What is the absolute?

[moksa]

Now that I have finished my degree (with First class honours) I thought it might be nice to share one or two papers that I have written. However there are one or two font problems such as Kçùõa = Krsna but I am sure the drift of the work can be understood.

 

The concept of the Absolute in Hinduism and Buddhism

 

To discuss fully every aspect of the Absolute in Hinduism alone is beyond the scope of this essay. Similarly to give an answer to the concept of the Absolute after possibly three thousand years of philosophical debate would border on arrogance and would be open to much dispute. In light of this it is my intention to first give a brief account of the development of thought through the Vedic tradition into the Upaniùads and the first five major philosophical schools before examining the concept of the Absolute as perceived by possibly the three most influential Vedanta scholars, Śaükara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; finally proceeding to examine notions of the Absolute in Buddhism.

The idea of an Absolute begins in the Vedic tradition and is developed further through the Upaniùads and into other schools of thought. It is not however, until the school of philosophy known as Vedānta that the concept of an Absolute fully develops. In Buddhism the idea is initially avoided by Siddhārtha Gautama (the Buddha) but is seen as not possible by some scholars while it is hinted at by others.

The earliest Veda is accepted as being the èg Veda (Knott 1998:14); it is a collection of myths often with the same event being attributed to different Gods (Flood 1996:46). It is possibly the earliest hint that all the Gods are in fact one but in different manifestations (Hiriyanna 1996:14). The Absolute in the Vedas is more abstract and is more argumentative than this simple explanation. The Creation Hymn (Nāsadīya) (èg Veda 10.129 Doniger O’Flaherty [tr.] 1981:25-26) suggests the notion of an absolute as the beginning of the universe. The ‘one’ (Ekam) is unknown and neither exists nor not exists and is described as being indistinguishable. What is ascertained is that the ‘one’ came before the gods; however, despite being described as singular there is a small paradox in that it becomes the creation and another exists at the end of the hymn, “the one who looks down on it.” However, possibly the most important point of note are verses 3 and 4 which will become even more relevant when discussing the concept of the Absolute in Buddhism; and that is that the ‘one’ arose through heat (tapas) from emptiness. Having said that, Hiriyanna (1996:15-16) points out that it is verse 2 and more precisely ‘that one’ (Tat Ekam) that is the closest concept of the Absolute developed in the Upaniùads to be found in the Vedas.

Virtually all literature on Indian philosophy and Indian monism begins with reference to the concept of brahman as the Absolute in the Upaniùads (Hiriyanna 1996:15-16, 1993:56, Hamilton 2001:14-15, Smart 1964:24, King 1999:44). However, the concept of brahman in the Upaniùads is one of ‘truth’ or ‘Real’ as opposed to the general conception of an absolute. Even the well known phrase “tat tvam asi”, ‘that you are’, may be interpreted as a meaning of reality rather than Absolute. It is not until we begin to explore Indian philosophy and especially Vedānta, the school of philosophy based on the end of the Vedas, that brahman comes to be considered more of an Absolute than merely truth.

It is generally accepted by modern scholars (King 1999:45, Hiriyanna 1993:183) that there are six main schools of philosophical thought in Hinduism; however, not all of these schools believe in an Absolute, and in those that do, the nature of the Absolute is not always agreeable. The first two of these schools, often grouped together because of their similarities, Nyāya and Vai÷eùika tend not to discuss the concept of an Absolute but rather discuss plurality and the independence of categories. Although their emphasis is on plurality, the later scholars such as Udāyana do believe in the existence of a singular God as the creator of all worlds (Potter 1977:527). In this respect he could be seen as a dualist who believes in an Absolute that is independent of the self.

The third and fourth schools, Sāükhya and Yoga, are also usually grouped together. The Sāükhya School has many different theories on the Absolute including monism and dualism (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987:6) and the scholar Aniruddha even goes as far to prove the non-existence of a God (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987:341). The Yoga School is also unclear in its belief of an Absolute. Hamilton (2001:111) discusses the concept of Īśvara as either a dualistic over ‘Lord’ or as a state of yogic practice but gives no clear argument as to which it is.

The Mīmā§sā School of thought connects the concept of brahman to language based upon the Vedas and the Upaniùads. Their ideas keep with the Upaniùads’ concept of brahman being an absolute of truth via language (Coward and Raja 1990:35). While each school of philosophy so far mentioned can relate to a certain aspect of brahman in the Upaniùads, it is language that allows us to identify via names, from names categories and truth can be realized. However, the concept of absolute truth is not precisely the same as an Absolute and the Mīmā§sā scholars although important in initiating and influencing the Vedānta School of thought remain lacking in the concept of an Absolute judged by this paper’s concept of the term as a Universal power.

Although the said mentioned schools have their discussions on the Absolute, these tend to be in retaliation to competing schools by later scholars; it is the school of Vedānta that discussion and quest for the Absolute really begins in Hinduism. It is argued by both Flood (1996:238) and Klostermaier (1998:200) that Vedānta is one of the most important and influential schools of Hindu thought in the realm of theological and ontological debate. It is the emphasis on the concept of brahman in the Upaniùads as an Absolute in the Western sense of the term, a Universal power, that distinguishes Vedānta from the other schools.

Vedānta meaning ‘end of the Vedas’, also known as Uttara Mīmā§sā meaning ‘The Later Exegesis’ contains several scholars and different view points (Potter 1981:3); however, it is generally the case that each of these scholars although interested in various literature, are principally concerned with the interpretation of three main texts, the Upaniùads, the Vedanta Sutras also known as the Brahmasutras or the Sarirakamimamsasutras, and the Bhagavadgita from within the Mahabrahata (Potter 1981:4-5). Although ten main schools of thought each viewing the Absolute differently have developed in Vedanta, three scholars have stood out from the rest, Śaükara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva.

Śaükara, although not the founder (Potter 1981:6) of the Vedānta view of Advaita Vedānta, meaning non-dualism or monism, is accepted as the most important philosopher in Indian thought (Halbfass 1991:132, Smart 1964:97). What he does is to focus on the passages from the Upaniùads, such as Chāïóogya Upaniùad 6.2.1-3 and 6.1.4 that identify ātman (self) with brahman, which he identifies as being the Absolute (Hamilton 2001:125-126). Śaükara then suggests that because all ātman is identical to brahman which is singular, therefore, all ātman must also be singular and the idea of plurality is hence an illusion or māyā. From this, Śaükara deduces that the Absolute is the entire cosmos and is not separate; what we perceive and name as plurality is an illusion. However, because brahman is the only thing that in reality exists, then the illusion is also the Absolute. Śaükara identifies two levels of reality; the higher reality, paramārthika, where the Absolute is perceived as one of pure consciousness and the lower level, vyavahārika, is the reality perceived as illusion (Potter 1991:166). The illusion itself is beyond comprehension and therefore belongs to the higher level; this means that the illusion and the Absolute are one and the same (King 1999:215). King quotes Ramana Maharishi’s summarization of this concept as:

1. Brahman is real.

2. The universe is unreal.

3. The universe is brahman.

However, within the lower level the Absolute is able to take form which it does on occasion in order to pass on wisdom. Śaükara, uses this analogy to permit that pūjā or worship is permissible as a means towards mokùa, however, at some stage one must abandon the concept of the lower reality so that knowledge and hence release can be achieved through the higher level (Smart 1964:100-101). To summarise, Śaükara’s concept of the Absolute is essentially one of monism, everything is the Absolute; however, he makes allowances that occasionally the Absolute decides to manifest as an Īśvara or Godhead within the illusion of itself to depart wisdom. What must be kept in mind is that everything is in truth a manifestation of the Absolute, not merely the Īśvara.

Rāmānuja’s concept of the Absolute challenged the non-dualism of Advaita; although not the first to teach qualified non-dualism, Viśiùñādvaita, he remains the most famous philosopher in this field. What Rāmānuja did was to point out that everything cannot be the Absolute because to say so would suggest that each person was an Absolute individually; thus causing a myriad of different Absolutes which in turn is a contradiction of terms. He furthered this point of view by quoting the Chāïóogya Upaniùad (6.2.3) passage, “Being thought to itself, let me become many” (Hamilton 2001:134). Instead, he argued that there is no illusion but only reality and this worked on two levels. Rāmānuja’s theory was that each person has a body and ātman, while the body changes through age and time, the ātman remains constant. By applying his theory to the cosmos, Rāmānuja was able to suggest that the changing cosmos was the body of the Absolute and not an illusion but that the ātman of the Absolute remains constant. The ‘body’ of the Absolute is the means in which the ātman experiences (Smart 1964:106-114). He maintains a sense of monism by allowing the Absolute to be the inner controller of us all, but each of us remains to a certain extent distinct and pluralistic in nature (Flood 1996:244), much like an arm differs to a leg but the inner controller of the body is said to be the mind. What Rāmānuja was saying is that the Absolute’s monistic nature is the subconscious but our conscious and atman remains, to a certain degree, autonomous as part of the changing ‘body’ in order for the Absolute to experience. Furthermore, Rāmānuja suggests that because the body of the Absolute is the cosmos, it is not only our inner controller but also our outer controller because it influences what we experience, much like a master to his servant; the servant remains to a certain amount autonomous but remains linked to the master’s commands that form an outside influence. Finally, Rāmānuja gives an almost ironic twist to the concept in that not only atman cannot exist without brahman, but brahman cannot exist without ātman (Hamilton 2001:132).

Madhva the leading Dvaita or Dualism scholar, rejected monism altogether and declared that the Absolute was completely separate from its creation. His argument was to stress the differences between objects, including people’s ātman, rather than show their interdependence and similarity. By showing that, no matter how similar things appeared everything in the cosmos was unique and different from everything else, Madhva was able to conclude that the Lord or Absolute was also different from everything else. However, Madhva perceived the Absolute as that which controlled not only the Universe but also our inner selves as an “inner witness” (Flood 1996:246); without the Absolute, nothing would function or exist. Although the Absolute was timeless and resistant to change, its nature caused time and the cosmos to change.

The concept of the Absolute that developed in Indian Buddhism, however, generally rejects the concept of Dvaita given by Madhva, although later schools of Buddhism outside of India that developed ideas such as the concept of the Amida Buddha remarkably mirror Madhva’s thought. It becomes difficult to disassociate the non-Indian ideas that entered such schools of Eastern Buddhist thought because many of them attempt to associate their school with India by the use of Sanskrit and talk of famous Indian teachers such as Nāgārjuna (Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai 1993:542). However, without doubt, the concept of the Absolute in Buddhism remains firmly in the Mahāyāna tradition or more precisely in Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka philosophy. Although pūjā is performed in the Theravādin tradition, even by monks, the concept of an Absolute is not truly accepted within the philosophical tradition. The Buddha in Theravādin philosophical tradition is not perceived as an Absolute, but is worshipped for guidance in much the same way as Confucius in Taiwan.

Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamaka philosophy, rejects the concept of an Absolute as being contradictory to Buddha’s teachings and his own theories that it is not possible for an independent entity to occur and hence only emptiness truly exists (Gethin 1998:240, Hamilton 2001:105). However, his theories were developed by the likes of Bhāvaviveka, Candrakãrti, and Śāntideva to express the concept of emptiness as a kind of Absolute. The idea was based on the doctrine of origination where everything is caused through its relation to something else, for example, one’s past life causes your next life. However, this implies that everything has inner connection that is identical in its true relationship, yet, it also implies that there are two entities that are different from one another (Smart 1964:54). By showing that the inner connection is emptiness, it becomes a kind of Absolute that connects all things. If everything is emptiness then this also applies to nirvāõa and the state of Buddhahood. The Buddha being in nirvāõa becomes emptiness and because it is emptiness that connects the relationship of everything, the Buddha comes to be represented as a kind of Absolute. Having lost his difference in attaining nirvāõa the Buddha becomes one with that which is the same. The concept has many similarities with Śaükara’s concept of mokùa and brahman. However, the reality of an Absolute in Indian Buddhism remains hazy and is often denied because of its empty nature. It truly develops through Wang Yangming Confucian philosophy that blends Chinese Confucian thought with Chan Buddhism and becomes very influential in Japanese Buddhism but this line of thought was developed outside of India and is hence not relevant to this essay.

I have shown a wide range of conflicting concepts of the Absolute in Indian Hinduism and Buddhism that allows me to conclude that there is no one correct concept of the Absolute in either Hinduism or Buddhism. The fact that an Absolute exists within the literature of these two religious traditions is not in doubt even though many would deny its relationship to Buddhism and Hinduism. What is in doubt, however, is the nature of the Absolute and its function in Indian religion; here lies the argument that is only touched upon in the limited scope of this essay.