partly inside time and partly outside" is definitely incoherent. No one has a clue what that might mean. To pursue such a line of thought might evade the charge of "incompatible properties," but it leads directly to the charge of incoherence, which is just as bad, if not worse.

 

Premise 4 might also be challenged. It might be said that its concept of personhood is too limited and that persons (or personal beings) could exist totally outside time. I am inclined to resist this sort of conceptual expansion. If the concept of personhood is extended that far, then it ceases to do the work that it was supposed to do, which was to make God into a more familiar figure. Furthermore, if persons (or personal beings) can exist totally outside of time, then it becomes unclear what it might mean to speak of "persons" (or "personal beings") at all. The boundaries of the class become so blurred that the concept becomes vacuous.

 

Closely related to the concept of personhood is the concept of being free, which is property (h) on our list. An argument similar to 6, above, one which might be called the "Transcendent-vs.-Free Argument," could be constructed, pitting property © against property (h). In its corresponding premise 4, the point would be made that, in order for a being to be free, it must exist and perform actions within time. Otherwise, there would be no way for any freedom to be manifested. Almost all theists, it should be noted, accept the idea that God is a free agent, and thus are inclined to say of him that he (at least occasionally) performs actions within time. If they call God "transcendent" at all, then they would aim to attack premise 3 of the arguments in question, not premise 4. Of course, as pointed out above, to attack premise 3 leads one to make incoherent statements, so such a maneuver cannot be regarded to be successful.

7. The Nonphysical-vs.-Personal Argument

 

Let us consider pitting property (d) against property (g). Then we get an argument which might be formulated in a very short way, as follows:

 

1. If God exists, then he is nonphysical.

2. If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).

3. A person (or personal being) needs to be physical.

4. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1-3).

 

Premise 3 has been advocated by Kai Nielsen, who wrote: "we have no understanding of 'a person' without 'a body' and it is only persons that in the last analysis can act or do things."6 But not all nontheists would accept premise 3. One who does not is J. L. Mackie.7 This argument turns on the issue of whether the idea of a "bodiless person" is consistent and coherent. That is a difficult and highly controversial issue, and I shall not pursue it here in this survey.8

 

It should be noted that the divine attribute of being nonphysical might also be taken to be incompatible with still other divine attributes, such as being free and being all-loving, which would give rise to slightly different incompatible-properties arguments. All such arguments, though, would lead into the same sort of difficult and controversial issues as does the Nonphysical-vs.-Personal Argument, and so should not be regarded to be among the most forceful of the various atheological arguments available.

8. The Omnipresence-vs.-Personhood Argument

 

Similar considerations arise when we pit property (f) against property (g). The argument may again be formulated in a brief way, as follows:

 

1. If God exists, then he is omnipresent.

2. If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).

3. Whatever is omnipresent cannot be a person (or a personal being).

4. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1-3).

 

The point of premise 3 is similar to that for the previous argument. When we contemplate what it means to be a person (or a personal being), we see that it conflicts with being omnipresent. What sorts of things might be omnipresent, anyway? Perhaps a gravitational field would serve as an example. They would all appear to be items in a different category from persons, so to try to assimilate them would be to commit a category mistake. Persons can no more be omnipresent than they can be odd or even (in the mathematical sense).

9. The Omniscient-vs.-Free Argument

 

We now come to a more complicated argument, which pits property (e) against (h). One way of formulating it is presented by Dan Barker.9 A slightly different version may be formulated as follows:

 

1. If God exists, then he is omniscient.

2. If God exists, then he is free.

3. An omniscient being must know exactly what actions he will and will not do in the future.

4. If one knows that he will do an action, then it is impossible for him not to do it, and if one knows that he will not do an action, then it is impossible for him to do it.

5. Thus, whatever an omniscient being does, he must do, and whatever he does not do, he cannot do (from 3 and 4).

6. To be free requires having options open, which means having the ability to act contrary to the way one actually acts.

7. So, if one is free, then he does not have to do what he actually does, and he is able to do things that he does not actually do (from 6).

8. Hence, it is impossible for an omniscient being to be free (from 5 and 7).

9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 8).

 

Some have denied that omniscience entails knowing all about the future. They say that omniscience only entails knowing what there is to know. But the future actions of free persons are open, and not there to be known about. Thus, not even an omniscient being could know about them. This may provide a basis for rejecting premise 3 of the argument.

 

This sort of objection to 3 can be attacked in many different ways. One way would be to affirm that an omniscient being would indeed need to know all about the future. All propositions about the future are either true or false, and an omniscient being, by definition, must know the truth of any proposition that is in fact true. Furthermore, theists, often following the Bible on this point, commonly attribute unrestricted knowledge of the future to God.10 Indeed, if God does not know the future actions of any free beings, then there is very little, if any, pertaining to the future about which he can be certain. For no matter what the situation may be, there is always a chance that it will be affected by such actions.

 

Another way to attack the given objection is to maintain that, even if God does not know about the future actions of other free agents, he must know about his own future actions. One reason for this is that God's actions are all based on perfect justice and immutable law. There is never any caprice in them. His purposes and intentions have remained steadfast from all eternity, so anyone who totally understands God's purposes and intentions, as he himself does, would be able to infallibly predict his actions. It follows that God must know what he himself will and will not do in the future, which would establish the truth of premise 3 if it is taken to refer to God.

 

Premise 4 is a consequence of the definition of knowledge. If a proposition is known to be true, then it must be true and cannot be false. So, if X knows that Y will do Z, then it is impossible for Y not to do Z. And this is so even where X and Y are the same person.

 

Premise 6 says that a free agent can do what he doesn't do. That may sound odd at first, but when it is understood correctly, it seems correct. Suppose we identify what Y does as "act Z." Then in order for Y to be free, prior to doing Z, it must have been possible for Y to do Z and it must also have been possible for Y not to do Z. If it were not possible for Y not to do Z, then Y's doing of Z could not be regarded as a free act. Free acts are avoidable. You can't be free if you had to do the thing that you did. This seems intuitively right, though some forms of compatibilism might reject it. It is not a totally settled issue in philosophy. I leave it to the reader to ascertain whether or not premise 6 is correct. If it is, then I think the argument goes through.

10. The Justice-vs.-Mercy Argument

 

The last argument to be considered in this survey pits property (j) against property (k). It may be formulated as follows:

 

1. If God exists, then he is an all-just judge.

2. If God exists, then he is an all-merciful judge.

3. An all-just judge treats every offender with exactly the severity that he/she deserves.

4. An all-merciful judge treats every offender with less severity than he/she deserves.

5. It is impossible to treat an offender both with exactly the severity that he/she deserves and also with less severity than he/she deserves.

6. Hence, it is impossible for an all-just judge to be an all-merciful judge (from 3-5).

7. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 6).

 

I have heard it said by Christians that the way God judges offenders depends on whether or not they are true believers. If they are, then he is lenient with them, but if they are not, then he treats them with exactly the severity they deserve (which can be pretty bad). By this Christian way of speaking, God is said to be both an all-just and an all-merciful judge. He is all-just in giving everyone an equal opportunity to become a true believer and thereby come to receive leniency, but he is also all-merciful in that every true believer, without exception, receives mercy. This way of viewing matters would be an attack on both premise 3 and premise 4, above.

 

I would respond by maintaining that premises 3 and 4 come closer to capturing ordinary language than the given Christian way of speaking. According to the latter, God treats some offenders more leniently with regard to what they deserve than he does other offenders. It does not seem that such a judge would (or should) be called "all-just." And similarly, since he does not treat all offenders less severely than they deserve, he would not (and should not) be called "all-merciful" either. Instead of being both all-just and all-merciful, the Christian God, as described, would be neither.

 

As with many of the previous attacks on the incompatible-properties arguments, this one turns on semantical issues. In a sense, it is all a matter of semantics, for the issue of whether or not certain property ascriptions conflict with certain other property ascriptions depends very much on what exactly they mean. Theists could defend against the arguments by denying that the property terms in question mean what the proponents of the arguments claim they mean. Often such denials lead to still other difficulties for the theist. A full presentation and defense of incompatible-properties arguments should explore such implications and fully pursue the many issues, whether semantical or not. That project is beyond the scope of the present essay.

 

My aim was simply to survey several of the more common (and a few not so common) incompatible-properties arguments for the nonexistence of God. Just which of those arguments are sound and which of them are most effective in discussions and debates with theists are further issues that are certainly worth pursuing.

 

References

 

1. See, especially, Theodore M. Drange, Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998).

 

2. Following tradition, and for simplicity, I use the male personal pronoun for God. My apologies to anyone who finds that linguistic practice offensive.

 

3. This obstacle applies to any version of the Ontological Argument.

 

4. See, especially, Richard M. Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter 2. The versions of the argument discussed by Gale are different from the one taken up in the present essay.

 

5. Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, chapter 3.

 

6. Kai Nielsen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 36.

 

7. See J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-2.

 

8. For reasons that support the incoherence of "disembodied persons," see Nonbelief and Evil, appendix E, section 2.

 

9. See his Web essay "The Freewill Argument for the Nonexistence of God" at the following address:

 

10. For a long list of biblical references to God's knowledge of the future free actions of humans, see Nonbelief and Evil, appendix B, section 2.

 

Theodore M. Drange is Professor of Philosophy at West Virginia University.

[Guest guest]

Posted by Raguraman

 

The Freethought Debater

The Freewill Argument

for the Nonexistence of God

By Dan Barker

This is the first article in the "Freethought Debater" series, dealing with how to debate believers. Each article will contain a succint argument, debating tip, or observation about how to deal with defenders of religion, based on formal debates Barker has done with Christians.

 

This argument (FANG, for short) is one of the "coherency" approaches Barker took against John Morehead in Sacramento (August 1996) and Douglas Wilson in Delaware (March 1997).If a religious term such as "god" or "spirit" cannot be defined meaningfully, then it is pointless to argue if it exists.

 

The Christian God is defined as a personal being who knows everything. According to Christians, personal beings have free will.

 

In order to have free will, you must have more than one option, each of which is avoidable. This means that before you make a choice, there must be a state of uncertainty during a period of potential: you cannot know the future. Even if you think you can predict your decision, if you claim to have free will, you must admit the potential (if not the desire) to change your mind before the decision is final.

 

A being who knows everything can have no "state of uncertainty." It knows its choices in advance. This means that it has no potential to avoid its choices, and therefore lacks free will. Since a being that lacks free will is not a personal being, a personal being who knows everything cannot exist.

 

Therefore, the Christian God does not exist.

 

Some people deny that humans have free will; but all Christians claim that God himself, "in three persons," is a free personal agent, so the argument holds.

 

Others will object that God, being all-powerful, can change his mind. But if he does, then he did not know the future in the first place. If he truly knows the future, then the future is fixed and not even God can change it. If he changes his mind anyway, then his knowledge was limited. You can't have it both ways: no being can be omniscient and omnipotent at the same time.

 

A more subtle objection is that God "knows" what he is going to do because he always acts in accordance with his nature, which does not diminish his free agency. God might claim, for example, that he will not tell a lie tomorrow--because he always tells the truth. God could choose outside of his nature, but he never does.

 

But what does "nature of God" mean? To have a nature is to have limits. The "nature" that restricts humans is our physical environment and our genetics; but the "nature" of a supernatural being must be something else. It is inappropriate to say that the "nature" of a being without limits bears the same relationship to the topic of free will that human nature does.

 

Free will requires having more than one option, a desire to choose, freedom to choose (lack of obstacles), power to accomplish the choice (strength and aptitude), and the potential to avoid the option. "Strength and aptitude" puts a limit on what any person is "free" to do. No human has the free will to run a one-minute mile, without mechanical aid. We are free to try, but we will fail. All of our choices, and our desires as well, are limited by our nature; yet we can still claim free will (those of us who do) because we don't know our future choices.

 

If God always acts in accordance with his nature (whatever that means), then he still must have more than one viable option that does not contradict his nature if he is to claim free will. Otherwise, he is a slave to his nature, like a robot, and not a free personal agent.

 

What would the word "option" mean to a being who created all options?

 

Some say that "free will" with God does not mean what it means with humans. But how are we to understand this? What conditions of free will would a Christian scrap in order to craft a "free agency" for God? Multiple options? Desire? Freedom? Power? Potential to avoid?

 

Perhaps desire could be jettisoned. Desire implies a lack, and a perfect being should lack nothing. But it would be a very strange "person" with no needs or desires. Desire is what prompts a choice in the first place. It also contributes to assessing whether the decision was reasonable. Without desire, choices are willy-nilly, and not true decisions at all. Besides, the biblical god expressed many desires.

 

No objection saves the Christian God: he does not exist. Perhaps a more modest deity can be imagined: one that is not both personal and all-knowing, both all-knowing and all-powerful, both perfect and free. But until a god is defined coherently, and then proven to exist with evidence and sound reasoning, it is sensible not to think that such a being exists.

 

Dan Barker is PR Director of the Freedom From Religion Foundation, and author of Losing Faith In Faith: From Preacher To Atheist.

[Guest guest]

Posted by Guest

 

when an atheist gives arguments that god does not exist,

can his arguments be used to conclude that he (the atheist) does note exist?

 

any way, some atheist want to believe god

if htey could be convinced.

 

others simply are out there with closed mind

who cannot take any argument.

only a mystic miracle can convince them.

 

it is said that swami vivekananda was an atheist.

when he first saw ramkrishna, he direclty asked him,

"have you seen god?"

 

"yes," said ramkrishna.

 

"show me," said narendra.

 

so ramkrishna called him near and held his thumb.

immediately vivekanda (narendra) was throwm in samadhi.

instantly he became a theist.

 

vaishnavas (pertucularly HKs) regret that he became an advaiti. but note that he did not say bhakti yoga 9K C) is wrong or bad.

[Gauracandra]

I scanned the articles but didn't go into them in real depth. One thing that caught my eye though was the idea of Justice vs. Mercy as if this is a contradiction in God. It said that God must be perfectly just, and perfectly merciful. These are not in contradiction to one another. The idea being you either punish the person (justice) or you let him go (mercy). But letting a person go and harm themselves is not mercy. Just like a father hitting the hand of his child to teach them not to touch fire. Its not merciful to let the kid touch a hot stove. So that was one pretty silly argument the author brought up.

[Jahnava Nitai Das]

I also went through the articles and found them to be so full of flaws (based on general ignorance and presumptions of what God must be) that I decided it wasn't worth a reply.

[REASWARAN]

A neat bit of semantics. But it begs the question - can the creator be defined by a neat bit of jugglery with words or an equation ? I think not. Let us consider what we mean by the term God. If we grant that it is taken to represent some universal force which is responsible for creation, maintenance and destruciton of the universe- call it what u will - God, Brahman, Jesus, these are only labels,

then comes a basic question - it it possible for us to understand a power which is responsible for our existence ?

Let us seek refuge in the scriptures- what do the Kena Upansishads say ?-

 

Understand it (God) to be that(power/cause) which makes the eyes to see, the ears to hear, the mind to think ....

Understand that to be Brahman and not what u worship.

 

Poignant words indeed ! It recognises that we worship what we understand and it does not tell us not to do so but definitely indicates to us the futility of such worship.

 

What further lessons are there ? It tells us that it is not possible for us to understand the creator by using the organs of perception which requires his power to work. The way is beyond -it is said - on another plane - u can reach the plane using any of the paths preached by our scriptures- all have one common thread- to reach inside oneself using a process of introspection called meditation.

 

This knowledge of God is only to be expereinced and cannot be described in words. The knowledge is obtained only when the mind is quietened - which brings us back to the beginning of this post- proof is required of that which cannot be expereinced- All the explanations in the world will not really tell what an electric shock feels like- But put your finger in a socket and I'll wager you'll never ask for proof of the existence of electricity.

 

I know it is not a very good analogy - but it illustrates why discourses on existence or non existence of God are exercises in futility.

[paul108]

They don't consider the fact that so many people have had positive proof of God. He just doesn't reveal Himself to people who think that logic can either defeat Him or reach Him. Too bad for them.

[Tarun]

ZrIla Bhaktiraxaka ZrIdhar Mhrj described these 2 Gita verses as most dynamic, contraversial, contradictory in all philosophy & science.

God cannot be seen if He remains behind the scenes. Curtain closed.

Reconmmendation for all atheists: get a backstage pass!

[theist]

Can science proove God doesn't exist. No because He does. But He will let them think they have proven His non-existence if that is their wish.

 

With their ever amazing observations on how nature works they prove there is an unlimited intelligence beyond all this phenomenen. But they won't accept that conclusion. They are very happy to have their intelligence praised for making the observation however. They give each other awards and money grants and feel quite good about themselves as very great intelligent beings.

 

Actual Krsna houses all seeming contradictions perfectly. We can't impose our mundane conceptions of existence or morality or anything else for that matter onto Him.

 

Just like His stealing butter. "Bad boy". But He is to be worshiped for His mischief as well as His generousity in giving the woman selling fruit, fabulous jewels.

 

[Guest guest]

 

Theist,

 

 

They give each other awards and money grants and feel quite good about themselves as very great intelligent beings.

 

 

This is exactly what religious people do. They feel they known better than the scientists and pat each other on the back for their intelligence.

 

Science *does not* have to offer proof that God does not exist. It is the other way around with theists having to prove the existence of God. However, this is impossible for the following reasons.

 

1. Since the theists around the world are incapable of even coming to a consensus on the definition of God, the possibility of all theists rallying to form a universal description of God is itself distant, if not impossible.

 

2. Assuming the hypothetical situation where theists have a univocal definition of God, empirical methods of analysis *cannot* prove the existence of God. This is why many Achaaryas in the past have stated that God can be known through scripture alone. Logic and ratioanale are useless tools in this case. Especially jejune arguments such as "someone must have put the universe together", etc.

 

1 and 2 => it is impossible for theists to prove the existence of God. Since the concept of God was stated by theists and since they cannot back it up with empirical facts, it stands concluded that as far as science is concerned, there is no God. The fault lies with those theists who think science should accept God without evidence. The existence of God solely depends on faith in scripture and has nothing to do with logic and/or science.

 

Cheers

[Jahnava Nitai Das]

It is actually irrelevant whether theists, or maybe even Theist, can prove the existence of God by science, as that wasn't the subject of the articles.

 

 

Science *does not* have to offer proof that God does not exist.

 

 

The articles above, written by an atheist, claim he can disprove the existence of God by science. Once he makes that claim, it is his responsibility to substantiate it.

 

 

Since the theists around the world are incapable of even coming to a consensus on the definition of God, the possibility of all theists rallying to form a universal description of God is itself distant, if not impossible.

 

 

...something like the scientists who also can't come to a uniform conclusion as to what is the source of the universe and on what basis it exists. The fact that there are multiple opinions does not negate the existence of the universe. Likewise, the fact that there are multiple opinions as to the nature of God does not negate His existence.

 

 

Assuming the hypothetical situation where theists have a univocal definition of God, empirical methods of analysis *cannot* prove the existence of God.

 

 

Same can be said for half of quantum physics, yet it remains a scientific field.

 

As far as science, it cannot even prove your existence to me, what to speak of God's. As far as I can tell, I am the only conscious living entity in existence, and everything else is just an unconscious projection of my mind - something like a dream. There is no scientific system that can prove your conscious existence to me beyond faith.

[Guest guest]

 

 

My point is, as far as as science is concerned there is no God. It does not have to take up the issue and disprove God.

 

For instance, if I come up with the wild claim that I saw a dragon in Upper michigan, it does not mean that science has to disprove my claim or else accept the existence of dragons. If I cannot backup my claim, then my claim is worthless. I cannot try arguments such as "science cannot prove your existence to me or my existence to you, etc". Such arguments will not substantiate my claim.

 

Cheers

 

[leyh]

Dear Guest:

 

"My point is, as far as as science is concerned there is no God. It does not have to take up the issue and disprove God."

 

it seems to me that the above statement is not very scientific. Science is not a monolithic community. There is a huge diversity of scientists some of whom are indifferent about God and some of whom are intensely concerned about the existence of God. Science does not speak in a single voice, but in a huge variety of voices.

 

 

[paul108]

God can be thought of as the Person who makes the rules. So why should He play according to the rules that the scientists propose (in the middle of the game)? I don't think He's going to take their bait.

[theist]

 

As far as science, it cannot even prove your existence to me, what to speak of God's. As far as I can tell, I am the only conscious living entity in existence, and everything else is just an unconscious projection of my mind - something like a dream. There is no scientific system that can prove your conscious existence to me beyond faith.

 

 

This a very profound fact. It even gets worse for matter only philosophers. They can't even find that self and some have concluded that they themselves do not exist. Neuroscientists have been scouring around for some evidence of themselves in the brain for a long time with no success. This has caused some of them to conclude that the self itself is an illusion.

 

Dr. Francis Crick: "Most neuroscientists believe there is no homunculus[self] in the brain....We certainly have an illusion of the homunculus:the self. There is probably some good reason for the strength and persistence of this illusion."

 

Just see the absurd position of these guys. Selves, looking hard for the self, not finding it, and then concluding that none exists including themselves.

 

I am very sure that a simple layman like myself will never be able to convince them of a Supreme Self.

 

 

I want to take this moment to once again point out Srila Siddhasvarupanada's book Who Are You, wherein he sytematically dismantles all these no-self philosphers in a clear and simple manner.

 

[Raguraman]

Hare Krishna J.N.Dasjee,

 

 

I also went through the articles and found them to be so full of flaws (based on general ignorance and presumptions of what God must be) that I decided it wasn't worth a reply.

 

 

 

I also found weak arguments throughout the article titled "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey".

 

But I was thinking perhaps someone could write to the journal(www.philoonline.com) an article on definition of GOD according to our upanishads and also refuting every point on that atheistic article. As I am not fully conversant with Upanishadic teachings(I did not have a Guru)I thought somebody like you could do it. Just a suggestion. This way our community reach those so called intellectuals also.

[madhav]

>>As far as science, it cannot even prove your existence to me, what to speak of God's. As far as I can tell, I am the only conscious living entity in existence, and everything else is just an unconscious projection of my mind - something like a dream. << -jn das

 

any one who thinks like this, i would say him this:

 

what is the use of consciousness if it cannot perceove truth?

 

if you think everything is dream,

then it is not real.

so if you jump from 3rd floor terrace, it is dream

and cannot hurt. would you try it?

 

whenyou drive and see red light.

it is just a dream.

cwould you keep goingin red light?

 

my point is:

 

god did not give consciousness to us

to 'dream' but to see truth as it is,

so that we can decide what good action we an take.

 

however all truth cannot be found easily.

it requires sharp intelligence and god's help.

 

tatva darshi can see truth.

(upadekshyanti te gyanam gyaninas tatva darsina).

 

[theist]

>>As far as science, it cannot even prove your existence to me, what to speak of God's. As far as I can tell, I am the only conscious living entity in existence, and everything else is just an unconscious projection of my mind - something like a dream. << -jn das

 

any one who thinks like this, i would say him this:

 

what is the use of consciousness if it cannot perceove truth?

 

>> The truth is I am the only perceiver<<

 

if you think everything is dream,

then it is not real.

so if you jump from 3rd floor terrace, it is dream

and cannot hurt. would you try it?

 

>>The hurting would only be an illusion that I create. Just part of the dream.<<

 

whenyou drive and see red light.

it is just a dream.

cwould you keep goingin red light?

 

>> I may dream I stop or I may dream I keep going. It doesn't matter if there is a wreck or not.The wreck would also be a dream. <<

 

my point is:

 

god did not give consciousness to us

to 'dream' but to see truth as it is,

so that we can decide what good action we an take.

 

>> That god you speak of is also a creation of myself who exists within my dream.<<

 

however all truth cannot be found easily.

it requires sharp intelligence and god's help.

 

>>As above<<

 

tatva darshi can see truth.

(upadekshyanti te gyanam gyaninas tatva darsina).

 

 

[madhav]

>>That god you speak of is also a creation of myself who exists within my dream.<< -theist

 

one who can crated god is god then,

and what he created is not.

 

aaham aadir hi devaanam.. says krishna.

 

who created you,

and who crated one who created you?

and so on.

 

the final answer is krishna, says gita and scriptures.

 

[theist]

Yes this word play can only end in impersonalism. this is where the better material scientists are heading. Unified field and I am that field. All distictions will disappear in theory but they will remain because their desires will still be ruled by the three gunas.

 

The only way past this conundrum comes by the grace of Krsna or His devotee. One moments association with such a soul has more intrinsic value than all the scientific or phiosophical speculations that have been produced on all planets from all time.

 

The devotee is the Way, the Truth and the Life, no soul comes to personal realization but through him.